Sat 19 Feb 2005
The cover story for this month’s Commentary magazine is about what author Podhoretz terms World War IV: the war against radical Islamism. In the article, “The War Against World War IV,” Podhoretz undertakes a broad defense of Bush’s grand strategy against its innumerable critics. The essay itself is quite intriguing and certainly worthy of its prominent status. The writer’s points on the need for democratic transformation, Bush’s resoluteness, and his various attacks on Bush’s critics are all valid. However, I do disagree with Podhoretz on several counts. Most importantly, I question the feasibility of his argument. As I see it, he merely evades discussing feasibility concerns, and never tackles the issue head on.
My first point of contention is with his belief in the ability to democratize by force.
As for democratization, Kesler is of course right: it is a hard thing to do, and it cannot be done overnight. But recognizing this truth is a very far cry from suggesting that it cannot be done at all unless the most stringent conditions are met. The conservative skepticism Kesler preaches on texts from Montesquieu and John Adams is all very well in the abstract; in practice, decades need not be required to get a process under way—to clear the ground and sow the seeds and help to water them as they flower and grow.
Mr. Podhoretz’s wishful thinking in this area–that it’s feasible to install democracy by force–is unfortunately misguided. Constitutional democracy, the model of governance that Washington should seek to encourage abroad, depends on a very conducive political cultural and strong national institutions to support it. Over the course of history, the transition to democracy has been difficult, and true constitutional democracy has only manifested itself after decades or centuries of institution-building, and then only then in areas with a friendly political culture. Whereas areas such as Britain and America have a rich heritage of liberalism and strong political institutions, areas such as Iraq and Syria have an immature political culture and weak political institutions. In India, the path to democracy was paved by centuries of European influence that exposed Indians to new ideas and built up political infrastructure and institutions. In Africa, democracy faltered precisely because it lacked cultural and institutional support.
The most feasible model of democratization is using commerce, ideological exchange, and education to build the groundwork for a gradual introduction of democracy. A climate of economic prosperity and geopolitical stability has traditionally been very conducive to the transition to representative government. A rising bourgeoisie seeks a more active role in governance, and indeed demands good governance; political security allows the country to focus inward, rather than on defeating external threats. Furthermore, Washington cannot expect these democracies to be formed exactly along the lines of liberalism. As Edmund Burke noted, collective groups of people develop differing traditions and precepts over time. Asian democracy is a good demonstration of this. Politics in Asian democracies certainly revolves around voting, but takes on a decidedly more authoritarian flavor than in the West. Fostering democracy in the Middle East involves long-term strategy and nation-building that allows each state to develop its own unique brand of the system. Cataclysmic change generates a strongly reactionary response and instability.
My second point of contention is with his belief that the Bush doctrine signifies a “revolutionary change in the rules of the international game.” This belief bears some merit when applied to terrorism; Bush’s response to radical Islamic terrorism is unprecedented, especially for the United States. However, Bush’s other policies are nothing new. Preemptive war has always been a mainstay of international relations, and wars of aggression have far from disappeared. Promoting democracy and good governance, as well as a capitalist international order, were all among the goals of the old British Empire. The only new facet here is the nature of the danger; a transnational and highly dangerous nemesis. Even then, this threat is somewhat transitory. Soon enough, Al Qaeda will fade into the background (save for if they launch a massive casualty attack with CBRN weaponry) and great power politics in Asia will take center stage.
My third point of contention is with his optimistic view of Iraq’s future.
Suppose, then (as I do), that in a year or so, a duly elected coalition government is in place in Baghdad; that it is guided by a constitution guaranteeing political freedom and minority rights; that the economy is improving; that Iraqi soldiers and policemen have taken over most of the responsibility for dealing with a severely weakened insurgency; that the number of American troops has been reduced to the size of a backup force; and that fewer and fewer Americans are being killed or wounded. What then? Will the realists and their liberal allies bow to this reality? Will they be mugged by reality?
I hold no such optimism as the author does. While I sincerely hope that Iraq becomes a successful democracy and a strong American ally, the signs I see aren’t promising. In fact, the situation is so messy and dynamic that I don’t think any commentator can reasonably know what the future holds. Attacking one’s opponents on a precarious supposition is bad form, and I’ll await the outcome to make a final judgment as to whether Mr. Podhoretz was correct. I’m not hopeful.
My fourth point of disagreement is with the way Podhoretz deals with the issue of opium in Afghanistan. In criticizing the response of the media to elections in Kabul, he suggests they spend less time talking about opium and more time talking about the political triumph of elections. While it’s true that the media gave far less coverage to the election than it deserved, the opium issue is much more important than he makes it out as. Afghanistan’s future in many ways depends on eliminating or at least curtailing the opium trade. This is probably the single most critical issue that must be dealt with in rebuilding the country. It rightfully deserves extensive media attention.
His views on the topic of North Korea are particularly wrongheaded. First, he attempts to disprove the argument that “no viable military options” exist against North Korea.
But can it, I wonder, really be true that no “viable military options” exist for preventing Iran from getting its evil hands on nuclear weapons, and North Korea from deploying or threatening to deploy the ones it evidently already has? Can it really be true that it is beyond the wit and the capabilities of the most powerful nation in the history of the world to devise and execute a strategy for averting something very close to a mortal danger?
This is a perfect example of argument by fallacy. The central argument–that the United States is so powerful it must be able to use a military option–is a fallacy of substitution. General power is not the same as the ability to defeat North Korea in a feasible manner. Podhoretz must actually give a method of defeating North Korea feasibly to disprove the argument that “no viable military options” exist.
The problem for Podhoretz is that no viable military options actually do exist, as I’ve noted before.
In essence, this option consists of the overwhelming application of airpower followed by a rapid ground advance from both coasts of the Korean peninsula. As they argued in a Wall Street Journal editorial piece, “we judge that the U.S. and South Korea could defeat North Korea decisively in 30 to 60 days with such a strategy.” However, this plan has several significant flaws. First, their optimism that overwhelming U.S. airpower would be able to counter North Korea’s impressive 11,000 pieces of artillery is misplaced. While American airpower is certainly dominant, the U.S. presently lacks the capabilities to accomplish such a feat. While high endurance UAVs could saturate the battlefield and provide real-time intelligence on the location of Pyongyang’s artillery batteries, it would take time to vector airborne assets to those locations (the endurance for even the most advanced tactical fighter is relatively short, and it takes time for a fighter to move within range of a target).Meanwhile, the North Korean batteries would be able to pound Seoul and industrialized South Korea with tens of thousands of rounds. The ensuing carnage would kill hundreds of thousands, destroy tens of billions of dollars of wealth, and instantly depress the global economy (to a significant extent). North Korea may also (its nuclear missiles are hidden) launch a nuclear attack against American forces in Japan and Korea, resulting in thousands of American deaths, and devastating damage to the world economy. U.S theater missile defense assets in the area employ primitive kinetic energy kill vehicles, and may or may not successfully defeat a North Korean launch.
The military option is thus overly risky and too costly to be used. The economic damage wrought by even a slightly imperfect campaign would far exceed the dangers of a nuclear North.
In that essay I also disprove his later contention that Bush is actually preparing to launch a military strike upon North Korea.
However, it is what the author did not address in the essay that is most interesting. Podhoretz completely avoided the domestic side of feasibility. Whether or not the Bush doctrine works effectively is in reality unimportant. What is important is that Bush’s policies have overtaxed the country fiscally and militarily. Bush simply does not have the financial resources to continue to fund an aggressive foreign policy. He simply does not have the troop strength to fight any more voluntary wars. (Not to say that he won’t continue to implement his grand strategy of democratization in a more moderate way). Which is why, despite his resoluteness, Bush has, indeed, been “mugged by reality.”