Power Politics

Ambassador Frank Lavin, who’s served as the US representative to Singapore for four years, recently criticized the island-state’s restrictions on freedom of speech, arguing that the country “will pay an increasing price for not allowing full participation of its citizens.” In and of itself, there’s nothing particularly alarming or newsworthy about this, because Lavin is leaving his post as ambassador. His remarks, moreover, were given during his “farewell dinner.” Both he and the Singaporean government clearly recognized what he was doing: ending his tenure as ambassador by reflecting upon his experiences and then politely suggesting to the government what he thought its leaders were best off doing into the future. He was not acting in an official capacity and his remarks did not announce a change in American policy toward Singapore.

What’s more concerning, however, is that his successor seems intent on making this criticism an official diplomatic issue.

Patricia Herbold, Mr Lavin’s successor, has suggested that the Bush administration might be preparing to take a tougher line on Singapore’s human rights record.

Ms Herbold, a lawyer and Republican fundraiser, told a US Senate hearing on her confirmation that she would continue a dialogue that Washington has with Singapore regarding the openness of its society and its political system.

US-Singapore relations have improved steadily since late 1980s, when Singapore accused the US of interfering in its internal affairs by alleging that the US embassy had secretly provided financial support to an opposition politician.

If Herbold does indeed “take a tougher line on Singapore’s human rights record,” it would be a costly diplomatic miscalculation for the United States: devoid of an upside, such a move would only risk retrenching US-Singapore relations.

Singapore is unique among states for having successfully developed a managed society. The government (and economy) is run by a bureaucracy of highly competent technocrats led by a small group of central figures. It is, for all intents and purposes, government by elite meritocracy; yet, despite the fact that the government is vested with a tremendous amount of power, Singapore is one of the least corrupt countries in the world. Due to a variety of factors, ranging from its Confucian culture to its compactness and homogeniety, Singapore has grown prosperous under this system of authoritarian governance; its economy is among the world’s most modern and sophisticated and its citizens are very well off.

Simply because the United States dislikes the illiberal flavor of Singapore’s government does not mean that Washington ought to pressure Singapore into becoming more American. The American system of liberal democracy works well for America, and the Singaporean system of authoritarianism works well for Singapore. Washington should respect that it does not hold a monopoly on legitimate political philosophy, and accept that other countries are better off under other systems of governance.

In this case, there’s absolutely no reason for the White House to pressure Singapore over the issue of the latter’s “human rights record.” Singaporeans prefer strict authoritarianism, and it’s their right to maintain it as they so choose. In any case, if change comes, it will come endogenously; the people of Singapore are exposed to all manners of foreign ideas, and will decide for themselves what they want. There’s already been, in fact, a loosening of the city-state’s famously harsh injunctions against such things as selling chewing gum (now legal for “dental” purposes) and gambling (the government has authorized the construction of a casino). More change will come in time, at the pace that Singapore desires. I trust Singapore, a modern and cosmopolitan nation-state, to be mature enough to make its own decisions over how it reacts (to borrow a Russian word) to public nyekulturny.

In any event, there’s a more practical reason why the United States should not press this issue. Singapore is fiercely protective of its sovereignty and independence, and will react harshly to any attempt by American officials to intervene in its domestic affairs. Washington needs Singapore as a strong ally to police the critical sealanes of Southeast Asia, mitigate the risk of war between Indonesia and Malaysia, and balance China’s growing power. There’s no need to introduce a strain on this key bilateral relationship when any such “gains” begotten by the new policy will only be Pyrrhic and illusory.

Fortunately enough, based on the actual statement the incoming-ambassador delivered, it seems as if the claim that Herbold intends to “take a tougher line on Singapore’s human rights record” is overstated. Of course the warning still stands, and Singapore is pretty sensitive about such matters, but the Bush administration seems to be deemphasizing the “human rights” aspect of relations. Since governments rarely blunder so badly, and since it seems likely that Herbold is perceptive enough not to really press Singapore over the matter, I’m fairly confident that this will be a nonissue. Nevertheless, the aforesaid argument had to be made.

The post-war Japanese political order, though nominally liberal, has in reality been among the most authoritarian in the democratic world. Policy has been drafted and enacted secretively by the political elite, and consensus policymaking has been the rule in governance. Like neighboring Singapore, the government has taken an active role in centrally planning a form of market economics; likewise, the government has also maintained an active role in regulating social conduct. Burkean analysts would ascribe this form of authoritarian democracy, a staple of Asian politics, as being rooted in fundamental cultural values (most prominently the Confucian system of ethics). I think that puts it best.

Yet, as Burke would be quick to recognize, culture is just a layer upon fundamental human nature; culture morphs, shapes, and regulates human nature, but cannot supersede it. And when confronted with a decrepit and stagnating system of government that has failed the people and is in desperate need of change, not even the strongest authoritarian streak will prevent the body politic from eventually challenging the status quo.

Junichiro Koizumi, who became Prime Minister in 2001, can be viewed as an expression of this deterministic process. For more than a decade, Japan had labored under economic stagnation and a failed political system; poor government planning and a fundamentally flawed system of political economy demonstrated clearly the need for change. Koizumi, following in the footsteps of Japan’s other great Westernizers, promised massive structural reform. With an unprecedented visibility in the media and popular perception, Koizumi pledged to restore good governance to Japan and restart the sagging economy. He exploited the techniques of mass electioneering, heretofore largely absent from Japanese politics, and received an unprecedented degree of public support and enthusiastic backing.

And so it was something of a disappointment when Koizumi failed to fully embrace his grand vision once in office. Instead, he started his term by adopting a policy of conservatism and incrementalism, embracing reform but unwilling or unable to impose a radical overhaul. He made economist Heizo Takenaka his point-man, first in reforming the badly debilitated banking sector and then in instituting a variety of sensible macroeconomic structural adjustments. The economy resurged, and has since entered into a period of growth that many analysts contend is finally sustainable. There is no doubt that sound economic reform and leadership on the part of Koizumi aided in the economic recovery; yet, as economists have aptly contended, the recovery was mostly the result of natural economics and private sector reform.

While Koizumi adopted a policy of incremental change in economic policy, his foreign policy has been characterized by anything but. Compelled by both the strategic environment and his own ideology, Koizumi has wrought dramatic changes in Japan’s security posture. He has forcefully promoted loosening the restraints on military action, and has sought to add a greater offensive component to the already powerful Japanese forces. He has placed a greater emphasis on the traditional tools of geopolitical statecraft, and has strengthened Tokyo’s security alliance with Washington. Cognizant of geopolitics, Koizumi has taken a more assertive posture toward China and particularly toward securing scarce energy resources. In effect, he has normalized Japanese foreign policy, turning the country from pacifism to a form of realism.

In 2004, Koizumi, in an effort both to repair the government’s fiscally unsound pension system and to deflect fallout from a growing pension scandal, put into law an ambitious pension reform scheme that reduced benefits in order to bring the system into sounder fiscal health. Although in absolute terms the reform effort was rather limited, it stirred great controversy in Japan; Koizumi’s approval ratings took a prodigious hit, but he survived. Nevertheless, this effort at ambitious reform foreshadowed Koizumi’s next political gambit, which was truly earth shattering.

In 2005, Koizumi took what seemed to be the biggest gamble of his political career. He introduced legislation to (albeit slowly) privatize Japan Post, one of the pillars of post-war Japanese society. To understand the sheer audacity behind the move, one must first understand exactly what Japan Post is. It is not just Japan’s national post office. It is also the country’s largest savings bank (and the largest bank in the world), responsible for financing many of the government’s favored initiatives. Through countless local branch officers, Japan Post became a key employer and a key pillar of social stability. Even more, it became the key to LDP electoral success. (The LDP has ruled Japan for the past fifty years, and is the party of Prime Minister Koizumi.) Local postmasters provided financial support to the party, and were instrumental in convincing local voters to simply choose the LDP ticket every election. This made the LDP almost invulnerable, and guaranteed it political dominance. By proposing to dismantle Japan Post, Koizumi sought not only to remove one of Japan’s key social institutions, but in the process also destroy the LDP’s lock on power.

Angry and embittered over the move, legislators in the Upper House threatened to reject the bill. Koizumi in return threatened to dissolve the Lower House and throw the country into political upheaval. LDP rebels rejected the legislation, perhaps believing him to be bluffing; Koizumi immediately dissolved the Lower House, and launched Japanese politics into turmoil. He threw dissenting LDP legislators (the old guard) out of the party, and sent in celebrity candidates (assassins) to defeat them in the polls. In a single stroke, he smashed the conventions of traditional Japanese politics and remade the LDP into a party modeled after his own vision.

In light of what happened, an interesting new possibility has emerged. First brought to my attention by Strategic Forecasting, it makes a great deal of sense. Keep in mind that Koizumi is an absolutely brilliant political strategist and sharp political observer. Then note that the greatest obstacle to his agenda has been the old guard of the LDP, who chafe at reform and adhere to the old political order. There was no conceivable way for him to rid the party of these rebels, who would vociferously block his major reform efforts at every turn… or was there? Recall what the contest over postal reform has done: it has smashed the old political order and enabled Koizumi to expel the old guard from his own party. In one bold stroke, it removed the greatest institutional stumbling blocks to massive reform. Stratfor’s view is that Koizumi might very well have engineered this fight from the start, holding back on major structural reform so that he could successfully eliminate the one big factor preventing it. This grand strategic view makes a great deal of sense logically and from what I know of Koizumi’s brilliance, and I must say I’ve been persuaded by it. Although I have always been supportive of the Prime Minister, this boosts my respect for him tremendously. He will easily be among the greatest Japanese Prime Ministers in history.

As far as Monday’s election is concerned, I wholeheartedly support Koizumi and the LDP. The LDP rebels are entirely out of sync with reality, and unfit to govern Japan. The DPJ (the opposition party) holds more promise, and has an even more boldly reformist agenda than Koizumi. Yet the party is weak in two areas. First, its grand strategy is unfit for Japan in the current East Asian security climate. Second, and more importantly, the party is a young and untested amalgam of views. Formed under a decade ago, it is compromised of a mix of ideologies and political philosophies only broadly united in opposition. It has not yet had time to coalesce into a mature political actor and has yet to solidify its views in a broad overarching ideology and framework for governance. I fear that a DPJ government would be ineffective, just as the one previous opposition government was (it collapsed very quickly). Japan needs effective and stable leadership at this crucial moment of reform.

Koizumi is not as radical a reformist as the leaders of the DPJ are, and his diplomacy is occasionally impolitic. Yet he’s dedicated to major structural reform, proven himself to be an effective leader, conducted an intelligent foreign policy, and smashed down the old guard in Japanese politics. His second term promises to be even more successful. I only wish America had a leader as competent and successful as he is.

As I have discussed before, one of the key trends in Asia is Japan’s gradual shift to a more assertive foreign policy paradigm. The reasons behind this transition are primarily geopolitical: the rise of China and India, along with the change from bipolar stability during the Cold War to anarchic competition today, have forced Japan to place greater emphasis on power politics and military deterrence. But the cultural opprobrium against force has also weakened, although it still remains an integral part of Japanese culture. Meanwhile, Junichiro Koizumi, Japan’s powerful Prime Minister, strongly supports a return to traditional geopolitical statecraft, which has greatly accelerated the trend.

This paradigm shift has manifested itself in a variety of ways, not least through the transformation of security policy. Although ignored by many observers, Japan’s military has long been among the world’s most technologically advanced and preeminent. While by design centered around defending Japanese territory, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) are extremely well armed and very well trained. Spending upwards of $40 billion annually on defense, Japan has ensured that its forces are equipped with the finest equipment money can buy. Aside from the United States, in fact, Japan is Asia’s most capable conventional military power.

Nevertheless, the Japanese military has been restrained by law from engaging in many types of coercive actions. Under the Constitution, for instance, military action not of a purely defensive nature is outlawed. Defense cooperation between Japanese firms and international contractors is greatly restricted by other legal impediments. Until recently, Japanese forces required time-consuming and very high level authorization to even shoot down a missile approaching the islands.

This has begun to change. For the first time ever, Japan deployed troops into a warzone when it participated (in a non-combat role) in the rebuilding of Iraq. Japan has stepped up patrols along its disputed maritime border with China, and used its military forces in service of securing much needed energy resources. Japan’s ban on arms exports, meanwhile, has come under serious scrutiny.

Although Koizumi has kept the entire Japanese government on an austerity budget for the past three years, this year the military is planning on increasing spending to $44 billion.

The defense budget for the next year includes 150 billion yen for missile defenses, including a new three-billion-yen package for joint development with the United States of a sea-based system to intercept ballistic missiles.

The idea of developing a joint anti-missile system was initiated after North Korea fired a suspected ballistic missile over Japan and into the Pacific in 1998.

The anti-missile shield will consist of land-based Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) interceptor missiles and seaborne Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptors.

The Defense Agency also plans to buy a helicopter carrier, a mine-sweeper and submarines for a total of 182 billion yen, the official said.

Additionally, it wants to acquire six F-2 fighters for 76 billion yen, 11 tanks for 8.9 billion yen and 20 helicopters, he added.

This should come as no surprise, and future increases in the military budget are to be expected. There have even been rumors that the United States is considering whether to authorize F/A-22 sales to Tokyo; the F/A-22 is the world’s most advanced air superiority fighter, and selling it to another government would be quite a statement. I personally doubt that Washington will do so anytime soon, but it underlines the dramatic shift in Japan’s security policy. The move to an offensively capable force will, it seems, come sooner rather than later for Tokyo.

Bill Gertz reports today that a prominent Chinese democracy activist believes that the threat of nuclear war between China and the United States is “substantial”. As one of the “leading international advocate[s] for political reform in China,” Wei Jingsheng is a strong opponent of the Chinese government; his authority must be taken with a large grain of salt, since he has ulterior reasons to engender American hostility to the regime in Beijing. Nevertheless, Wei is a noteworthy observer of Chinese politics and raises some interesting points during the interview.

Mr. Wei said he has heard from government officials in China, including some within the military, who are worried by the growing chance of a nuclear war.

Among Wei’s arguments, this is one of the weakest. He is asking the reader to accept, on his word, that some in the Chinese government are “worried by the growing chance of a nuclear war.” Since this is an unverifiable claim, it’s impossible to say if it’s right or wrong. However, as I noted above, Wei is no impartial scholar; he has a direct interest in portraying Beijing as a serious threat. While there may be some truth in the statement, it’s unpersuasive in proving his larger contention. China, like any great power, has sought and will continue to seek to guarantee its security. In the modern age, nuclear weapons are a vital component of great power security, as India has recently demonstrated. There is nothing unusual or particularly concerning about China now building up its arsenal, which has been woefully inadequate for some time. Wei’s contacts, if anything, are most likely opposed on ideological grounds to this nuclear buildup and just expressing their concern and opposition.

Recent Chinese military exercises and a Chinese general’s threat to use nuclear missiles against U.S. cities are two signs of the danger, said Mr. Wei, who has an office in Washington.

Regarding the former, it’s difficult to twist the exercises into a portent of nuclear danger. The military exercises were clearly designed, in part, to send a message to the United States. But it’s far from clear that the message threatened any sort of war. Rather it signaled that Washington ought not press China militarily; it was a demonstration of China’s military deterrent. China, if anything, wants to avert a direct war with the United States, not start one.

As for the latter, I previously covered that here. Even if Zhu was acting under the authority of the central government, however, it still wouldn’t augur a heightened risk of nuclear war; it would then be another example of deterrence, trying to avoid any sort of war by threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

“In the past, China may have felt that it was not time for them to confront the U.S.,” Mr. Wei said. “Now, things are different. Now the Chinese feel that they need to use these kind of nuclear threats. China is very serious about that. The nuclear threat from China is a substantial threat, not theoretical.”

Wei is absolutely correct that the Chinese have been hesisant about directly confronting the United States; in a way they still are, although that’s beginning to change. As China has grown in power and strength, it has been less concerned about American coercive diplomacy. Beijing is more willing now to come into opposition with Washington when its national interests are at stake. Talking up its deterrence capabilities is an example of this, because having a nuclear deterrent gives China greater freedom of action. A deterrent is, by definition, however, used to prevent military action. The Chinese are not looking to provoke a war, they are looking to force Washington to back down.

Politically, differences between Mr. Hu and Vice President Zeng Qinghong, who in the past was considered a Jiang loyalist, appear to have been resolved temporarily, Mr. Wei said.
The accommodation appears related to a decision to use force in the future against Taiwan, Mr. Wei said, adding that Mr. Hu favors a conflict as a way to consolidate power over the military.

Wei expects the reader to accept this rather shocking conclusion just on his word. Coming from a biased source without verification, that would be incredibly unwise. Let’s see some proof first.

China’s leadership is divided by factions headed by Mr. Hu and former President Jiang Zemin, Mr. Wei said. Additionally, there are elements within the military who think that a war to retake Taiwan should begin as soon as possible, Mr. Wei said.
“There are many conflicts within the military,” he noted.

There are have been many conflicts within the American military too; MacArthur’s desire to attack the Chinese with nuclear weapons during the Korean war comes to mind. Yet despite the fact that the United States gives its theater commanders a great deal of operational authority, that idea was dramatically crushed. In China, the central government maintains a far stronger grip over the military, and the prospect of a rogue military officer being able to force a great power war is relatively small; even if somehow a war came about that way, the Chinese leadership would quickly put an end to it before nuclear weapons became involved.

Mr. Wei also said that social unrest is growing rapidly in China and that hundreds of demonstrations in recent months have weakened Communist Party rule.
In Chinese history, he said, unrest has been a sign that a ruler is about to fall, prompting concern among Beijing’s communist leaders.

This is Wei’s most persuasive case. Indeed, the only credible factor that could lead Beijing to invade Taiwan would be the threat of a revolution. Yet even supposing a war over Taiwan broke out (possible but nevertheless highly unlikely), there’s little reason to think that China and America would get entangled in a nuclear war. Neither side would have an incentive to broaden the war to anything even approaching that.

In the end, the fact is that China’s leadership is rational. There is absolutely nothing to gain out of a nuclear exchange, and a great deal to lose. The prospect of Hu or his successors bringing the country into a nuclear war with the United States is so remote that it’s barely worth discussing. Wei raises some interesting points, but is ultimately unpersuasive.

The Deccan Herald reports that India is developing a three-stage indigenous intercontinental ballistic missile.

India will soon develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a flight range of 9,000-12,000 km.

According to sources in the ministry of defence (MoD), based on the experience with the Agni, the medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), the MoD is pressing for the creation of an ICBM.

The ICBM would probably be a three-stage ballistic missile with solid fuel rockets in the first and second stages, and a liquid propellant rocket in the third stage. The launch weight of the missile may reach 270-275 tonnes and an impact error of around 2 to 2.8 km, the sources said.

The missile may have a 2,490-3,490 kg releasable front section with two to three warheads of 15-20 kilotons each, the sources added.

There are plans to use the second stage propellant engine of the Vikas booster rocket during the development of this missile to increase its flight range. The ICBM is likely to be test-fired by 2008 and is expected to be added to the Indian armed forces’ deterrence arsenal by 2015.

Defense Industry Daily argues that, contrary to what the Herald has reported, the ICBM will probably have an impact error substantially less than the cited 2 to 2.8 kilometers.

Note that CEP impact errors of this magnitude make such missiles useful for city targeting only - this is not precise enough to attack hardened bases, especially given 15-20 kiloton (kT) warheads that are roughly the size of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs.

Those figures may also be wrong, as even basic modern inertial guidance plus stellar update should provide CEPs of under 1 km. By comparison, current Chinese CSS-9 (DF-31) ICBMs have an estimated CEP of 0.3 km, and the late 1980s technology Russian SS-18 Mod 4 ICBMs had an estimated CEP of 0.5 km. Even Russia’s SS-9 ICBM, which was phased out by 1979, had an est. CEP around 1.2 km. As one might imagine, the U.S. D-5 Trident II submarine launched missile has an est. CEP around 0.1 km, as do its land-based Minuteman III ICBMs.

There are two important details to note here. First is the stated range, 9,000-12,000 kilometers. I’ve created a graphical illustration of the targets within range (supposing the launching point is Hyderabad, which is where analysts speculate the ICBMs could be based), which I suggest you take a look at. The red circle represents the area that can be attacked if the ICBM ends up having a range of at least 12,000 kilometers, which is likely for several reasons. First, the planned timetable for the development of the ICBM is rather lengthy. Although testing will begin in 2008, deployment is not projected to occur until 2015. This will give Indian engineers a great deal of time to refine and enhance the missile’s design; in fact, the Herald article notes that there are already plans to try to increase the ICBM’s range beyond the original plans. Unless the Indians run up against significant stumbling blocks (unlikely but possible), the range might in fact turn out to exceed 12,000 kilometers (and thus fall into the blue zone on the map). Second, the ministry of defence is already comfortable and familiar with the technology being employed in the new ICBM, and there are no serious technological hurdles that must be dealt with. Finally, in the future, this project will only become more important to Indian defense strategists, and will likely enjoy a considerable level of political support.

In any case, one can clearly see the sheer scope of the areas India would be able to strike with the new ICBM. Every major world and regional power (with the glaring exception of many countries in the Americas, such as the United States) would be vulnerable to Indian nuclear forces, including China, Russia, Japan, Australia, France, and Britain. If the Indians are able to extend the range beyond 12,000 km, the continental United States and Brazil would also be a viable targets.

The second detail to note is the payload. According to Indian sources, the missile will carry “two to three warheads of 15-20 kilotons each.” This is a substantial allotment of firepower; each warhead, as DID noted, is comparable to those used against Japan at the end of World War II. With two to three warheads on each ICBM, the devices are clearly designed to be city-killers; there will be no using these on the tactical battlefield. In fact, as India’s nuclear technology grows more advanced (perhaps with help from Israel, the United States, or Russia), it’s more than likely that the ICBMs will be upgraded with a heavier payload in the future.

The fact that India is developing highly destructive ICBMs with a global reach is an unsurprising but still significant milestone in its ascent to great power status. In the world today, there are only two countries that can be considered world powers but that lack nuclear weapons. In Japan, cultural and strategic factors have prevented it from becoming a nuclear power, but it retains the capability to rapidly field nuclear weaponry. In Germany, which may or may not be considered a world power, deeply entrenched cultural and strategic factors have also stopped nuclearization; this may someday change, however. In any case, India is not nearly as constrained. It already possesses short and medium range nuclear weapons (built in order to counter regional security threats from Pakistan and China), and has an active nuclear program. The development of a global strategic deterrent is the next logical step in this progression, especially as India moves into the elite realm of the powers of the highest order. Deploying a global nuclear deterrent is the key step in creating a strong national defense system, which will allow it to pursue its interests in a broader fashion while still protecting itself both from retaliation and the military designs of rival powers. New Delhi is recognizing its widening stature and responding quite rationally to insulate itself from the threats faced by the great powers.

This trend will only intensify as India grows more powerful and Asia more anarchic; expect to see a greater emphasis in India on global nuclear deterrence and defense in the future.