Power Politics

The May issue of the Atlantic has an interesting analysis about what the future holds for Israel. Suffice it to say, the writer is not optimistic, and believes that long-term trends portend badly for the Jewish state. After examining both demographics and political culture, author Schwarz concludes that the current-day peace process is bound to fail, and the rapidly expanding Arab population will make Israel’s geopolitical position untenable in the long-run.

Schwarz’s analysis of why the present-day peace process will fail is persuasive and instructive.

He argues that while some political leaders in both factions may support a peaceful division of territory, the bodies politic will not. In Israel, the political system is a gigantic obstacle to negotiating a successful peace. The government is organized around a parliamentary system of proportional representation, and requires the Prime Minister to have a majority coalition behind him in order to exercise power. Since one political party almost never holds a majority of seats, the Prime Minister must cobble together a coalition of support to remain in office. Coalitions are often weak, and the departure of even one party can lead to the collapse of the government. In assembling a coalition, the Prime Minister is forced to compromise on policy issues. Since a very significant portion of the Israeli electorate is opposed to granting serious concessions, any Prime Minister seeking to adopt a serious peace agreement will have to gather a coalition of all friendly forces together around the single issue. As demonstrated by the Sharon disengagement plan from Gaza, this is extremely difficult to accomplish, even when it comes to the smallest of concessions. Successfully forming a coalition to back a formal peace agreement will be next to impossible.

The situation in the occupied territories is even more bleak.

Groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, which are committed to Israel’s destruction, are hardly on the fringe. And Palestinians seem to demand the right of return as adamantly as Israelis oppose it: 98.7 percent of refugees surveyed in 2001 dismissed compensation in place of return. Among nonrefugees polled the figure was 93.1 percent. Given that Abbas has promised to submit a “final status” agreement to a plebiscite of Palestinians in the occupied territories and throughout the Arab world (a promise all but ignored in the Western press), the chances of a real peace (as opposed to what the Palestinians call a hudna—a tactical truce) appear to be slim.

However, even if “a comprehensive settlement could be reached, Israel’s long-term prospects are bleak,” Schwarz believes. He bases this gloomy conclusion on demographic trends in the occupied territories, as well as in Israel proper.

The population trends in Israel proper are the most threatening to the Jewish state’s future.

Today Israeli Arabs (that is, Palestinians living within Israel’s pre-1967 borders and in East Jerusalem) have one of the highest population-growth rates in the world (among Israeli Arabs in the Negev, specifically, it is the highest), and they now make up about 20 percent of Israel’s population; demographers project that they’ll compose nearly a quarter of the population by 2020, and as much as 30 percent by 2050. (These figures don’t count the approximately 150,000 Palestinian noncitizens, drawn to Israel largely by the prospect of higher-paying jobs, who live there illegally.) Such large antagonistic minorities have historically engendered conflict and calls for binationalism, which would further weaken the Jewish state.

That said, his other demographic arguments are less persuasive.

More troublesome still, a future Palestinian state hemmed in between the Green Line and the Jordan and in the Gaza Strip will face astronomical population growth (the population in Gaza now doubles every generation, and an enormous influx of former refugees now living throughout the Arab world—mostly in Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon—is almost certain), scarce water, and dire economic conditions. (The obvious outlet for Palestinian labor—Israel—will perforce be tightly closed; otherwise the sort of creeping immigration the United States has experienced from Mexico would swamp Israel, thereby subverting efforts to maintain a Jewish state.) A host of realistic Israeli observers, including Israel’s national security adviser, General Giora Eiland, doubt that the area between the Mediterranean and the Jordan contains enough land and resources to sustain two viable sovereign states. In few places in the world do conditions more demand that two peoples develop a symbiotic relationship; in no other place are the chances of building such a relationship more remote.

Whatever accommodation is made now, it seems inevitable that given the future that confronts a Palestinian state, its expansionist energies will be directed toward Israel (and, to a lesser extent, Jordan). At that point Palestinian leaders seeking further territorial revision will no doubt argue, correctly, that the Green Line was a cease-fire line, not an international boundary; that that line itself awards Israel territory won in war; and that it in no way resembles the boundaries of the UN partition resolution upon which the Jewish state was founded.

Mr. Schwarz’s analysis falls short in several areas. In particular, he underestimates Israel’s power, overestimates the strength of the Palestinians, does not sufficiently consider the effects of unilateral demarcation, and fails to factor in the hostility of many Arab states (particularly Jordan) to the Palestinian cause.

The most important reason why Israel will likely maintain an upper-hand against the Palestinians is the effect of unilateral demarcation. Through the construction of a very defensible West Bank security barrier, Jerusalem has laid the groundwork for unilaterally demarcating a border between Israel and a Palestinian state. Should negotiations fail (as they likely will), Israel has the option of cordoning itself (including prime settlements) off from the instability of the Palestinian territories. Backed by sophisticated border patrol systems, a thriving economy, and a potent military, Israel will have no problem controlling the flow of people and goods along the border. Instability, terrorism, and violence can be easily contained within the territories. The wall may be subject to sporadic attacks, but these will nevertheless be minor in threat and intensity. Furthermore, the Palestinians will be working from a position of weakness. The occupied territories will be impoverished, unstable, and anarchic (for the conceivable future). The Palestinian Authority will receive little support from important Arab states like Jordan, who wish to both curry favor with Washington, and suppress any radical movements within their own borders; Israel will continue to have the backing of the United States.

Nevertheless, demographic realities in the region present a serious threat to Israel’s future. The rapid growth of the Israeli Arab population raises the specter of internal ethnic strife, while external pressure from the Palestinians will always be a problem. Yet, for now at least, Israel is prepared to weather the storm.

Also in Commentary magazine, Victor Davis Hanson has an excellent essay on American policy options in the Middle East. Although I don’t agree with all of it, he makes a very persuasive case that the benefits accrued by the invasion of Iraq are broader than most observers think. This piece unquestionably hits the mark in a number of significant ways.

Without a doubt, Saddam’s Iraq was the most challenging of all the Middle East rogue regimes. The next step, reforming or changing the governments in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran demands its own flexible strategy and its own proper diplomatic and military calculus. But, contrary to the imagining of critics, the post-Iraq reformation of the Middle East will not necessarily have to be accomplished by the invasion of tens of thousands of American troops. Other remedies may well suit our national and humanitarian interests—strategies opened up, ironically, by our previous determination to use our ground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as by our will to see the process through to its end, without hesitation, apology, or compromise.

Yet it’s not his conclusion that I’d like to discuss, but one of the strategies he advocates for use against Middle Eastern states.

If Americans have learned anything from the careers of Qaddafi, the Saudi royal family, Saddam Hussein, and the Iranian clergy, it is that huge petroleum profits accruing among illegitimate autocrats are a recipe for global terrorism and regional havoc. One way to end the present pathology is for the United States, accepting that concerns for our national survival can sometimes trump the logic of finding the cheapest energy source, to develop a policy that helps drive down world petroleum prices. Another option is far more aggressively to promote democratic reforms among the petrol sheikdoms themselves. A third is to do both. Given the entry of India and China into the world petroleum market, fostering tighter global demand while potentially circumscribing our own clout, the hour is more urgent than ever; but the Middle East is also, and once again thanks to the ongoing reform of Iraq and Afghanistan, more fluid and perhaps more promising than ever.

Mr. Hanson, I’m afraid, overestimates the amount of practical leverage held by Washington over this issue.

Mr. Hanson advocates that Washington develop a policy to reduce global oil prices. Yet he provides no concrete plan. Unfortunately, the world oil market is extremely convoluted, and the traditional laws of economics hold less sway than in other areas. The intersection of nationalism and commerce has produced a system where price direction is often inaccurate and the market cannot effectively respond to price signals. Geopolitical concerns have led governments to lock in long-term contracts and alliances with stable price regimes. The United States, for instance, consumes oil shipped from a number of specific sources, but would be unable to purchase oil from sources locked in by China. The international market primarily comes into play with the oil produced by countries such as Russia that refuse to enter into ironclad long-term partnerships. This oil is mobile and priced at market level. However, the amount of slack in the oil market is declining fast.

Supply and demand in the oil market respond very poorly to price signals. Supply is actually used to manipulate prices, rather than being a function of prices. Since oil is so essential to the economy, demand is for all intents and purposes unaffected by small changes in price. However, demand is rising rapidly now due to industrializing China and India. This has reduced the ability of suppliers to manipulate prices, and now they are being forced to pump all out. Soon, it’s possible that demand will eclipse maximum supply, causing a sharp rise in oil prices. Thus, American efforts to either reduce demand or create excess supply will fail. Demand is an economic function, and cannot be changed without long term planning at great expense. Supply is already being maximized. In any case, if the United States lessens its oil purchases from the Middle East, another buyer will merely step in.

Because of competition from China and India, the US has lost sway over oil prices. Only an international consensus by the great powers could even attempt to bring down oil prices, and that’s not going to happen.

Following more than a decade of political isolation and punitive sanctions, Libya was recently welcomed back into the international community. Lengthy negotiations culminated last year in an agreement between Libya and the United States to normalize relations. Washington has proceeded to drop many of its sanctions against the African state (although it maintains Tripoli on its official list of terrorism sponsoring nations), in exchange for innumerable goodies. Among the first of these benefits was well deserved compensation for the victims of the Lockerbie bombing from the Libyan government. This, however, was just the start. Libya has, more importantly, agreed to become an American geopolitical ally. Desperately in need of western expertise and investment, Tripoli has opened itself up as a market for investment and weaponry. Under Qaddafi, the government has also indicated a willingness to move toward increasingly freer markets. Plus, the United States continues to hold the terrorism list trump card, which it will certainly use as leverage to extract even more.

The benefits of warm Libyan-American relations are perhaps best illustrated by the success of US firms in acquiring petroleum concessions from the Libyan government. American firms won rights over ten of the fifteen exploration areas being offered. Furthermore, talks between US oil companies and Tripoli over the properties the firms were forced to abandon in 1986, “have resulted in a tentative agreement and could be approved by Mr. Gadhafi’s government within a month.” Libya has significant untapped oil and natural gas reserves, and, since exploration has virtually ceased since sanctions were imposed, great upside in the quantity of recoverable reserves.

Not only will American oil firms (and thus the US economy) benefit from access to Libya, but so will the global economy. An increase in the supply of hydrocarbons will necessarily relieve the pressure of cost push inflation that threatens the world market. While most industrialized nations are well protected from such inflation (due to structure economic features), other countries are not. Lowering the price of oil will spur global growth. Furthermore, bringing Libyan oil production back up to three million barrels will erode OPEC’s market share and reduce OPEC pricing power. Not to mention that due to ease of shipping and quality, Libyan crude is significantly less expensive for American buyers than Saudi oil.

While some criticized the deal struck between Washington and Tripoli, through its results it is clear that it’s been a boon for both sides. Hopefully this will prove to be a durable model for other international pariahs (notably Iran, but others as well) to follow.

In the meantime, Powell hopes for a glorious coup with which to end his stint as secretary of state. Nailing down a meaningful agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis would certainly fit the bill. Unfortunately for Powell, if there were ever a moment when that wasn’t possible, this is it.

– Strategic Forecasting: Geopolitical Diary

As Turkey has shifted its strategic priorities toward becoming a gateway between the Middle East and Europe, it’s special relationship with Israel has suffered. Turkey has traditionally been a close Israeli ally in the Middle East, both because of ideology (western secularism) and a common threat (Arab autocracies). Turkey has allowed Israeli pilots to train extensively in Turkey, provided Israel support in times of hostilities, and forged extensive commercial ties with Israeli companies. In return, Israel supported Ankara against Kurdish separatists (sometimes very aggressively), gave Turkey access to advanced military technology, and legitimized Turkey’s status as a westernized nation. However, the key common interests that made the relationship so successful have eroded, and the alliance has eroded as a result.

First, Turkey’s status has been thoroughly cemented and legitimized in the west. This has enabled Turkey to trade extensively with the west, and now be eligible for (and indeed, likely to obtain) membership in the European Union. Turkey has also developed a more sophisticated deterrent against Kurdish uprising, and the threat of a violent Kurdish nationalist revolution has subsided. In addition, Turkey’s much more friendly relationships with Europe and the United States have granted it access to military technology on par with Israel’s. Furthermore, with Turkey now certain to enter the EU, it will have an opportunity to act as a bridge (political and commercial) between the Middle East and Europe. This will enrich and empower Turkey far more than any strong relationship with Israel will. Thus, the alliance continue to be marginalized, despite visits such as the one reported by the New York Times.

That said, Turkey will continue to ally itself with Israel. The benefits of cooperation out of the public view remain enormous for both sides, and Turkey’s powerful military establishment will ensure that beneficial military ties remain strong. Furthermore, in its role as gateway, Turkey will want to maintain cordial relations with all parties in the Middle East, including Israel.