India and China concluded “the third round of a series of high-level talks over a border dispute,” reports the Financial Times. The negotiations were conducted in New Delhi, and come as part of improving diplomatic relations between the two nations, although it is unlikely that “concrete measures” will be implemented any time soon. “The dispute involves the entire 3,500km Himalayan border,” and the two sides “fought a short war over part of it in 1962, in which Chinese troops humiliated the Indian military.” In particular, “China has claimed 90,000 sq km of the north-eastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, while India claims Aksai Chin, a portion of the divided state of Kashmir that New Delhi says was illegally ceded to China by Pakistan.” Since the early 1990s, India has embarked on ambitious military modernization program, aimed at bringing its forces on par with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
These negotiations signal an important inflection point in Indo-Sino relations. This particular inflection point (the point where the costs of direct military confrontation begin to outweigh the benefits) actually occurred years ago (when India was close to becoming a nuclear power), but geopolitical realities (such as strife between India and Pakistan, and the impotence of either China or India to enforce zones of influence noncontiguous to their mainland) delayed its official onset. In any case, China and India now officially recognize each other as great powers that cannot realistically be invaded (just as the United States and Soviet Union once did). With this comes of the type of diplomacy, proxy conflict, and power plays common during the Cold War. In effect, the two countries will now strive to divide up Asia into spheres of influence, using the traditional tactics of great power politics (minus war, though). The resolution of border disputes is a first step: neither China nor India wants tensions alongside its own border - geographic separation from conflict is safety, after all.
War is still possible of course - just note the rising power of the Indian military (clearly not aimed at deterring weak Pakistani forces), and the fact that all the ingredients causing world war exist in Asia. But with both China and India armed with nuclear devices (the latter, despite using Pakistan as a pretext for developing nuclear technology, building its arsenal to deter Beijing), war is highly unlikely. What’s more likely is the division of Asia into contested zones of influence by China, India, Japan, and Australia. Which provides a perfect environment for the United States to remain in the background and quietly manipulate the powers for its benefit. Furthermore, since America is a geographical fortress far away from the region, the US can avoid becoming embroiled in a regional war. Finally, with strong alliances and shared interests with Singapore, Japan, and Australia, the United States also has an excellent foothold in the regional to use in implementing these policies.
If the Washington plays its cards right, the United States can benefit greatly, while also diverting China’s attention from balancing American power to countering Indian power.
As President Vladimir Putin continues to assault Russian oil firm Yukos and its key officers, it has become increasingly apparent that he has gone far beyond merely crushing a political opponent. He could have simply taken up Mr. Khodorkovsky on his offer to relinquish control of Yukos. Then he could have restructured the company, seized the assets the government needed, and silenced other opposition figures. That way, he could accomplish his objectives without triggering a capital flight, or a disruption in the petroleum industry. However, instead, he has decided to bring down Yukos, and its key officers with it. Russia is now prepared to seize Yukos’ main oil facility, and sell it to Kremlin allies for 10% (or less) of its value. This will destroy Yukos, throw the oil industry into turmoil, and scare off valuable foreign capital. Mr. Putin is also now pressing charges against an assortment of wealthy executives with the resources to challenge him. Yet this is more a vendetta than a calculated political move: business leaders can be deterred through decidedly less destructive means, and a functioning free market can be exploited to appease the body politic.
Mr. Putin seems to be falling into the trap that has plagued rulers of petroleum rich states for a century. He foolishly believes that by imposing (de facto) nationalization on petrol firms, he can exploit their resources and continue operating them at peak efficiency. Combine this with an irrational desire to pulverize those who opposed him, and one has all of the ingredients for a failed state. Mr. Putin cannot hope to control the oil industry through government mandates - production will fall, and the industry will be reduced to Soviet era lackluster. Like other oil states before it, Russia will become corrupt. Mr. Putin will have to implement successively more repressive measures, and sooner or later will preside over an uneven, powerless state. Some industries will continue to prosper, but Russian society will be in decay.
Perhaps it won’t come to this, but I’m afraid that Putin seems unable to understand the scope of the events he’s set into motion. I can only hope that Mr. Putin will see the error in his ways, and revert back to a more indirect form of authoritarianism capable of sustaining Russia.
The United States and the Republic of Korea formally agreed on a plan to relocate American troops from Seoul to bases south of the city. The property currently occupied by US forces - highly valuable - will likely be used to build residential skyscrapers. Furthermore, American forces stationed between Seoul and the demilitarized zone will be “consolidated before moving to permanent quarters south of the capital.” This move comes as part of a general realignment of United States Forces Korea (USFK). Other components of the realignment include the withdrawal of nearly 1/3 of USFK, and the deployment of new attack helicopters and land platforms to South Korea. Now that the move has been formally agreed to, no obstacles remain to the relocation (which, in some form or another, had been facing opposition for nearly a decade).
The realignment recognizes strategic shifts between the US, the DPRK, and the RoK. American military capabilities have improved enough to make rear deployment optimal, and to reduce the risk to American soldiers. Now, instead of being tied to a position that’s vulnerable to a mass DPRK assault, US forces are free to dynamically attack and bombard any DPRK invaders, while having protection from any DPRK counterattack. This not only protects the lives of American soldiers (who would have previously been slaughtered in the first few hours a war), but increases the lethality of USFK. Furthermore, by moving out of Seoul, USFK decreases its visibility, and thus lowers its profile as a beacon of resentment for young Koreans. Finally, the relocation will reduce tension along the North Korean border, since Kim Jong-il no longer has to fear an American preemptive strike.
Yevgeny Bendersky published an interesting study of Russia in Power and Interest News Report, a shadowy site claiming to be a “global organization that provides analyses of conflicts and other international events.” This site (PINR) is new to me, but it appears to be a front group for a few leftist radicals, passing itself off as a professional journal. In any case, Mr. Bendersky’s article contends that “while the current state of the Russian military is far from where the Russian leadership wants it to be, the country’s support for modern technological developments, and its historical ability to succeed in a short period of time in spite of internal economic weaknesses, should not be underestimated. Russia has yet the chance and ability to someday rival the most technologically advanced states.”
The article is a mix of insightful points speciously strung together into a flawed conclusion. Mr. Bendersky persuasively compares various military platforms, and makes a compelling case for the lethality (and parity) of certain categories of Russian military goods. He also presents a compelling argument for not underestimating Russia’s military and defense industry. However, basing his conclusion on a series of points rather than a comprehensive comparison, he draws the flawed conclusion that Russia has the capability to achieve military parity with the United States in the near (i.e. within the next twenty or thirty years) future.
Following in the style of the article, here’s a point by point discussion of its contents.
Mr. Bendersky argues that Russian military technology is on par with American military technology. He cites several examples to reinforce this argument. First, he implicitly argues, the BMP-3 is as good or even better than it’s western counterparts. He notes that the infantry combat vehicle “has been chosen over Western vehicles in contracts for the United Arab Emirates and Oman, long located in Washington’s sphere of influence.” However, during the urban fighting in Chechnya, Russia’s BMP-3s were shredded by RPGs and anti-tank weapons, leading to the development of the BMP-4, a platform unsuitable for traditional inter-state conflict. The BMP-3 has also been (rightly) criticized for its armaments, suited more towards tank killing than supporting its troop contingent. Yet while the BMP-3 has proved unsuitable for urban combat, the M2 Bradley has faired well in Iraq, proving resilient against all but the most concerted attack. Perhaps a better comparison would be with Russia’s new ground platforms, such as the BTR-90. However, even if they are superior (questionable, considering that the US army’s new future combat system is set to blow it out of the water), heavy battlefield combat vehicles are outdated. As the cost and ease of aerial tank plinking will very soon have rapidly decreased (with the introduction of “mircoordinance” and guided bomblets), the US air force will make mincemeat out of any of these vehicles.
Second, Mr. Bendersky contends that the Russian S-300 and S-400 surface-to-air missiles are superior to the Patriot missile. This is probably accurate: the Russians have long held an edge in anti-aircraft weaponry (to counter the American advantage in airpower). However, the Patriot missile is still an effective platform, and the US SM-2 Standard naval based SAM is unquestionably the most capable ship mounted anti-air platform in the world. Furthermore, what Mr. Bendersky fails to take into account is the Arrow II SAM system. A joint venture between the US and Israel, the Arrow II is regarded as serious competitor to the Russian’s best systems. While no comparison tests have been conducted, tests involving the Arrow II have proven it to be extremely successful. That said, the S-300 and S-400 are tangential at best to determining Russia’s military strength. American B-2 bombers, cruise missiles, and stealthy (albeit speculative) UCAVs can easily destroy these emplacements. Again, airpower makes Russian ground strength essentially irrelevant.
Third are the “Kamov-50 family of military helicopters,” that, the author contends, “incorporate the latest cutting-edge technologies and tactics, making them an equal force to the best Washington and the West has to offer.” Yes, the Kamovs are effective and potent. However, there is no direct comparison to current American helicopters. The Kamov-50 is designed to act as a close support gunship, exposing itself to ground fire and delivering a heavy ballistic punch. However, the closest US helicopter competitor, the AH-64 Apache, is designed for long range tank destruction. In that role, it’s Hellfire missiles and Longbow radar are far superior to the Kamov’s anti-tank capabilities. In the close attack role, the Kamov-50 is better. That said, the US has other (fixed wing) platforms such as the AC-130 gunship that are even more potent than the Kamov (plus they can hover over enemy fire). Not to mention that the Kamov would be worthless against a vastly superior US air force.
Fourth, Mr. Bendersky cites the Indian air exercise, where US F-15s were outmaneuvered and outfought (in many cases) by Indian Su-30s. True, this shows that the aging F-15 has its limits, and that modern Russian fighters can be just as capable. However, as I noted, the particular tactics used by the Indian air force were very specialized, and not necessarily applicable to modern air combat. In addition, Mr. Bendersky ignores the new F/A-22 air dominance fighter, wholly superior to anything the Russians can or will offer in the next decade. With the introduction of the stealthy F/A-22, the US is guaranteed air dominance for the next few decades, until nearly invulnerable UCAVs come into full force.
Finally, Mr. Bendersky argues that “the Russian military establishment is continuing to design other helicopters, tanks and armored vehicles that are on par with the best that the West has to offer.” However, he offers little substantiation for this claim. Let’s assess this claim in general, platform by platform:
Tactical Fighters: The Russians are developing the PAK FA based on the Su-47 experimental fighter. The aircraft is comparable in performance to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, although perhaps not as stealthy. The PAK FA, however, is far inferior to the F/A-22, and the only potential (although very over-hyped) Russian competitor to the F/A-22, the MiG MFI, has been (permanently) cancelled. Advantage: United States, by far.
Strategic Bombers: No new Russian platforms are planned, but Russia is currently producing (at very low rates) the Tu-160 Blackjack. Now, the Blackjack is a very impressive bomber. It’s certainly comparable to the B-1B, and suffice it to say that Russia maintains parity here. However, both the B-1B and Tu-160 are completely outclassed by the B-2. In fact, it’s probably a safe bet that the B-2 is the most advanced unclassified aircraft in operation. Advantage: United States, by far.
Ballistic Missile Submarines: Russia is currently developing a new class of ballistic missile submarines, known as the Borei class. These submarines are estimated (probably accurately) to be superior to any other ballistic missile sub. As the US continues to rely on the excellent, but dated, Ohio class, and the Russians value their nuclear deterrent extremely highly, it is highly probable the Russian SSBN fleet will exceed its American counterpart in quality and sophistication. Still, a nuclear deterrent IS a nuclear deterrent, whether or not it is based on the most advanced platforms. Advantage: Russia, by far.
Attack Submarines: Focusing on diesel submarines (and having essentially given up on contesting the US nuclear sub lead), the Russians are currently developing the project 677 Lada Diesel-Electric Torpedo Submarine. Clearly, since the United States has ceased developing diesel subs, Russia has built the finest diesel boat ever. However, with the advent of the ultra-powerful Seawolf class, and the advanced Virginia class (designed to dominate in littoral areas - previously the domain of the diesel-electric sub), Russian submarines have fallen far behind. Russia’s current submarine capabilities are marginal and fading. Advantage: United States, by far.
Helicopters: Russia is currently developing the Ka-50 Kamov family, as previously mentioned. The US is upgrading its AH-64 Apache family. Both are roughly equal in their capabilities, and both roles are being phased (over the next few decades) out to aircraft and UCAVs. At the moment, the US army has shifted away from the RAH-66 Comanche (a platform that would have been superior to the Kamov), while the Russians have nothing new planned. Helicopters, however, are gradually losing favor, making this category (somewhat) irrelevant. Advantage: Tied.
Tanks: Russia is presently developing an advanced main battle tank labeled the T-95. Information is speculative at the moment, but it seems the T-95 will have several novel features (such as a special encapsulated crew module for crew protection, and an incredibly powerful gun). Perhaps it will exceed the performance of the M1A2, but due to lack of information about the platform that cannot be determined. What can be determined is that the armor and defense systems (the overrated Arena system, in particular) aren’t very special. As per usual, whoever gets the first shot off will win, and US forces maintain a massive advantage in information and communications. Furthermore, the US army is developing a new, advanced tank as part of the Future Combat System, designed specifically to exploit US force structure. The Russian tanks - while perhaps enjoying platform parity, would be demolished by combined US arms in any engagement. Advantage: United States, slightly.
Armored Vehicles: Russia is currently developing the BTR-90, in addition to variants of other armored vehicles. These are nothing special, and will be outclassed by the US army’s FCS. Advantage: United States.
I purposely left out comparison of surface vessels and anti-aircraft systems. Surface vessels because Russia has essentially given up on these, and because the United States maintains an absolutely dominant lead in aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, and amphibious landing vessels. The new DD(X), littoral combat ship, LPD-17, and CVN-21 will only further cement this dominance. I have already discussed SA systems above. As is clear, however, the United States maintains a lead in military research, and will continue to field dominant platforms well into the 21st century. Russia has fallen behind in nearly all areas, and has become something of a niche provider.
Mr. Bendersky then goes on to delineate why American strategists should be concerned about Russian weapons. I would concur with his reasoning. Essentially, he emphasizes the fact that America will be fighting against advanced Russian exports, Russia has designs on central asia and the baltic region, and Russian strategic interests will compel it to attempt to develop a military on par with other world powers. Allow me now to state that Russian defense products - especially their SAM systems and SSMs - present a dangerous threat to US forces that US procurement must be designed to counter. This is why I endorse advanced platforms such as the F/A-22 (along with the rising capabilities of the Chinese and Indian defense industries), and one of the best general points in the article.
Combining this all together, the author makes the case that Russia has all of the ingredients to rise again as a great power. Putting aside the fact that much of his analysis of Russian technology is flawed, there are several compelling reasons to be skeptical. First and foremost, Russia’s defense industry depends on exports to China and India. Yet these are rising powers, and have already started to incubate domestic arms industries. Once their industries mature, Russia will be denied most of its lucrative business, and will, indeed, have two more competitors in the arms trade. Secondly, Russia’s economy needs structural reform, and is unlikely to mature until 2015 or later. Russia will not have the cash or resources to embark on an ambitious defense buildup, and will instead be focused on internal problems. Finally, while the author reminds us of Russia’s previous naval buildup in the 18th century, there is a significant difference between now and then: today, weapons systems are very expensive and time consuming to construct, and once you lag behind, it’s difficult to catch up.
In summary: The article exaggerates Russia’s military technology, and its ability to rebuild to great power status during the first half of the 21st century. However, Russian missiles and select systems pose a great threat to US forces, and US strategists should plan accordingly (by purchasing advanced aerial and naval platforms).
As Japanese business groups move to overturn Japan’s ban on arms exports, a legislative showdown is underway between supporters and opponents of the ban. The Financial Times, as usual, has an insightful article on the ban. As the article notes, Japan currently bans the sale of internally produced weapons systems to other countries, save for the United States. Japan’s defense sector, thusly, lags far behind its other industries in terms of market share and innovation. Although Japanese improvements of US defense products are first rate (just as Israel’s improvements of existing defense platforms are), Japanese companies are unable to sell their products and services abroad. Japan’s new grand strategy of becoming more involved in international geopolitics, plus increased competition from other defense companies, has prompted the government to strongly contemplate rescinding some restrictions.
Personally, I’m overjoyed to hear this news. Japan is one of America’s closest allies (and should remain America’s principal ally in East Asia for as long as possible), and any economic improvements there are beneficial for the United States (and world) economy. Furthermore, if Japan develops a strong defense sector, it will enable it to trade back even more sophisticated technology to the US, and to arm itself more effectively for future wars. It may even lead to a new paradigm in US defense procurement (as Japan has in other sectors): innovate in America, refine in Japan.