Power Politics

The Financial Times reports that the Bush administration is considering whether to deny newly elected Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a visa in order to prevent him from addressing the United Nations. As journalist Guy Dinmore notes, such a step would be “unprecedented;” in addition to compromising the principles underlying the United Nations as an institution, such a step would fall far afield of Washington’s interests.

Ahmadinejad, a very conservative member of Iran’s ruling elite, was recently elected president of the Persian nation, replacing the relatively moderate Mohammed Khatami. His election was a significant victory for reactionary forces that, while always in ultimate control of the country, acquired a new sense of democratic legitimacy and support. The success of Iran’s hardliners in taking full control of the government irked the Bush administration, which views the reactionaries in Tehran as dangerous and threatening to American interests in the region. Indeed, the election results were a double blow for the Bush administration’s strategic aspirations; the democratic process, which the White House has placed at the forefront of its Middle East policy, resulted in the election of a hostile leader more friendly with the East than the West. Since the Bush administration is unwilling to strike a so-called “grand bargain” with Iran, the election results boded particularly badly for United States foreign policy. The administration is understandably upset; this displeasure has been compounded by allegations that Ahmadinejad was a direct participant in the embassy hostage crisis of 1979, in which hundreds of Americans were held hostage in Iran after the overthrow of the previous pro-American regime.

Yet even supposing that Washington’s hardline stance is proper (which I would contend is not the case), rejecting Ahmadinejad’s visa application is strategically foolish. For one thing, it would serve no important purpose; while some might suggest that it would be a strong and effective censure of the Iranian government, such thinking is foolhardy. Besides Israel, which has a strategic interest in suppressing Iran, no other important nation is yet willing to roundly condemn the regime. In rebuking Ahmadinejad and the Iranian government, Washington would at best stand alone in a pointless exercise in futility.

It would be more detrimental than a mere exercise in futility, however. An exercise in futility is often ignored, or taken as a honorable but token gesture. This would be harmful in three respects. First and most simply, Washington would incur the wrath of the Iranian government and would irrevocably sour its bilateral relations with the Persian state. Tehran would rightly interpret the move as a major and unprecedented diplomatic slap reserved only for Washington’s most reviled enemies. This would push Iran solidly into the orbit of Moscow and Beijing, and seriously erode any chance for a grand bargain. It would thus act to close off future foreign policy options that Washington may one day wish to contemplate

The second harm ensues from the fact that denying Ahmadinejad a visa is most likely against international law. As Stephane Dujarric, a UN representative, observed, “the host country agreement calls on the US not to impose any impediment to the travel to the UN of any representative of a member state on official business.” While the White House is searching for a reason that rejecting the visa application “would be justified under international law,” it’s unlikely to find one. The fact is that such an act would be illegal. While it’s reckless to consider international law fundamentally binding, it nevertheless pays dividends to adhere to it when possible. In disregarding this particular portion of international law, Washington will be weakening it; it will also be squandering precious diplomatic capital that ought to be expended judiciously.

But finally, and most importantly, Washington will be damaging the United Nations, the very institution it should be seeking to promote and rebuild. The UN is today at a particularly critical juncture; mired in the past and dogged by corruption and ineffectiveness, the organization is in dire need of bold reform. Recognizing this, member states have embarked on just such a course. Yet current reform efforts are fragile and troubled, under assault from vested interests and narrowness in vision. It will take significant diplomatic capital and effort for Washington to push through its reform agenda and improve the efficacy of the UN. Rejecting Ahmadinejad’s visa would instead weaken the institution. The UN is, by nature, designed to be a neutral meeting place for all of the world’s nations, no matter how despotic or reviled. In this respect it serves as a crucial forum for diplomacy, where all nations are represented. Whether or not this promotes world peace is debatable; its usefulness as a diplomatic instrument is not. By denying Iran’s leadership the right to fully participate, Washington would reject a fundamental precept upon which the United Nations is based. It would damage the legitimacy of the organization, and undermine its effectiveness as a diplomatic institution. It would counterproductively weaken Turtle Bay at a time when the UN can least afford it.

By suffering harm without accruing any attendant benefits, it is clear that the idea of denying Ahmadinejad a visa should be quickly dismissed. If Foggy Bottom functions with any measure of sensibility, it will be; fortunately enough, this outcome looks likely. Yet the simple fact that this has come under serious consideration reflects the sadly disappointing state of American foreign relations vis-a-vis Iran. If anything, Washington should be considering whether or not to develop closer relations with Tehran. While, due to the complexities of the situation, I would certainly respect a decision by the administration to continue its hardline policies (though I would disagree), all diplomacy involves shades of gray. The debate should be between these shades, not between a hardline policy and an even more hardline one.

An article in yesterday’s Moscow Times explores an issue left dormant for some time, but which nonetheless provides an interesting look at American foreign policy toward the former Soviet republics. At question is the 1997 sale of 21 advanced MiG-29C combat fighters to the United States by Moldova; in particular, a Moldovan court is exploring whether then-defense minister Valery Pasat defrauded the government from the full proceeds of the deal. The government itself only received $40 million from the exchange, which independent analysts valued at upwards of $80 million. Whether or not Mr. Pasat indeed defrauded the government (it seems that he probably did) is immaterial to this analysis, however. Instead, I’ll focus on the fascinating strategic dynamics surrounding the deal.

The US purchase was sparked by concern that the jets could ultimately end up in the hands of Iran. Iran had expressed interest in acquiring the planes, and American intelligence believed that the South Korean firm vying for the contract intended to resell the planes to Tehran after completing the purchase. Fourteen of the MiGs were hard-wired with nuclear launch capabilities, and Washington believed Iran would’ve used the jets to supplement its depleted stock of nuclear capable delivery vehicles. Yet Iran possessed 30 Su-24MK’s (figure 80% serviceable), which are far superior nuclear attack platforms; plenty enough to accommodate it’s strategic objectives in the region. More likely, Iran would have used the planes to reinforce its dilapidated air-to-air combat forces. According to the latest edition of The Military Balance, Iran’s stock of fighters is grounded in aging and outdated platforms. Perhaps Tehran’s most advanced fighters are its 25 F-14’s (60% usable) and 25 MiG-29A’s (about 80% serviceable). Yet these pale in comparison to modern fighter aircraft, and would be easily slaughtered in any air-to-air engagement with Israel, Iran’s primary enemy. The addition of 21 advanced MiG-29C’s, capable and modern fighters, as well as spare parts, would have helped to solidify Iran’s strategic position. Should Tehran have decided to intervene militarily in neighboring Iraq, for instance, the Iraqi air force would’ve been totally outclassed against the new MiGs. Plus Israel would’ve been much more hesitant in intervening, fearing the loss of some fighters to the Iranians. Thus the balance of power would have shifted.

Therefore, in service of containing Iran as well as acquiring a significant sample of relatively advanced Russian military hardware, Washington decided to intervene in the matter. The following deal was struck between the United States and Moldova.

Under an agreement finalized on October 10, the United States acquired 14 MiG 29Cs, described by U.S. officials as wired to permit delivery of nuclear weapons, six MiG 29As, one MiG 29B, 500 air to air missiles and all the spare parts and diagnostic equipment present at the Moldovan air base where the aircraft were stationed. In return, Moldova will receive a cash payment, humanitarian assistance and non lethal excess defense articles such as trucks.

This is an excellent example of very effective diplomacy on the part of the United States.

After learning of the deal, Washington swiftly informed Chisinau of its interest in obtaining the MiG jets. A generous package of cash remuneration, humanitarian assistance, and non-lethal excess defense articles was offered up in exchange for the MiGs and their ancillary equipment. The deal was negotiated under the framework of the cooperative threat reduction (CTR) program, which Moldova had recently been inducted into, and was comparable in structure and composition to previous CTR arrangements. To ensure that Tehran would be unable to secretly raise its monetary payment in response, the US also threatened harsh consequences in terms of trade and relations should the MiGs end up in Persia. Thus the relative cost-benefit scale was pushed sharply in Washington’s favor, for Moldova hardly desired to be on poor terms with the world’s dominant power. Chisinau also benefited in absolute terms, since the American package was quite lucrative. However, in the end, it was the United States that came out the big winner.

This was the first time, at least officially, that the US would be able to conduct detailed examinations and tests on the MiG-29C. The Fulcrum-C, as it’s known, is a formidable and very capable fighter. In terms of performance, it’s comparable to and with upgrades perhaps superior to the F-16; it’s a potentially lethal weapon in the hands of a well trained air force like that of India. However, these planes likely represent the greatest risk to US pilots when in the hands of a small third-world power. Since the US is increasingly moving toward a flexible and distributed deployment of naval units, the amount of airpower available to be concentrated over a specific low-importance area is decreasing. Units like the expeditionary strike group will have to fend for themselves. Thus the risk that a particularly good enemy pilot will be able to get a Fulcrum-C off the ground and take out an American jet becomes rather salient. Were this the only benefit, then it would be mostly insubstantial. In general, the real threat to American forces will come from the Su-27 and its successors.

The MiG-29C, though, also lends insight into other Russian designs. The deal permitted the Pentagon to study and analyze the structure, design, and features of the Fulcrum-C. The US this way acquired a greater understanding of Russian aircraft, as well as new ideas for future American platforms. Furthermore, once detailed examinations are complete, the planes can be used in OPFOR exercises. As the “real thing,” the MiGs will be able to supply participants with highly accurate insights into the combat capabilities and tactics of potential future adversaries. US pilots can train against the MiGs while strategic planners in the Pentagon use them to develop and test new tactics and strategies.

The balance of power in the Middle East was favorably preserved, the United States gained valuable insight from the study of the highly capable MiG-29C, and Moldova received a lucrative payment package; both sides went away better off. Now that’s what I call good diplomacy.

Update: This, on the other hand, seems to have been managed without sufficient tact.

Update II: Yes, definitely.