Power Politics

Chapter four of Paul Pillar’s wonderful book is, quite possibly, the most important and informative segment of the book. Weighing in at a hefty fifty-six pages, the chapter is by far the longest in the work, and is thoroughly footnoted. This is the meat of Mr. Pillar’s opus.

Chapter four is, in essence, a description of the various techniques that can be employed against terrorism. The author does a fantastic job of discussing and analyzing diplomacy (working with other governments), criminal prosecution, the interdiction of financial assets, military force (although he stops short of discussing complete war), and intelligence (including “possible use […] for covert action” (73)). He also discusses the interrelationships between these various tactics, and how counter-terrorist instruments are tied together in the government bureaucracy.

One of the points the author highlights is the problem of trying terrorists for capital crimes. As he points out, “most governments that do not themselves have capital punishment, including members of the European Union, will not extradite fugitives to the United States without an explicit agreement that the death penalty will not be sought” (85). “Moreover,” he observes, “many countries will not even provide evidence for prosecution of a terrorist without receiving such assurances” (85). The author’s point is particularly valid, since using the policy of criminal justice against terrorists necessarily introduces the entrenched legal element (of opposition to the death penalty), rather than simply keeping it as a foreign policy decision. Furthermore, since the governments of other nations have no pressing reason to hand over custody to American authorities (without a costly incentive), trying terrorists under penalty of death hamstrings the criminal justice system. True, keeping prisoners alive and well cared for is expensive, but it’s well worth the gains that follow (additional evidence, and custody of suspects).

The author makes another salient point during his discussion of criminal justice, this time relating to the investigative capabilities of the FBI. As Pillar notes, law enforcement officers should not be singularly concerned with getting a conviction in US criminal courts. They “constitute an impressive investigative capable” (92), Pillar observes, and should be exploited for “unearthing and interpreting information about the activity of international terrorists” (94). These intelligence gathering operations might include, for instance, “gathering information in support of administrative actions or simply helping to find out more about a murky terrorist-related situation (such as the Bangkok incident)” (94). This capability can be used to supplement other facets of US counter-terrorism policy, and is an effective resource that needs to be utilized.

When discussing the use of limited military force (such as a commando raid), the author advises caution. He notes the Israeli track record in dealing with terrorist incidents, and shows how even the finest commando teams are bound to fail sometimes. The risks of a botched operation are great (see, for example, the problems Israel suffered when its agents were caught in Jordan), and “the operative word [here] is ‘chance’” (99). As Pillar wisely recommends, “any decision to use military force in this mode should anticipate - and be well prepared to deal with the consequences of - failure as a possible outcome.” The point being that while commando strikes can be a valuable counter-terrorist weapon, the risks of using them have to be carefully weighed against the rewards.

On the issue of assassination as a viable counter-terrorism instrument, Pillar leans towards not declaring it as such, but still leaving open it as an option if absolutely essential to US policy objectives. After analyzing the results of the Israel assassination policy, Pillar concludes that “there are particular leaders whose elimination probably would seriously weaken their groups and thereby reduce terrorism, but that there are many other cases in which an assassination […] is at least as likely to be counterproductive” (122). However, his opinions are more towards the belief that assassination “should not be relied on as a counterterrorist instrument” (122-3), and should only be engaged in after thorough analysis and debate. However, I think that he undervalues the tactic. As Gal Luft aptly argues, assassination can often be an effective policy instrument. Does that mean it should be institutionalized? Of course not. As Pillar explains, there is currently an international norm against assassination, and institutionalizing assassination would degrade the value of that norm (other national leaders would become worried over possible assassination attempts). However, use of the tactic against terrorists (such as through CIA Hellfire missile attacks) does not degrade the norm, as terrorists are classified distinctly from states (and their methods give the US a reasonable pretext to use assassination). Furthermore, if the US does not make assassination an official policy, but instead uses the method “off the books,” it will not set off an “arms” race.

The one method the author does not tackle is, however, total war against terrorists and terrorist-sponsoring states (e.g. the US invasion of Afghanistan). At the time the book was published, this type of response to terrorism was out of the question, and could not be justified. However, it is still a valid option for counter-terrorism, and must be considered along with everything else.

Terrorism and US Foreign Policy by Paul Pillar is among the most thoughtful and well written books currently available on terrorism and counter-terrorism. Although I disagree with the author on a few minor points (such as the value of force in counter-terrorism), I concur wholeheartedly with the general arguments of the work. Even though the book was written prior to the WTC terrorist attacks, the general policies and realities discussed by the author are clearheaded and valuable. Indeed, one advantage of that is that the lessons of the book are untainted by the hysteria surrounding the September 11th attacks. The book is balanced and nonideological.

First, the author lays out his central premise, which is that US counter-terrorism policy must be integrated into a broader US foreign policy, and counter-terrorism concerns must be put into perspective. He discusses the various dimensions of counter-terrorism policy and terrorism in general. In the second chapter, Pillar begins by providing a technically rigorous definition of terrorism (building from the official definition of “premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience,” and adding the mere specter of terrorism to the definition). This is a crucial framework for the construction of the book’s arguments, as disagreements over what constitutes terrorism cloud many arguments about the subject. His definition is concise, well stated, and inclusive; it would behoove commentators to adopt it or a definition like it before setting forth to discuss the subject. Pillar also notes the clear distinction (that some seem to miss) between terrorism and legitimate state foreign policy. Finally, he reminds the reader that terrorism is a method, not “a set of adversaries or the causes they pursue” (18). This distinction is often missed in contemporary discourse, a rather perilous rhetorical slip that can lead to incoherent and inconsistent thinking.

The author also asseses the severe costs associated with terrorist attacks. These include “direct physical harm inflicted on people and property” (18), which he shows are much greater than many analysts believe. They also include indirect costs, such as “the fear instilled in individual citizens” (25) (and its effects), and the expense of “countermeasures against terrorism” (25). Terrorist attacks, he further points out, greatly complicate the formulation and execution of US foreign policy, not to mention destabilize already dangerous areas of the world.

Pillar suggests that the threat of CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) terrorism is overblown. However, while he is correct in stating that the risk of an actual CBRN attack is relatively small, recent developments have heightened the threat considerably. With the discovery of the Khan proliferation network, Bin Laden’s attempt to acquire nuclear devices from the former Soviet Union, and Iran’s nuclearization, a CBRN attack on American soil has become much more feasible. Moreover, even if the risk of an actual attack is minimal, a single successful nuclear or biological strike would be devastating. Knowing what we know today, it is critical to American security that CBRN attacks be averted, and reducing the CBRN threat should be a priority in American foreign policy.

Pillar believes any successful anti-terrorism policy must attack at the problem from four angles. First, he proposes, by disrupting the roots of terrorism (resentment, anger, propaganda) that encourage some to join terrorist organizations. However, Mr. Pillar believes that often this either cannot be done (as in the case of terrorists who attack the US because of what it is–the guarantor of international capitalism and liberalism), or should not be (as when it conflicts with other, more important objectives and interests). Secondly, by reducing terrorist capabilities. Thirdly, by compelling terrorists to change their intentions by shifting the fundamental cost-benefit scale (reducing the incentives for hostage-taking, for instance, by maintaining a firm policy of non-negotiation). Finally, by building local defenses (such as concrete security barriers) to protect installations from terrorists.

In the third chapter, the author describes the current geopolitical climate of terrorism, and how the United States fits in. Pillar provides an excellent description of leftist and especially Islamic terrorism, its roots, and its modus operandi. He concludes that terrorists are motivated both by American interventionism abroad and the nature of American society. However, he demonstrateds that withdrawing from overseas intervention, while being beneficial in the short term, would actually bring about more, and more lethal, terrorist attacks in the long run–for America is essential to stability and security in many parts of the world.

The essential message of Pillar’s argument is that counter-terrorism policy must be integrated into American foreign policy as a whole. As he shows, the nation cannot focus solely on the threat presented by terrorists, but must instead focus on all threats. Retracting support from Israel, for example, may alleviate some terrorism, but it would deny America the benefits of the relationship (and in my opinion, the trade-offs are not worth it). With US foreign policy increasingly geared towards combating terrorism–to the detriment of other facets of a proper security posture–this advice is all the more relevant.