Power Politics

This year’s centerpiece of China’s annual military exercises, the mock invasion of Dongshan Island, has been cancelled, reports the China Times. The invasion, designed to simulate an attack on Taiwan, was primarily aimed at sending a message of strength to Washington. China was also using the opportunity to demonstrate the enhanced capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), which would serve as the most important component of any invasion of Taiwan. The exercises were well publicized, and provoked significant responses from both Taipei and Washington.

There are several theories as to why the invasion was cancelled. Weather, always a problem in the region, was expected to be particularly inclement. Chinese forces have not yet progressed to the level of being able to reliably and effectively execute all weather strike warfare, and thus an embarrassing failure may have ensued. This is probably the reason that the invasion was scrubbed. The internal power struggle between army commander Zemin and president Hu may have contributed as well, although a struggle over the carefully planned exercise would have (most likely) only killed it during the far-passed design phase. As for Chinese concern over the Sino-American relationship, it is most likely not a factor. This event had been meticulously crafted for some time - if Beijing had thought that it would hurt relations with Washington too much, it would have been quietly reworked some time ago. As it is, the United States has done little to discourage the exercise.

Note: I’ve decided to remove my fiction pieces from this site. Instead, they’ll be solely located here.

The Army Times reports that the Mobile Tactical High Energy Laser system successfully intercepted seven mortar shells (fired in single and salvo). The MTHEL system has previously intercepted “five artillery projectiles and 28 rocket targets, including the short range 122mm Katyusha type rockets fired singly and in salvos and larger, long range 160mm rockets which has twice the range of the standard katyusha.” In May of 2004, the system intercepted a “large caliber rocket” with a live warhead. Development of the fixed version, the THEL, is proceeding along smoothly, and a prototype (operational) version will be produced by 2007 for the army.

Laser anti-missile systems - as opposed to traditional kinetic energy kill vehicles - are the only feasible method of consistently destroying airborne missiles, rockets, and shells. The time from activation to impact is effectively zero, so the problems of calculating lag and avoiding missile evasion are bypassed. Furthermore, since the laser fires in a (again, effectively) straight path, factors such as wind and vehicle performance do not have to be accounted for. The technology, of course, still needs refinement, but it shows great promise. This is where investment should be going - practical, theater based platforms that have proven themselves effective (and not to creating a system of outdated and ineffective kinetic energy kill vehicles). Mount one (or two, in the long term) of these on a dozen Aegis platforms, and North Korea loses much of its offensive hit power. Perhaps they may even be able to destroy ICBMs just after the launch phase. As these are miniaturized and installed as point defense systems, primitive cruise and anti-surface missiles (such as the Silkworm) will lose their value.

The CS Monitor features an excellent piece on the new US strategy of lily-pad basing. As the article discusses, US forces are being redeployed from fixed facilities in Germany, Korea, and other places, to “smaller, transitory bases in places like Kyrgyzstan.” This realignment, outlined in the Pentagon’s Global Posture Review, is long overdue. Now that the Cold War has ended, most of the threats the United States needs to suppress militarily exist in the undeveloped, unconnected region that Thomas Barnett calls the “gap.” To effectively deal with these threats (in the aim of connecting the gap to the rest of the globalized world), US forces need to able to deploy anywhere within the gap fairly quickly. These lily-pad bases are inexpensive, and easily expandable. While the United States must obviously retain a few of the large bases (particularly in Asia), the flexibility and minimal downside of the new staging strategy ensure it will supersede centralized basing as the primary means of US deployment overseas.

A short excerpt:

At the heart of the strategy is the Pentagon’s desire to take the offense in a post-Sept. 11 world where future threats are unpredictable, although broadly seen as emanating from lawless or less developed regions. The goal, therefore, is the fast, flexible, and efficient projection of force - with “lily pad” bases like Manas playing crucial role as staging points.

In fact, the Pentagon’s sweeping Global Posture Review, now under consideration by the Bush administration, is less focused on specific troop deployments than on extending broad military capabilities, US defense officials say. Especially vital is the “forward basing” of air and sea power able to skirt national boundaries and political sensitivities as well as the prepositioning of large, off-shore stocks of tanks, armored vehicles, weapons, and other military equipment that incoming troops can readily draw upon.

“We are not focused on maintaining numbers of troops overseas,” said Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Douglas Feith at a recent House hearing. “Instead, we are focused on increasing the capabilities of our forces and those of our friends.”

President Bush officially nominated Representative Porter Goss to succeed John McLaughlin as Director of the CIA (DCIA). Goss, the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, is a Republican from the 14th Congressional District of Florida. He is a former CIA clandestine officer, and an accomplished Congressman. He is also a strong Bush supporter, and would prove to be an ideological ally for the President if confirmed.

Politically, the move is absolutely brilliant - Karl Rove at his best. Some Senate Democrats have attacked Goss as a partisan pick, and threatened to derail the nomination. Privately, many have said his nomination will be obstructed through parliamentary procedures and lengthy debate. If they follow through, however, Bush can use their obstruction as a political advantage. He’ll be able to capitalize on the public fervor over the 9/11 report by portraying the Dems as obstructionists that put partisan politics above reforming the defense establishment. And the public will eat it up. John Kerry won’t have a chance, and neither will some Southern Democrats aspiring for Senate seats. If the Democrats recognize the futility of that tactic and approve Goss, framing the issue as a bipartisan reform favoring neither candidate, Bush will have successfully gotten an ideological ally confirmed as DCIA. Either way, Bush wins.

The Democrats, for their part, will probably use the nomination as a televised platform to attack Bush administration intelligence failures. This is a very risky gambit, however, as RNC spin doctors could be able to spin this as the Dems putting partisan politics above true reform. Of course, if the Dems are able to successfully portray Bush as weak on intelligence, the gambit will pay off big time for John Kerry. We’ll just have to see how it plays out during the hearings, but I suspect the media will frame the issue as correcting Bush’s intelligence failures (thus giving the Democrats an excellent platform).

In any case, Bush wins. Even if the Dems use the hearings as an opportunity to lambast the President, either getting an ideological ally appointed to the CIA or acquiring a potent new political weapon is worth it. If Goss turns out to be a poor selection, or the Dems obstruct, Bush could then turn around and rapidly install a national intelligence director (as he has promised). That officer would supersede Goss, and would be immune from Congressional attacks (that’s real reform, and truly a third rail).

Petroleum, already one of the most important factors in global affairs, has seen a resurgence in its power. With supplies flat and demand high, petrol prices have surged, and oil has seen a return to preeminence in the strategic calculus of policymakers. In the first half of 2004, economists believe, high oil prices suppressed economic activity and slowed down the economic recovery. This has had a dramatic effect on the vitality of the world economy at large, and particularly on the United States. The shortage of oil intensified the struggle in Asia over energy deposits in the South China Sea (and other bodies of water). And to make matters worse, volatility in the oil market is only expected to increase over the next decade.

Continued violence in Iraq recently prompted officials to suspend pumping oil to two major terminals. This suspension dramatically reduced Iraqi oil exports, and demonstrated the great vulnerability of Iraq’s oil infrastructure. There is little hope that the violence will subside anytime soon; indeed, it is entirely possible that the country will erupt in a lengthy civil war. Even if a central government realizes power in Baghdad, it will be some time before it can establish security around the lucrative and highly desired oil facilities. High risks, meanwhile, will scare off private investment, leaving Iraq’s infrastructure to deteriorate even further. And despite the great utility oil income would have for the reconstruction effort, US forces lack the capabilities to guard the highly vulnerable oil facilities necessary for oil exportation. In effect, Iraq will be unable to consistently export even a modest amount of oil for at least a decade.

In Russia, the long term situation is positive, but the short term prognosis is poor. Putin continues to press ahead with his assault on Yukos, again seizing Yukos’ main production facility despite a court order not to do so. He has essentially destroyed Yukos, and will now proceed to sell its parts to Kremlin allies. While the long term consequences of this may not necessarily be too severe (that’s not to say the industry isn’t at long term risk), the short term damage is immense. Until the dynamic between the government, investors, and Russian businesses is firmly established, companies will adopt a very defensive mentality. New ventures will be put on hold temporarily or hedged, and expansion will be tepid. Over the long term, Russia will be able to exploit its vast reserves, but production won’t increase greatly within the next decade (both because of the unstable legal situation, and the lengthy period between investment and facility operability).

In Venezuela, a close recall vote may trigger instability in the oil supply. Hopefully, Chavez will prevail decisively, as he seems friendly toward international investment. However, I suspect that popular resentment runs so deep that he may in fact be kicked out of office. Thus, although Venezuela’s growth potential is massive (at present levels, oil production can expand by more than 50%), Caracas’ future prospects are uncertain. In any case, development in Venezuela won’t be able to fill the near term shortfall in energy supplies, as new facilities won’t come on line for some time. Bolivia, where international investment is under siege and a leftist leader is threatening to derail the oil industry, won’t be exporting much oil for a long time to come. Libya, the most promising of the “new” oil powers, lacks the reserves to compensate for skyrocketing demand.

Over the next five years, the world economy will be hit especially hard. With production flat and consumption rapidly rising, there’ll be a great (but temporary) shortfall in petroleum supplies. The price of oil will probably rise to an all time (real) high, and the US economy will be mired with sluggish growth. Any prospect of a European recovery will be crushed by high prices, and China’s red hot economy may actually slow down of its own accord. Japan will fare the best, as one of the core pillars of its economic policy has been to shield the economy from oil shocks. However, even Tokyo will have its economic recovery slowed. Competition in Asia over energy deposits will further intensify, although it won’t come to direct violence. Then, later in the decade, as new lines of production open, the oil squeeze will lessen. After 2015, it’s likely that the power of oil to strangle the world economy will decrease, because new sources of energy will be on equal terms with it.

Unfortunately, there is little that the United States can do to ease the economic consequences of tight oil supplies. Releasing the strategic petroleum reserve would merely provide temporary relief, and would leave America unprotected from future oil shocks. Instituting stricter efficiency standards would simply impose an unnecessary burden on industry, as oil would remain a powerful force acting on the economy (and China would eat up the excess that was created). The only thing that can be done (but won’t be) is authorizing the construction of more refineries and terminals. Unfortunately, the power of environmental interests precludes that option, and it would only provide long term relief. The best course of action is to weather the difficult period (the US economy will still expand, but at a reduced pace), while investing in liquified natural gas terminals (LNG is a plentiful energy source that will come to supplant oil within a few decades) for future energy “security.”