Power Politics

Walter Pincus of the Washington Post reports on the development of new nuclear warheads at the Pentagon. Mr. Pincus’ report treats the issue very fairly, putting it in the context of overall defense posture while also describing opposition to the plans.

Saying that the current Cold War stockpile is inadequate technically and militarily, Linton F. Brooks, administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, told the Senate Armed Services subcommittee on strategic forces, “We want to explore whether there is a better way to sustain existing military capabilities in our stockpile absent nuclear testing.”

This issue should really be divided into two different segments, changing the nuclear force posture and modernizing the nuclear arsenal. Modifying the US nuclear force posture is highly controversial, contentious, and risky. Debate today primarily revolves around the introduction of the bunker busting nuclear penetrator, as well as changes in the size and composition of the tactical nuclear arsenal. Modernizing the stock of nuclear warheads and missiles, on the other hand, is less provocative. More a matter of technical efficiency, incorporating advances in nuclear technology into a new series of upgraded warheads would not change the American nuclear force posture, and would have an insignificant impact on the strategic balance of power. Perhaps more importantly, it would consist only in following a precedent laid out by Moscow, reestablishing nuclear parity with the Kremlin.

Many in the United States have taken issue with the President’s plans to overhaul Washington’s tactical nuclear force posture, and rightfully so. The addition of a greater range of advanced tactical nuclear weapons would be a counterproductive and wasteful policy.

But he insisted that the yields of most of the nuclear warheads in the current stockpiles, built to attack Soviet hard targets, “are probably too high.” Because their casings were not designed to penetrate earth, “we have no capability against hardened, deeply buried targets.” He also described the current stockpile as “unsuited for some specialized missions” caused by post-Cold War situations.

I have written in opposition to bunker busting penetrators several times before, more recently here. As I noted in the earlier piece:

There are a great number of reasons why Washington would be well advised not to venture down this path. First and foremost, several studies have shown that these penetrators would be only marginally effective at best. There would be no practical way to shield the target region from radioactive fallout, and while the payload of these penetrators would be significantly greater than conventional munitions, they would suffer from the same limitations on capabilities. The fact is that as bunker technology becomes increasing advanced, and bunkers are built deeper into the ground, neither convention nor nuclear munitions will be able to successfully defeat it. The key is isolating these compounds by sealing off entrances and links to the outside world. This can be accomplished much more efficiently with the use of precision guided bombs.

Second, the political implications of embarking on advanced research or early development of the bomb are enormous. It sends a dangerous signal to countries around the world that new nuclear development is welcome, at a time when nuclear proliferation has become especially perilous. It thus weakens the international inspection regime, which very much depends on mutual trust and cooperation. Merely using the bomb in combat would usher in a new era of warfare and danger that cannot be reversed. The application of light nuclear force legitimizes it in the eyes of all other nuclear powers, and that can never be taken away. Soon, others, such as Russia, would use such weapons in their own wars. Many countries currently forsaking nuclear devices would seek to acquire them to guarantee security. The yield on the nuclear weapons that are used would gradually escalate and soon get out of hand. And that spells international disaster.

Third, the projected costs of the program would be better spent elsewhere. The Pentagon would gain far more value out of purchasing more planes or ships than investing in this useless program. There are more important priorities within the nuclear division itself, even. Russia is modernizing its ICBMs and nuclear forces in order to make them more effective and potent against the threats of the 21st century. The United States should do the same. Nothing so threatening as to amass more nuclear weapons, but simply an upgrade program to strengthen the backbone upon which the international peace rests.

More on the third point later. These arguments may also be applied to tactical nuclear devices in general. The first-use of tactical nuclear devices is politically untenable, and the mere development of a new generation of these weapons would endanger the international arms control framework that the US and Soviet Union managed to establish. The military value of tactical nuclear weapons to the United States is dubious. Although they could be used in a war against an equal weight nemesis (such as China) to good effect, their effectiveness against rogue nations is highly questionable. The US military has enough firepower to absolutely devastate these nations, while facing relatively minor costs and risks, as is. Employing a nuclear device would add nothing to this impressive array of firepower, and indeed present complications for soldiers on field as they advance through irradiated and devastated territory. Rebuilding efforts would be completely compromised by public distrust, contaminated local resources, and extensive ecological devastation.

In essence, there’s absolutely no good reason to use tactical nuclear weapons against rogue states. Against an equal weight power, their use may be militarily justified, but would be completely unacceptable from a strategic point of view (their employment would lead to nuclear retaliation, global devastation, and, in many cases, the escalation of a proxy conflict to total warfare). The fact that the White House continues to push for the development of these weapons publicly only contributes to a worsening of America’s image abroad, providing cannon-fodder for propagandists seeking to show the United States as an aggressive militaristic empire.

The issue of modernization is, in my view, less provocative and far more beneficial. Unlike the policies I just discussed, modernization involves no significant strategic shifts. It’s far more technical than political; a matter of capabilities rather than strategy.

A bit of theory is in order. Nuclear weapons are perhaps the most potent deterrent sought by any state. Due to their sheer destructive power (the power to obliterate all that the enemy is fighting for, and indeed to end the world as we know it), any nation that possesses them is almost totally invulnerable from direct invasion. Proxy wars, low-intensity conflict, and localized fire-fights remain within the realm of possibility, but total war is eliminated as a viable option. The power of nuclear weapons is what kept the Cold War cold, and what maintains a solid peace between Russia, China, the US, and India. Maintaining this arsenal is thus critical to the security of the nation, and keeping it up to date ensures that potential adversaries will think twice before deciding they hold the power to subvert the arsenal.

The Kremlin, well versed in the realities of power, recognizes this fact. In the past decade, it has undertaken a program of modernization for its nuclear weapons. Russia developed a new class of more reliable, more efficient, and more effective missiles and warheads. It’s currently in the process of upgrading its stock of nuclear weapons with the new technology. In response to the White House’s renewed commitment to developing a nuclear defense shield, Moscow has designed a nuclear missile than can evade kinetic energy kill systems. It will likely sell this technology to India and China. In this way, the nuclear balance of power is maintained.

Washington, for its part, is looking to comparably enhance its strategic forces, augmenting them with newer technology and, hopefully, improved delivery platforms.

Brooks said money for the feasibility study would be taken from what Congress approved last year to initiate a so-called Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program that was originally proposed to study replacement parts for current warheads, designed almost 30 years ago and now being updated.

Those funds and new ones added in the proposed fiscal 2006 budget would be used “to begin concept and feasibility studies on replacement warheads or warhead components that provide comparable military capabilities to existing warheads,” Brooks said.

If those studies produced a feasible program, he added, by 2012 to 2015 “we should be able to demonstrate through a small build of warheads that a reliable replacement warhead can be manufactured and certified without nuclear testing.”

This modernization program is long overdue. The US has fallen behind Russia in updating its aging stock of strategic nuclear weapons. More effective, reliable, and efficient nuclear devices yield only benefits for the national defense.

The Washington Post has a report on the Pentagon’s recent moves to militarize space. The article is framed within the context of arms control, particularly as it relates to a set of recent conferences on space militarization. Representatives from Russia, China, and an assorted group of thinktanks have recently issued statements condemning Washington’s policy agenda in this area, and the article approaches the issue from that perspective.

In any case, the Post story touches upon one of the most important aspects of security policy in the 21st century: space. The global economy has increasingly come to rely on the use of satellites in Earth orbit for communications, commerce, and travel. This space infrastructure is also vital to American intelligence agencies and the armed forces. Satellite reconnaissance (although in some ways being eclipsed by the use of unmanned aerial vehicles) is essential for monitoring potential hostile agents, safely tracking troop movements and exercises, and a variety of other important intelligence gathering tasks. The US military is extremely reliant on space infrastructure; the functions of aerial attack, communications, command, logistics, and movement are all irrevocably tied into the constellations of US satellites. Should this space infrastructure ever be destroyed or suffer massive damage, the consequences to both the global economy and American security would be tremendously detrimental. Worldwide depression, massive US losses, and global destabilization are all within the realm of possibility. Meanwhile, the exploitation of space for offensive purposes promises to yield rich rewards; the Pentagon, for example, is currently exploring technology that would enable America to launch decisive aerial attacks both through space (originating in the United States itself) and from space.

The Pentagon is developing a suborbital space capsule that could hit targets anywhere in the world within two hours of being launched from U.S. bases.

It is therefore exceedingly critical that this space infrastructure be protected from all potential threats. Furthermore, considering the significant advantages granted to any military force through space infrastructure, the ability to deny a wartime enemy use of space infrastructure is similarly important. It is therefore in the essential national interests of the United States to develop systems of this nature, and thus to militarize space. Recognizing this truth, strategic planners at the Pentagon have mapped out a comprehensive future plan for satisfying American interests in space. Described in a series of recent documents (beginning with the 2002 report on national defense strategy and continuing), this map includes both offensive and defensive components.

A series of Pentagon doctrinal papers, released over the past year, have emphasized that the U.S. military is increasingly dependent on space satellites for offensive and defensive operations, and must be able to protect them in times of war.

The Air Force in August put forward a Counterspace Operations Doctrine, which described “ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains space superiority” and has worked to develop weapons to accomplish such missions.

On March 1, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld signed a new National Defense Strategy paper that said the use of space “enables us to project power anywhere in the world from secure bases of operation.” A key goal of Rumsfeld’s new strategy is “to ensure our access to and use of space and to deny hostile exploitation of space to adversaries.”

The US push to militarize space is being rapidly propelled along due to two factors. First is the rise of China as a competitor in space. Beijing is actively seeking to neutralize the American advantage in space, and thus correspondingly to enhance its military power relative to that of the United States. Since Washington’s domination of space currently provides US forces with greatly augmented strength and capabilities, China can gain significantly by reducing Washington’s ability to leverage this advantage. An international agreement not to militarize space would leave the American satellite constellations vulnerable and unprotected, a weakness that China could then exploit with the anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons it’s certainly developing. Even the mere threat of downing the US satellite system could be enough to keep American out of a Chinese-Taiwanese war. China is also undertaking a crash program to exploit the benefits of space for itself. It’s participating in a European rival to the GPS system, working on developing space launch technology, and generally preparing to make its own forays into space. When its technology is sufficient, China will almost certainly make an attempt at militarizing space for Chinese interests. The US is concerned about this, and wants to head Beijing off.

The second reason is, as mentioned earlier, just how reliant the US government and economy have become on the space infrastructure.

The measures under consideration speak volumes about exactly how the government feels that American interests are at stake in space. These are not proposals to mount weapons of mass destruction or high powered armaments on space platforms; the former is politically unwise and untenable, the latter is currently unfeasible. These measures are reasonable responses to a realistic problems. The problems are the vulnerability of the satellite constellations and the future exploitation of space by China. The solutions are anti-satellite weaponry, satellite defenses, and the ability to leverage space for limited forward offensive operations.

Off topic note: Apologies for my absence — I’ve been writing a lengthy essay on China and North Korea, which should be ready for posting soon.

The New York Times reports that Washington is gearing up for a big clash over the 2005 round of base closure that will be coming to a head on May 16th. The previous round of base realignment and closure (BRAC) featured pitched Congressional battles, as interest groups around the country mobilized to protect local interests. This round will undoubtedly be characterized by vicious clashes as well, since, as the NYT reports, the affected areas are pulling out all the stops. Interest groups, high-powered lobbyists, popular governors, and frightened Congressmen will all be converging upon Capitol Hill in an effort to block the closures.

There is no doubt that at least some of the bases in question will remain open owing to political considerations. As noted in the article, the amount of pressure being applied to Congress over this is quite intense; the star-power of some lobbyists alone makes it an extremely tough fight for the Pentagon to win. Coupled with bipartisan skepticism and a vested political interest in preserving the bases as a source of dependable employment, these lobbying efforts will hold great sway. Unfortunately, since President Bush has decided to spend his political capital elsewhere, I’m not optimistic that a big dent can be made in this last scheduled round of BRAC. However, it looks like at least some of the decaying arsenal bases, as well as other bases serving a dated purpose, will be shutdown. Closing these opportune targets would be a big victory for military efficiency.

In policy terms, the BRAC process is highly beneficial for US forces. At a time when chronic undersupply problems plague forces in Iraq, and Congress has been forced to cut spending on key future defense programs because of budgetary constraints, squeezing out inefficiency at the notoriously poor-spending Defense Department is an essential goal. In fact, previous rounds of BRAC “yielded savings of $28.9 billion through 2003, with recurring savings of $7 billion annually after that.” That’s seven billion dollars more to spend on useful programs per year. Cutting nearly one fourth of the current basing scheme would yield even more savings above that. Even if nothing else changes, that funding can go a long way toward extra procurement, higher combat pay, and replenishing the depleted stocks of pre-positioned equipment.

BRAC also has benefits beyond monetary efficiency. For one thing, it improves interservice synergy and joint-interoperability by stationing units from different services on a single base. These units can practice together and perhaps break down some traditional interservice barriers. Furthermore, as noted by here, BRAC helps to solve the problem of encroachment. “Expanding populations are encroaching on many of America’s bases, and the result will be reduced training opportunities and reduced readiness. BRAC can help secure future training opportunities by closing those bases most affected by encroachment and expanding those that are least affected.”

As for the damage to local economies, it’s much more political than real. In the short term there will be acute structural unemployment as the local economy adjusts to the loss of the base. This will cause political pain for legislators. Yet, as proponents of base closure point out, “since 1988, 107,000 jobs have been created in the communities where installations were closed or realigned.” Private industry will propagate in the community and provide far better employment than the military base ever could.

Perhaps base closure could be accomplished gradually; a five year drawdown, for example, would minimize the economic hardship and thus protect incumbent politicians. Still, a short-term shutdown whose windfall can be immediately used for better purposes is preferable. Nevertheless, it remains clear that BRAC is an important legislative item, beneficial for both the country and the military.

Incoming Secretary of Energy Samuel W Boden, unanimously confirmed by the Senate yesterday, will have a full plate of issues to deal with when he begins his term soon. Prominent among them are the question of drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Reserve, and the potential development of a new nuclear bunker buster bomb.

I have previously written in opposition to developing new nuclear penetrators destined for active service. The idea was shot down repeatedly by Congress, but seems to have reared its head yet again.

There are a great number of reasons why Washington would be well advised not to venture down this path. First and foremost, several studies have shown that these penetrators would be only marginally effective at best. There would be no practical way to shield the target region from radioactive fallout, and while the payload of these penetrators would be significantly greater than conventional munitions, they would suffer from the same limitations on capabilities. The fact is that as bunker technology becomes increasing advanced, and bunkers are built deeper into the ground, neither convention nor nuclear munitions will be able to successfully defeat it. The key is isolating these compounds by sealing off entrances and links to the outside world. This can be accomplished much more efficiently with the use of precision guided bombs.

Second, the political implications of embarking on advanced research or early development of the bomb are enormous. It sends a dangerous signal to countries around the world that new nuclear development is welcome, at a time when nuclear proliferation has become especially perilous. It thus weakens the international inspection regime, which very much depends on mutual trust and cooperation. Merely using the bomb in combat would usher in a new era of warfare and danger that cannot be reversed. The application of light nuclear force legitimizes it in the eyes of all other nuclear powers, and that can never be taken away. Soon, others, such as Russia, would use such weapons in their own wars. Many countries currently forsaking nuclear devices would seek to acquire them to guarantee security. The yield on the nuclear weapons that are used would gradually escalate and soon get out of hand. And that spells international disaster.

Third, the projected costs of the program would be better spent elsewhere. The Pentagon would gain far more value out of purchasing more planes or ships than investing in this useless program. There are more important priorities within the nuclear division itself, even. Russia is modernizing its ICBMs and nuclear forces in order to make them more effective and potent against the threats of the 21st century. The United States should do the same. Nothing so threatening as to amass more nuclear weapons, but simply an upgrade program to strengthen the backbone upon which the international peace rests.

The Financial Times supplement also included a good article on the revolutionary new Littoral Combat Ship, which is currently being designed to serve as the core of the Pentagon’s brown water force. While the blue water naval threats of the future (primarily consisting of great powers such as China and India) must be countered by the continued development of conventional large displacement vessels, most of the naval threats faced by the United States in the future will be brown water, which necessitate different doctrines and platforms. Whether operating against rogue states and pirates, or clearing a minefield close to shore, the LCS can and will be instrumental in accomplishing the objectives of brown water warfare.

The LCS is required because of the intrinsic insufficiency of conventional surface combatants against brown water threats. Most of America’s current fleet is incapable of operating effectively close to shore. Relatively slow, large displacement vessels are vulnerable to fast-attack boats, shallow mines, and entrenched diesel submarines. Furthermore, the current spectrum of US assets lacks the capability to efficiently vanquish the threats of the brown water. Blue water vessels are too large to feasibly police and protect busy sea lanes, for example, and require significant overhead. Coastal mine-clearing and special operations support are far too unwieldy to be practical with many of today’s conventional assets.

With a base price of just about $250 million, the hull is much less expensive than the multi-billion dollar blue water combatants. Further, the design is highly modular, and each hull can be fitted with a panoply of “mission modules” capable of undertaking a variety of tasks. This flexibility enables a detachment of LCS’s to perform the roles of dozens of vessels, all with minimal overhead and resources.

There are two competing designs for the contract. One, by Lockheed Martin, is a conventional single-hull design capable of accommodating mission modules, cargo, and a helicopter landing pad. The other, a joint venture between Austal and General Dynamics, is a futuristic trimaran that “offers greater stability at high speeds”, and a sophisticated control scheme. I personally support the Austal design. It’s an advanced and capable design, with a number of significant benefits over the conventional single hull. Perhaps most importantly, it’s extremely stable, which is critical for the rapid attack combat and pursuit that the vessel will be required to engage in. The trimaran design also reduces hull surface area, allowing for more economical propulsion. The ship is more resilient, since the damage to one of the hulls can be compensated for by the others. Finally, some engineers have suggested that it may be possible to vent engine exhaust between the hulls, and thus reduce the thermal signature of the ship when viewed from the side.

As for the risks in developing such a radically new design, they are actually quite minimal. The RV Triton, a British demonstration vessel for the technology, has performed very well in trials. The technology has also been around for a long time, and innumerable papers and analyses have been done confirming the feasibility of the trimaran warship. In addition, Austal, one of the shipwrights, specializes in the construction of high-speed vessels of this type.

Perhaps most importantly, however, is that there is plenty of time to iron out any design problems before the ship enters service. The navy should take the risk and go with the Austal entry, because nothing ventured means nothing gained.