Power Politics

The New York Times notes an American program in Iraq to purchase lethal arms from Iraqis. According to the Times, the program has resulted in the removal of 56,536 dangerous items from the streets of Iraq. Total payment: merely $761,357. The weapons included AK-47 assault rifles, mortars, RPG-7 launchers (pdf), and Strella anti-air missiles.

This program seems like one of those smart ideas soon to be adopted all across Iraq. While it’s true that insurgents could use the money they obtain from selling their old arms to purchase new ones, there will be fewer arms (in total) circulating around Iraq, and the newly purchased arms would have been purchased anyway. The only real risk of this program is that it could encourage more weapons smuggling into Iraq, and that risk can be mitigated with better border security.

Instead, however, of melting down the weapons as the US army probably plans to do, I think it would be wise to stockpile them. When the new Iraqi army is constituted in its final form, weapons from this stockpile could be used to supply them. Furthermore, if the US ever needs to provide a country or movement abroad with weapons, they could be distributed at minimal additional cost.

“Terror threat to fuel supplies grows in Asia’s busiest sealane,” by John Burton, Financial Times, 18 May, p. 7. Online link.

The Financial Times article discusses a fascinating and oft ignored danger to the global economy: an attack on shipping or infrastructure in the Straits of Malacca & Singapore. As the article notes, “the straits of Malacca and Singapore form one of the world’s busiest sealanes, with 50,000 vessels a year passing through, carrying half the world’s oil supplies and two-thirds of its liquefied natural gas to the energy-dependent economies of China, Japan and Korea.” The sealane is also highly dangerous, “topping the global list for piracy attacks in a region where there are several well established terrorist groups.” This combination of volatile factors had led to educated speculation that terrorists will launch a lethal attack in the Straits, “with the potential of disrupting the shipping industry and making energy costs much higher for Asian users.” The article goes on to discuss, in more depth, the issues related to terrorism in the Straits. I highly recommend you read it, as well as a summary of analyst Michael Richardson’s stimulating working paper.

Before going further, it’s instructive to note that Singapore takes this threat extremely seriously. Not only does Singapore field a potent military force for use, in part, against terrorism / sea piracy, but Singapore’s deputy prime minister has stated that “recent attacks have been conducted with almost military precision. The perpetrators are well trained, have well laid-out plans and have sophisticated weapons.” Singapore, unlike Indonesia or Malaysia, can be counted on as a solid ally in this endeavor. Furthermore, Singapore’s organic military strength enables US policy-makers to dedicate fewer precious resources to any measures implemented.

That said, I recommend that the US develops and organizations a plan to aggressively police and secure the Straits. They are crucial to American national and economic interests, and (as a focal point of world commercial power) deserve US attention. The US needs to work with Singapore and other willing nations to crack down heavily on piracy, and reduce volatility in the region. This objective can be accomplished by organizing a coherent and potent grand anti-proliferation strategy for the entire area (including East Asia), and moving a few destroyers or cruisers into the Straits for joint patrols with Singapore.

“Boeing hit by doubts on $23bn Air Force deal,” by Caroline Daniel, Financial Times, 14 May, p. 15. Online link.

The Financial Times reports that Boeing is facing continued scrutiny over the tanker deal, and that the Defense Science Board recently released a report blasting the Pentagon for mishandling the acquisition of new tankers, and delineating a range of superior alternatives. Following the recent wave of criticism, and after intense attacks by powerful Senator John McCain, it looks unlikely that the contract will be signed. Meanwhile, in a thinly veiled threat, Boeing suggested that it would be forced to close its 767 production line and incur massive costs if the USAF didn’t ink the deal.

Since this deal is effectively doomed, it is prudent to discuss solutions to the Air Force’s air tanker problems. The Air Force’s fleet of KC-135 tankers, while “manageable,” need to be replaced in the near future. They are hopelessly outdated, and represent one of the weakest links in American air doctrine. However, their service life can be extended for a few more years, and it is imperative that the Air Force acquires the optimal air refueling platform for future operations. The DSB report offered several options, including refitting the KC-135s with new engines, or overhauling used airliners for refueling duty. However, while those alternatives may be inexpensive, I believe the Air Force needs quality more than value. The effectiveness of the US air force must be shortchanged.

Perhaps I’m an optimist when it comes to US research and development, and perhaps I’m a technophile, but the Blended Wing Body airframe looks to be the best solution to the problems of the air force. True, it relies on some speculative technology. But given the sophistication of US aerospace companies, and the technological muscle of the US economy, I think any obstacles are surmountable. The aircraft can refuel two other aircraft at once, nearly doubling its effectiveness and allowing for a faster operational tempo during combat operations. “It can fly 25% to 50% more efficiently than current aircraft,” reports BusinessWeek, as well. The performance of the aircraft is truly amazing, and although the price tag is high, I think the benefits of investing in the platform are well worth the costs.

So will the Blended Wing Body project be adopted by the Air Force? Perhaps, as it has a number of dedicated proponents. It would herald a revitalization in Boeing if it is selected. However, Washington politics may yet consign it to a premature death, as it has for numerous other exceptional platforms.

Chapter four of Paul Pillar’s wonderful book is, quite possibly, the most important and informative segment of the book. Weighing in at a hefty fifty-six pages, the chapter is by far the longest in the work, and is thoroughly footnoted. This is the meat of Mr. Pillar’s opus.

Chapter four is, in essence, a description of the various techniques that can be employed against terrorism. The author does a fantastic job of discussing and analyzing diplomacy (working with other governments), criminal prosecution, the interdiction of financial assets, military force (although he stops short of discussing complete war), and intelligence (including “possible use […] for covert action” (73)). He also discusses the interrelationships between these various tactics, and how counter-terrorist instruments are tied together in the government bureaucracy.

One of the points the author highlights is the problem of trying terrorists for capital crimes. As he points out, “most governments that do not themselves have capital punishment, including members of the European Union, will not extradite fugitives to the United States without an explicit agreement that the death penalty will not be sought” (85). “Moreover,” he observes, “many countries will not even provide evidence for prosecution of a terrorist without receiving such assurances” (85). The author’s point is particularly valid, since using the policy of criminal justice against terrorists necessarily introduces the entrenched legal element (of opposition to the death penalty), rather than simply keeping it as a foreign policy decision. Furthermore, since the governments of other nations have no pressing reason to hand over custody to American authorities (without a costly incentive), trying terrorists under penalty of death hamstrings the criminal justice system. True, keeping prisoners alive and well cared for is expensive, but it’s well worth the gains that follow (additional evidence, and custody of suspects).

The author makes another salient point during his discussion of criminal justice, this time relating to the investigative capabilities of the FBI. As Pillar notes, law enforcement officers should not be singularly concerned with getting a conviction in US criminal courts. They “constitute an impressive investigative capable” (92), Pillar observes, and should be exploited for “unearthing and interpreting information about the activity of international terrorists” (94). These intelligence gathering operations might include, for instance, “gathering information in support of administrative actions or simply helping to find out more about a murky terrorist-related situation (such as the Bangkok incident)” (94). This capability can be used to supplement other facets of US counter-terrorism policy, and is an effective resource that needs to be utilized.

When discussing the use of limited military force (such as a commando raid), the author advises caution. He notes the Israeli track record in dealing with terrorist incidents, and shows how even the finest commando teams are bound to fail sometimes. The risks of a botched operation are great (see, for example, the problems Israel suffered when its agents were caught in Jordan), and “the operative word [here] is ‘chance’” (99). As Pillar wisely recommends, “any decision to use military force in this mode should anticipate - and be well prepared to deal with the consequences of - failure as a possible outcome.” The point being that while commando strikes can be a valuable counter-terrorist weapon, the risks of using them have to be carefully weighed against the rewards.

On the issue of assassination as a viable counter-terrorism instrument, Pillar leans towards not declaring it as such, but still leaving open it as an option if absolutely essential to US policy objectives. After analyzing the results of the Israel assassination policy, Pillar concludes that “there are particular leaders whose elimination probably would seriously weaken their groups and thereby reduce terrorism, but that there are many other cases in which an assassination […] is at least as likely to be counterproductive” (122). However, his opinions are more towards the belief that assassination “should not be relied on as a counterterrorist instrument” (122-3), and should only be engaged in after thorough analysis and debate. However, I think that he undervalues the tactic. As Gal Luft aptly argues, assassination can often be an effective policy instrument. Does that mean it should be institutionalized? Of course not. As Pillar explains, there is currently an international norm against assassination, and institutionalizing assassination would degrade the value of that norm (other national leaders would become worried over possible assassination attempts). However, use of the tactic against terrorists (such as through CIA Hellfire missile attacks) does not degrade the norm, as terrorists are classified distinctly from states (and their methods give the US a reasonable pretext to use assassination). Furthermore, if the US does not make assassination an official policy, but instead uses the method “off the books,” it will not set off an “arms” race.

The one method the author does not tackle is, however, total war against terrorists and terrorist-sponsoring states (e.g. the US invasion of Afghanistan). At the time the book was published, this type of response to terrorism was out of the question, and could not be justified. However, it is still a valid option for counter-terrorism, and must be considered along with everything else.

“Atal Behari Vajpayee, India’s prime minister and leader of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party-led coalition, resigned on Thursday after the country’s rural voters delivered a stunning backlash against his government in favour of the main opposition Congress party.” The previously defunct Indian National Congress party (which once had a virtual monopoly over Indian governance but collapsed in the last decade) scored a major victory, and now (with its communist allies) has been able to form a majority parliamentary coalition. This effectively guarantees the Congress party control of the Indian government, and its quasi-socialist nature makes the prospect somewhat disturbing.

Should INC leaders try to return India to its previous economic system (with significant government control), they risk halting or deteriorating the economic prosperity brought about by market oriented reforms. This could be severely detrimental to American interests in the region, as India’s race with China for economic supremacy acts as a balancing factor in the region. If both India and China become great powers (economically and militarily), the United States can exploit them for great gain. If, however, India falls behind China, the US would lose the great potential benefits it could have had (such as extensive and robust troop support), and China would be less inclined to cooperate with the United States. That said, economic regression is unlikely. The powerful forces of globalization and free market progress have become entrenched in India, and removing them will be extremely difficult. Perhaps reform will be slowed slightly, but there shouldn’t be any appreciable loss in momentum towards a freer market.

The other major concern about the change in government is its effect on negotiations will Pakistan. General Musharraf (the leader of Pakistan) has formed a good working relationship with the former Indian Prime Minister (and he trusts the former PM and his policies). The introduction of an ideologically distinct, and potentially untrustworthy, new leader may lead to the breakdown of talks, or a lessening of their tangible results. Furthermore, any new foreign policies may trigger a change in the (relatively) good relations between Islamabad and New Delhi. If relations sour, the two nations could go back to the brink of war in the future, a risk that the United States should strive to avoid. Fortunately, the policy of negotiations is strongly favored by the Indian populace, and is in India’s national interests. Furthermore, the threat presented by China compels India to organize its national security resources towards addressing the threat, and removing the possibility of a war with Islamabad will go a long way towards freeing resources for competition with China.