The Financial Times features an excellent story about the increasingly greater proven oil reserves being reported by petroleum majors operating in Russia; according to the analysts cited by the FT, Russia’s proven oil supply is likely to end up tripling to about 180 billion barrels, making it the second largest source of petroleum in the world. One quoted analyst believes that Russia’s hydrocarbon (oil and natural gas) deposits may eventually prove to be 50% greater than those of Saudi Arabia. This is significant for two reasons.
First, this news should serve to quiet fears of a peak in oil production coming anytime soon. Many of the analysts forecasting a peak use only proven oil reserve figures (or very pessimistic projected figures) to increase the impact and visibility of their studies by inflating the danger. However, as these new figures show, known oil reserves can increase substantially as new extraction technology becomes available and more advanced geographical tools are used to discover previously unknown reserves. Russia is a case in point: new discoveries like these have expanded and will likely continue to expand its oil-exporting potential beyond what was projected by older estimates. Mapping unexplored reserves in other countries will similarly continue to increase the amount of proven oil available in the world, as will processing unconventional sources such as Canada’s oil sands.
Second, Russia will be able to leverage these reserves in the future to counterbalance the influence of OPEC and other oil producers. In addition to already having an established track record of refusing to cooperate with OPEC price fixing (for several reasons, not least of which is that Russian companies are often independent actors), Russia has seen fit to play the role of nonaligned actor when it comes to world power politics. Russia selectively supports the policies of other states mostly as its national interests dictate; it has thus far avoided forming strong security alliances. Expansive oil reserves, if properly developed, will give Russia geopolitical leverage over both Europe and the United States; it will be able to use oil both to threaten and support other international actors, depending on where Moscow’s interests lie.
The Financial Times reports on the declining strength of the US-South Korean alliance. While I believe that external realities (such as South Korean dependence on American provided security guarantees, the great interconnection between the US and South Korean economies, and the fact that China’s aspirations for regional hegemony loom large over any Korean strategic calculus) will compel Seoul to mainain the alliance, this polling data is fairly disturbing. It suggests that in the future the South may not be as cooperative and pliable as it has been, and that, in the long term, the US is in danger of its ties with a strong Asian ally fraying.
The increasing distance between America and South Korea also suggests that Washington ought to pay serious attention its alliance with Tokyo. American strategy in Asia depends on the projection of force through proxy allies–South Korea, Japan, Australia, Singapore–and the loss of any of these proxies undermines the resilience and capacity of the American presence. As South Korea drifts away, the alliance with Japan will become ever more important in sustaining American power. Since unless Washington is willing to commit massive naval forces on a permanent basis to trawl the area (which would no doubt raise regional tensions dramatically and create suspicion of American movites), Japan is the only viable forward staging area for the United States (besides South Korea).
The US is enhancing the defensive capabilities of its forces in South Korea with the addition of two Patriot missile batteries for defense against North Korea. This move comes as part of a new US grand strategy for dealing with the North Korean nuclear problem.
The missile batteries are aimed at supplementing the organic defensive capabilities of the American forces in the Republic of Korea. Specifically, the additions are designed to protect American troops against North Korean ballistic missiles and aerial bombardment. This comes as US troops reposition themselves to the south of Seoul, limiting their usefullness as a tripwire, but improving their ability to respond to a North Korean assault.
The changes also come as US forces in the area prepare to implement more aggressive (or rather proactive) strategies for mitigating the North Korean threat. By constructing a robust anti-missile defensive perimeter around South Korea while also maintaining a strong presence in the sea between North Korea and Japan, the United States has placed itself into an excellent position to embark on a strategy of containment vis-a-vis Pyongyang. With China now putting pressure on Kim to cooperate with the US and diplomatic negotiations planned, establishing the infrastructure for a future implementation of containment gives Washington more leverage over the situation. If diplomacy fails and the situation deteriorates, containment and deterrence can serve as an adequate back-up plan to prevent instability and proliferation; because of this safety net, the United States can feel more free to press North Korea in pursuance of American strategic aims.
The US government will be revising its intelligence estimates on the size of the North Korean nuclear arsenal from “possibly two” to “at least eight.” According to the Washington Post, the revised estimate has been derived from evidence that includes plutonium residue on the clothing of American visitors to the DPRK. This is very significant news, especially because Kim has, at China’s request, agreed to participate in substantive multilateral negotiations.
The articles suggest that China is becoming more and more concerned with the North Korean arsenal. When Pyongyang’s stock of weapons consisted of only one or two devices, regional powers considered the reclusive state to be only a minimal threat to their interests (such a small arsenal really can’t be effectively employed for offensive purposes). However, with the acquisition of eight or more devices (and with the potential for North Korea to build additional weapons in the future), Pyongyang’s arsenal has come to constitute a more severe danger to other states in the area. It is a threat that may be grave enough to compel regional powers like Japan to constitute their own nuclear programs for deterrence; such a nuclear arms race in East Asia is something China wants desparately to avoid: it does not wish to see the rise of rival nuclear powers and has no wish to see increased regional tensions if they can possibly be avoided. Since Beijing sees that the situation is leading directly to a regional militarization (see, for example, the US decision to deploy a naval missile defense system in the area and Japan’s decision to purchase advanced anti-air missile batteries), it has begun to take steps to defuse the situation. Were China to finally decide to fully press the North Korean government on the issue, it would be quite difficult for the reclusive state to squirm its way out of negotiating a diplomatic solution. Although there are a number of factors preventing China from opposing North Korea’s program to the degree that Washington might prefer (such as the need to avoid instability), I suspect that China will soon exert much more pressure on the regime in Pyongyang as the negative consequences of the latter’s program become increasingly apparent.
The United States should seize this opportunity to work with China in diplomatically resolving the nuclear crisis.
As a necessary preface to getting the most possible out of this blog, I feel the reader would benefit from a brief discussion of the philosophical and ideological principles underlying my corpus of work. I furthermore feel that describing my purpose in undertaking this endeavor will help the reader better appreciate the frame of reference from which entries are written.
This blog is very much an endeavor of interest. I write not only to persuade and inform (which I feel is a civic duty of all who take an active interest in political affairs), but more important because I enjoy it. I enjoy thinking about the issues, composing objective analyses of the issues, reading what others have to say of my work, and then engaging in constructive discussion and debate. My interests, international politics and economics, for the most part, therefore inform my writing. More importantly, I am a strident believer in objectivity and the scientific method. I find partisan politics boring and intellectually deadening. I therefore almost always avoid engaging in partisan issues–I prefer to discuss policies and realities, not stilted versions of truth. In the off chance that I do feel strongly against a political party or figure and decide to write about it (such as with some of President Bush’s policies), I strive to do it respectfully and logically. This is why my posts take on a very analytical and strategic tone.
I further avoid interjecting morality into my writing. Although I find many aspects of moral philosophy fascinating (particularly from the Enlightenment on to the age of postmodernism), I do not enjoy writing or debating about them. As the moral relativists have shown, debating morality can be a very difficult task, and often boils down to duels of rhetoric that cannot be logically resolved. I have not the time, training, or inclination to engage in such (for me) unproductive debate. Thus, I write implicitly from my own framework of morality, which I’m certainly willing to discuss here, and almost exclusively focus on analytical and strategic issues. Though I’m a believer in the calculated amorality of international relations and economics, as I shall describe below morality does play a significant role in my other beliefs.
Being as such, it would be productive to establish exactly what moral framework I’m coming from in this blog. In the following paragraphs, I’ll attempt to do so. I welcome comments about my views.
In general, I suppose, I could be called a utilitarian liberal (in the classical sense). My instincts lie fundamentally on the side of liberty and republican government. Yet I temper this view with the realization that life is far from perfect. The panacea of classical liberalism–libertarianism–is for all practical purposes impossible to achieve. History has taught us that government must become involved in the affairs of the body politic in order for society to function well and be economically productive. Government has a positive role to play in enhancing the lives of its subjects. To a point. Although government should take an active role, it must always lean on the side of limits and restraint. Government should fundamentally be minimized, rather than maximized, and should seek to give as much freedom as practically possible to the individual.
In international relations, I’m very much an adherent of the power realism school. Relations between governments are fundamentally dominated by the calculus of power, wealth, and prestige. International politics tends to be amoral and anarchic (although, of course, sometimes it isn’t). I recognize, however, that ideas can have a power of their own, and that has to be factored into the otherwise amoral calculus. I believe that war should typically be a last resort of foreign policy, and that the wise diplomat should use both hard and soft power to achieve national objectives. I diverge with the realist school in terms grand strategy; I believe that a world of democratic capitalism (with each country having its own flavor, whether it be liberal, social, or authoritarian) is a realistic and wise long-term goal for the United States. This maximizes economic prosperity and connectivity, and correspondingly lessens the benefits of militarism. Although great power war can never be truly eliminated, such a system will decrease its occurrence dramatically. Nevertheless, thinking that such a change can be effected rapidly or with force is foolhardy. It will take a century of gradualism (using a combination of soft power, hard power, and ideas) to achieve, and has to be accommodated within the framework of realpolitik, not made a replacement for it.
As far as social policy goes, I lean heavily toward the liberal line of thinking. Freedom, objectivity, humanism, and tolerance are all values that should be encouraged and inculcated. I feel that people should be treated as individuals, not as members of larger groups, and that everyone should have an opportunity to participate in society. On social issues, I’m almost universally pro-freedom (with the exception of dangerous and abusive practices such as polygamy and incest). I’m a strong defender of civil liberties, and I believe the government has little business being involved in religion (beyond, say, providing chaplains and religious services to military combatants). I’m also very much in favor of responsibility; people should be held accountable for their actions (those who break the law deserve to be punished, for instance), and individuals should be expected to support themselves in society unless they are unable to do so. Nevertheless, I understand the Burkean criticism of this line of thought and believe that Burke has a good point in regards to other societies. Whereas I promote liberalism for the United States, I believe authoritarianism is a better fit for Asian society and socialism a better fit for continental Europe.
In matters of economic policy, I categorically reject both socialism and complete laissez faire capitalism. My economic leanings comprise a mix of monetarism, Keynesianism, and classical capitalism. I believe that government has a positive role to play in regulating the economy and smoothing the business cycle. However, I strongly believe in the power of markets and think that capitalism and private property should form the core of the economic system. I think that government control should be minimized, although not excessively so (government should regulate in order to improve economic growth and competitiveness, as well as to achieving some desirable social goals, such as reducing poverty, and to correct natural market failures, such as externalities). I suppose this makes me a neoliberal.
As far as government programs go, I base my feelings firmly in the values of responsibility and efficacy. Where society or the economy inadequately provides a good or service, the government should step in and take action. This is the case for the environment, civil rights, medical care, and other issues. In taking action, the government should seek to adopt the most effective plan (typically market-driven). When dealing with issues such as welfare and retirement plans, the government should have a decided emphasis on personal responsibility. Those who can provide for themselves should be required too, and most of the funding should be reserved for those who truly cannot. The overriding theme, here, however, is to minimize government involvement. I can see government spending being in the range of 20-30% GDP. I’m very skeptical of spending rising beyond that. As far as budget deficits go, I think that they should be capped at 2% GDP per year (and the national debt should be capped at 40% GDP barring national emergency); that way, Congress can stimulate the economy without spending spiraling out of control.