rakhiir at teleologic blog critiques The Option of Last Resort with a particular focus on potential crisis resolutions. In addition to commenting on the four solutions I presented, he offers two of his own. Unfortunately, I did not become aware of his response until very recently, but I hope to address his concerns adequately.
1. The author contends that total isolation (through a full trade embargo) is a potential solution, provided that Washington has the support of both Seoul and Beijing. Putting aside the fact that neither Seoul nor Beijing is interested in seeing a trade embargo implemented (particularly South Korea, since trade with Pyongyang is becoming very lucrative and advantageous, as well as because Seoul wants to avoid the regional instability ensuing from regime collapse), one must also consider how Japan, Indonesia, and Russia will react. Japan could potentially - with great effort and difficulty - be persuaded to participate. However, it is doubtful that Moscow will cooperate, due to the very profitable opportunities that routing energy through North Korea will open up. Indonesia (and Europe, for that matter) would take advantage of the situation to earn additional revenue and gain a foothold in an emerging market.
Thus, a mutually enforced embargo would fail; it simply lacks the international support to be viable. A unilaterally enforced embargo would also fail, since the United States cannot afford to cripple its strategic position in Asia by forcefully repelling neutral vessels from North Korea.
2. The author also brings up the option of withdrawing American forces from South Korea, and then launching a precision air campaign against North Korea. This is probably a more realistic military option than the one I presented, but dismissed by many mainstream policymakers (and unlikely to be employed). This option has several extremely serious drawbacks and pitfalls. In particular, the chances of success are low, and the risks are very high.
Ever since the bombing of Osirak, rogue nations have distributed their weapons research and manufacturing over many different installations in many different geographic locations. Many of these facilities are secret, and there’s no way that the United States could destroy them all (or even know how much damage it had done to the program), especially due to the insular nature of North Korean society. Launching such an air raid aimed at disarming North Korea would only inflame Kim, and probably give him impetus to actually sell weapons to terrorists.
If the goal is regime change, then the course is equally perilous. There’s no guarantee that Kim’s regime will fall, as he’s proved remarkably resilient and politically adept. Even if Kim’s regime does collapse, then his nuclear research and weaponry falls into the hands of rogue commanders, who will have few qualms about selling these to any group (terrorist or not) to finance their own personal efforts to take control of the country. A subsequent American invasion will only invite the use of nuclear devices against U.S. interests and forces.
The risks are immense as well. Kim has little in the way of advanced command, control, and communications technology. As soon as he gets word of incoming American attacks, he will almost certainly assume that a massive decapitation strike is on the way, and launch his offensive forces (conventional and nuclear) against their preplanned targets. The devastation wrought will be exceptionally great, and will send the global economy into a spiralling depression.
Finally, as to why Kim will not cooperate with Islamic terrorists, allow me to refer you here.
The Taiwanese premier, acting in his government capacity, has publicly acknowledged that Tapei is seeking to acquire land attack missile capabilities against China. Speaking in favor of the $18 billion weapons procurment plan currently under Taiwanese consideration, Premier Yu Shyi-kun argued that the island state must seek to establish “balance of terror” to deter China from launching a military strike. Mr. Yu specifically mentioned offensive missile batteries, arguing that “if you fire 100 missiles at me, I should also be able to fire 100 missiles at you, or at least 50 […] if you strike Taipei and Kaohsiung, I should at least be able to strike Shanghai.” According to intelligence estimates, Beijing has deployed more than 610 short range ballistic missiles within range of Taiwan, and is increasing this force by 75 missiles a year.
This is the first time in modern history that Taepei has publicly announced a security policy that includes the credible specter of a terrestrial counteroffensive against China. Previous defense policy, while establishing the capabilities necessary to stage a major counteroffensive operation (principly against naval and air targets), stayed short of acquiring the assets needed to bombard mainland China, let alone publicly announcing such a deterrent. In that way, this represents something of a significant step forward. Taiwan not only intends the acquire the missiles required for such an attack against Chinese urban centers (of which the island state would need to procure many), but is so confident in its ability to employ them that it is willing to announce them as a public deterrent.
This new round of arms procurement certainly presents a strategic dilemma for Beijing. Taiwan is not only acquiring the ballistic missiles (which put Chinese urban centers in great peril), but also submarines, air defense batteries, and other arms. These threaten to erode the advantage Beijing strategists had hoped to achieve by 2020. Once these assets are emplaced, any Chinese invasion would not only risk the loss of prestige and military assets, but also endanger commerce, and the lives of millions of citizens. Furthermore, the deployment of ballistic missiles by Taipei will put in place the straging infrastructure for a nuclear arsenal. Beijing wants to avoid a nuclear Taiwan at all costs.
However, for China, the military option is off the table. At the moment, Chinese forces are incapable of successfully annexing the island state - at least not without unacceptable losses. That leaves Beijing with three responses. First, the country could ignore this development and continue with current force development plans. This would be taking the long view, since Beijing has already been undertaking a long term force build-up aimed at achieving supremacy in Asia. Even fully implement, the arms packages currently under consideration in Taipei would be vastly insufficient to stand up to China in several decades. Second, Beijing could increase military production in the short term, and aim to continue to maintain an advantageous balance of power vis-a-vis Taipei. However, this would be expensive, and may potentially saddle China with an excess of outmoded capacity some time down the road. Finally, Beijing could lean on Washington, and try to compel it to pressure Taiwan into scaling back its armament program. This, however, is unlikely to succeed, since the United States has made it something of a policy point to maintain an effective Taiwanese deterrent.
It’s probable that China will at least continue its long term modernization and force buildup on schedule. This is essential to Chinese strategic goals, and affected little by Taiwan’s arms procurement. It is likely that Beijing will at least invest slightly in a short term capabilities buildup. This, while costly, will maintain a favorable power dynamic between the two countries, as well as continue to apply Chinese military pressure on Taiwan. It is unlikely that Beijing will attempt to forge a diplomatic agreement with the United States - not only does Washington support Taipei in this matter (for both political and economic reasons), but China would prefer to use the points its built up with the U.S. during trade negotiations. There is the remote possibility of a multifaceted agreement (for example, Beijing applying pressure to Pyongyang while Washington reins in Taipei); however, due to the nature of the Korean crisis, such as a resolution is highly unlikely.
Taiwan used to depend on Washington for offensive support during a war with China; the U.S. had the military capabilities, will, and power to do so. This move is demonstrative of an increasingly independent leaning government in Taiwan; that is to say, the government has become more interested in developing organic military power, and less in depending upon others whose support is tied into geopolitical factors. There is little Washington can do about this. What the United States can and will do is authorize the sale of the arms, and lobby for the deal to go through. This will extend the Taiwanese deterrent for some time into the future, and preserve stability between Beijing and Taipei. While some talk of an arms race, they ignore the fact that there already is a conventional arms race in Asia; it’s merely taking place over the span of decades, rather than years.
Taiwan’s purchase won’t upset the strategic dynamic.
When the North Korean nuclear crisis erupted in late 2002, the Bush administration set into action a complex sequence of events that it felt would best resolve the situation. At the time, it appeared that Washington was depending on a combination of pressure from Beijing and six party negotiations to denuclearize Pyongyang. Now, two years later, a more complete picture has emerged, and it is clear that the United States did not expect the negotiations to be successful. Instead, Washington had used the time it bought with negotiations to lay the extensive groundwork necessary for the containment of a nuclear-armed North. As it stands, this strategy may very turn out to be most optimal.
The Four Options
The United States presently has four options available for resolving the nuclear crisis.
The first is the military solution, principally advocated by former CIA director James Woolsey and retired Lieutenant General Thomas McInerney. In essence, this option consists of the overwhelming application of airpower followed by a rapid ground advance from both coasts of the Korean peninsula. As they argued in a Wall Street Journal editorial piece, “we judge that the U.S. and South Korea could defeat North Korea decisively in 30 to 60 days with such a strategy.” However, this plan has several significant flaws. First, their optimism that overwhelming U.S. airpower would be able to counter North Korea’s impressive 11,000 pieces of artillery is misplaced. While American airpower is certainly dominant, the U.S. presently lacks the capabilities to accomplish such a feat. While high endurance UAVs could saturate the battlefield and provide real-time intelligence on the location of Pyongyang’s artillery batteries, it would take time to vector airborne assets to those locations (the endurance for even the most advanced tactical fighter is relatively short, and it takes time for a fighter to move within range of a target).
Meanwhile, the North Korean batteries would be able to pound Seoul and industrialized South Korea with tens of thousands of rounds. The ensuing carnage would kill hundreds of thousands, destroy tens of billions of dollars of wealth, and instantly depress the global economy (to a significant extent). North Korea may also (its nuclear missiles are hidden) launch a nuclear attack against American forces in Japan and Korea, resulting in thousands of American deaths, and devastating damage to the world economy. U.S theater missile defense assets in the area employ primitive kinetic energy kill vehicles, and may or may not successfully defeat a North Korean launch.
The military option is thus overly risky and too costly to be used. The economic damage wrought by even a slightly imperfect campaign would far exceed the dangers of a nuclear North.
The second solution is near total isolation. North Korea has a Stalinist economy that is incapable of supporting itself without foreign aid and international trade. As the CIA World Factbook notes, “industrial capital stock is nearly beyond repair as a result of years of underinvestment and spare parts shortages. Industrial and power output have declined in parallel. The nation has suffered its tenth year of food shortages because of a lack of arable land, collective farming, weather-related problems, and chronic shortages of fertilizer and fuel.” During the mid-1990s, in fact, millions died of starvation because the country could produce nowhere near enough food. Today, most North Koreans are stunted (both physically and intellectually) and malnourished, because of the lack of even basic necessities such as food. The North Korean military is dangerously low on stockpiles of ammunition, oil, and spare parts, forcing a reduction in training to a very minimal level and rendering many vehicles and other equipment inoperative. These shortages have historically brought the country close to a revolution, averted only by liberal injections of foreign aid.
Above all, the regime in Pyongyang requires trade and foreign donations to survive. It is also highly desirous of the goods and services it can obtain from industrialized powers (and the ensuing wealth the regime elites gain from international commerce). Thus, if North Korea was isolated from the international community, the theory goes, its government would either collapse, or come so close to collapse that it would agree to verifiably disarm. The economic benefits it would accrue from such disarmament would serve to encourage Pyongyang to disarm in good faith (being uncooperative would reduce these extra benefits that the regime desires). This option was undertaken in the later 1990s, and nearly worked. However, when the situation again became extremely perilous for the citizens of North Korea, Seoul insisted on breaking the isolation and providing food aid, thus preventing the fermentation of conditions necessary for a successful revolution.
However, isolation is no longer an effective solution for the nuclear crisis. In the intervening years, increasing trade between Pyongyang and the international community has conspired to rid isolation of any significant detrimental effects. Bilateral trade with South Korea is rising rapidly, from just $400 million in 2000 to $726 million in 2003. Each country recently opened up seven ports that the other could trade at, allowing the volume of commerce to increase dramatically. The South Korean government is even planning on revising a decades old statute that forbids citizens from cooperating with North Koreans (most likely to pave the way for legitimate commercial joint ventures). Meanwhile, Russia is preparing to unilaterally supply North Korea with electricity and gas from its nearby plants, guaranteeing a stable supply of energy for the North Korean economy. This comes as Moscow considers whether to extend an oil pipeline through North Korea into South Korea, and improve trade relations with Pyongyang at the same time. In addition, North Korean trade with European countries like Germany continues to rise – and a new joint venture by a British lawyer in the Stalinist state is aimed at facilitating even more investment. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi has indicated that he wishes to capstone his legacy by normalizing trade relations with Pyongyang – and soon.
Should the United States wish to impose isolation, it would only be unilateral. Trade relations between Seoul, Tokyo, Moscow, and even London and Pyongyang have simply become too strong to be disrupted. Unilateral isolation would then be completely ineffective, since North Korea would be acquiring all of the resources it could possibly need or want from other nations. Washington’s biggest trump card, the construction of energy infrastructure, has been negated by Russia’s desire to exploit the North Korean market.
Perhaps the situation is best exemplified by the fact that, in its 2004 white paper, for the first time ever, Seoul refuses to designate North Korea an enemy.
The third option – the one that has been attempted over the past two years – is negotiation. In particular, six party diplomacy with corresponding pressure from Beijing. The theory goes that when presented with pressure from its close ally, China, Pyongyang will opt to go with a generous negotiated settlement. This option relies on Beijing being willing to apply a great enough amount of pressure on Pyongyang.
Supporters cite three main reasons why China could influence Pyongyang’s policy. First, Beijing is North Korea’s only true ally, and the only regional player that holds sway over North Korean security policy. Second, at the moment, Pyongyang depends on China to provide it with the raw materials and energy critical to the sustenance of the regime. Third, without China’s support, North Korea becomes vulnerable to the hard power (i.e. military) policies of the U.S. and its allies, as American geopolitical relations with China are the main factor blocking implementation of the military solution. Advocates also argue that China could be relatively easily persuaded to intervene. They argue that the most important incentive is security. When Pyongyang possessed one or two short-range devices, it presented regional powers with no real threat (such a small arsenal cannot be effectively employed offensively). However, with the acquisition of eight or more devices (with additional weapons on the way), the North Korean arsenal has come to constitute a danger to other countries in the area. It is a threat grave enough to compel regional powers like Japan to consider constituting their own nuclear program for deterrence. A nuclear arms race in East Asia is something China wants to avoid - it cannot afford to compete so directly with Japan or South Korea. Furthermore, China wants to improve its relationship with the United States, and wants its trade privileges upgraded. A trade deal could be worked out on the side, and tied into the North Korean situation.
Since Beijing already sees that the situation is leading directly to a regional militarization, it can probably be compelled to take a harder line on Pyongyang. Especially since it would earn points on the side with Washington (that would be cashed in later during trade negotiations). However, the difficulties with this solution lie in Beijing’s decreasing influence. Over the past few years, Pyongyang has been improving foreign relations with a multitude of countries. Whereas it has previously been a true international pariah, today countries and individuals are willing to conduct extensive trade with the North. The autocracy is no longer dependent on China to retain power or maintain order, and is near to being energy independent of Beijing. It has also (with its nuclear arsenal) created an immutable deterrent, and no longer must rely on geopolitical circumstance for protection. Beijing certainly still holds some sway over North Korean security policy, as it is the North’s only true ally, but this influence is limited and draining fast. In effect, while China may want to disarm Pyongyang, it may lack the ability. Its only other option, invasion, is far too devastating (economically and geopolitically) for policymakers to contemplate.
The final option – left publicly unconsidered until only very recently – is accepting the North Korean arsenal de facto, and implementing a regime of containment, inspection, and missile defense. This is, understandably, the option of last resort, since North Korean possession of nuclear devices runs decidedly contrary to American interests. However, advocates argue, it may in fact be the only realistic solution. Proponents cite the flaws of other potential options, and suggest measures taken now to implement a system of containment would do much more good than merely ill fated attempts at disarmament.
Essentially, a strategy of containment would be trifurcated into three significant components. First, North Korean territorial and power ambitions would be suppressed. The U.S. military would stage a powerful force presence in the general area (particularly naval wise), and would station overwhelming forces in South Korea. This would deter North Korea from attempting to annex South Korean territory (such as outlying islands), and would keep Pyongyang in line when it comes to maritime matters (the North has been making trouble for shipping in the area for some time). Second, smart sanctions would be instituted against Pyongyang. It would be completely banned from exporting CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) technology or components. It would be banned from importing such components, or other advanced weapons systems. Preferably, it would also be prohibited from exporting advanced arms (such as missiles), or sharing missile technology with rogue regimes. These measures would be backed by American naval power, and enforced through aggressive inspection protocols. Intelligence would keep tabs on air and sea shipments, which would be intercepted and searched if considered potentially compromised. Ships and airplanes believed to be violating the sanctions would be unofficially destroyed. Third, American allies in the region would be protected by a robust, interconnected missile defense grid. This grid would be comprised of ground-based surface to air missiles, ground based kinetic energy kill vehicles, and sea based anti-missile vehicles.
The risk inherent in this strategy, of course, is that North Korean nuclear technology finds its way to terrorists and hostile regimes. Nevertheless, this option of last resort may very well be the optimal way for Washington to address the crisis.
Future Prospects
At the moment, Washington claims to be employing the strategy of negotiation toward resolving the crisis. Negotiations are indeed on going; a fourth round of talks is scheduled to be held in Beijing at the end of September. American diplomats have also been conducting impromptu meetings with their North Korean counterparts at regional association meetings. In fact, there is a distinct possibility that Pyongyang may soften its stance after November. It is presently awaiting the outcome of the U.S. general election, hopeful that a more amenable party will come to power to negotiate with. However, it is doubtful that Pyongyang will put forth any proposal acceptable to Washington, now or then. It has repeatedly refused to accept verifiable disarmament (a necessary condition for a settlement), and it is not in the regime’s security interests to relinquish its nuclear deterrent. Indubitably, Washington realizes the same, and has crafted policy in response.
If one takes a careful look at recent shifts in the East Asian balance of military power, a pattern of shifting forces and procurement in order to defeat a nuclear attack is evident. Over the past few years, friendly powers such as Japan and South Korea have been purchasing and emplacing advanced air defense batteries. Japan has just recently requested authorization to purchase twenty PAC-3 Patriot batteries; Seoul has requested authorization to purchase hundreds of naval based SM2 IIIA Standard anti-air (including anti-missile) missiles, as well as hundreds of advanced RAM missiles (usable against all types of airborne targets). This is in addition to the already potent air defenses of both nations. The United States has opted to station its first detachment of theatre anti-missile cruisers in East Asia (in fact, the cruisers are specifically positioned to be most viable against North Korean launches). American forces in Korea (U.S.F.K.), while being numerically decreased, are being armed with the most lethal weapons platforms available. U.S. forces in South Korea are being repositioned in the South, to act as a mobile defense force while remaining out of the zones likely to be struck by North Korean nuclear missiles. Many of America’s most advanced strategic bombing assets are being permanently redeployed in Diego Garcia, thus enabling U.S. forces to rapidly level Pyongyang and North Korean infrastructure if ever necessary. This force build up corresponds to the missile defense and containment phases of option four, as outlined above.
These force shifts come as the United States and its allies turn East Asia into the focal point for the new Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is a major multilateral initiative aimed at inspecting for and interdicting shipments of banned weapons and technology on the open seas. The PSI, established in 2003, has so far resulted in the definitive exposure of the Libyan CBRN program, as well as in the detection and interdiction of illegal North Korean arms and drug shipments. The PSI is endorsed by and supported by nearly the entire industrialized world, including Australia, Japan, France, and South Korea. The PSI framework will enable Washington and its allies to significantly restrict the potential for Pyongyang to export nuclear technology. The PSI will also facilitate the unofficial destruction of vessels or planes believed to be carrying sensitive technology or components (due to the increased level of intelligence about such transports). The PSI, as well as corresponding sanctions and other instituted counter-proliferation programs, represent the inspection phase of option four.
Finally, Washington is positioning additional naval assets in East Asia. These assets, while primarily aimed at China, serve the side purpose of policing the Korean waters (along with South Korean help). They keep Pyongyang in line, and are an insurance policy against any North Korean attempt to disrupt maritime commerce. Washington is also conducting an exercise called Summer Pulse ’04, designed to demonstrate that the United States can deploy seven carriers at once, in several regions of the world, each capable of crushing an enemy. This is in clear reference to North Korea (as well as others, such as Beijing), designed to send the message to Korean policymakers that the United States would not sit back idly if Pyongyang made an aggressive move, and indeed had the capabilities to suppress such an act.
One way to enhance the strategic position of the United States in this matter would be to negotiate an agreement that, while falling short of fully verifiable disarmament, contains provisions that discourage the exploitation of North Korean nuclear technology by terrorists. In particular, such a settlement should, as Professor Avery Goldstein persuasively argues, “be designed to maximize the effectiveness of counterterrorism efforts (reducing the opportunities for the transfer of radioactive materials), even if it cannot ensure that the DPRK has been deprived of its nuclear deterrent. The inspection regime that the agreement establishes should focus mainly on ways to hamper the ability of the North to produce radioactive materials that could wind up in terrorists hands. The best way to do this is to establish rules that so tightly constrain North’s nuclear production capacity that its own interest in preserving a deterrent (latent or hidden) reinforces the fear that any illicit transfers may be detected. Because Pyongyang sees a nuclear weapons potential as the ultimate security guarantee, the scarcer its nuclear resources and the more difficult they are to retain after the imposition of inspection rules set up by an agreement, the more strongly motivated Pyongyang will be to husband them rather than sell them off.” Such an agreement is very much within the realm of possibility, as both acknowledged by Washington and North Korea.
This constitutes clear evidence that, however the Bush administration hopes to resolve the North Korean crisis, it is clearly hedging its bets. If the current strategy fails (which it probably will) Washington is prepared to fall back on containment. The groundwork for containment has been being laid over the past few years, and continues to be constructed even now. Containment as a historical policy option has generally been successful, although it requires a delicate touch to maintain. I suspect that this act of containment will work fairly well, but will not be sustainable indefinitely.
It is Pyongyang, though, that gains the most from the current state of affairs. Its nuclear weapons provide a deterrent against foreign aggression. Its improving relationship with other nations will accrue geopolitical benefits (in particular, it will no longer depend on China). Its vastly improving trade relationship will better the regime elites, decrease starvation, and generally improve the lives of the populace. Coupled with its minimal market reforms, these benefits will facilitate the extended survival of the regime.
At some point or another, relations between Seoul and Pyongyang will warm enough to make reunification an option. Although initially weary of the heavy financial burden reunification would impose on their economy, South Koreans will eventually agree to the prospect. Reunification will (in a very long time) come to pass, and South Korea’s dynamic information economy will provide enough wealth for it to be successful (as opposed to the example of Germany).
After that, it’s impossible to tell. But it’s best to keep in mind that “the more things change, the more they stay the same.”
This morning, Russian special operators stormed a school held by a heavily armed band of terrorists. Dozens are reported killed, hundreds wounded. The school has reportedly sustained heavy structural damage, and Russian troops are currently battling isolated pockets of resistance. This is the fourth terrorist attack within the last two weeks, and perhaps the most devastating. Most importantly, Russian intelligence suggests that there is another Chechen operative currently in Moscow, preparing to strike. Whatever the outcome, it is clear that these terrorist attacks are pushing the conflict towards a greater level of intensity.
Putin called for an emergency meeting of the United Nation’s security council on Wednesday, a measure usually reserved for grave situations requiring a serious response. This suggests that Putin may use the terrorist attacks as justification for a massive re-invasion of Chechnya. Or even more harsh measures, such as the instatement of direct rule. Moscow will, at the least, increase the intensity of Russian attacks in Chechnya. Moscow may also use this as an opportunity to strengthen its control over the secessionist provinces of Georgia - a move that would be inconspicuous and strategically advantageous. In addition, Putin will likely use a more aggressive posture toward Chechnya as a vehicle for avoiding internal reform (as happened during the last great terrorist strike on the Russian theater).
The decision to storm the school was Putin’s to make; the available information didn’t particularly lend support to either approach. I would’ve, personally, tried to negotiate, if only because the terrorists had fortified themselves extremely well (they were armed with high-explosives, rockets, assault rifles, and perhaps other weapons). An assault would be bloody and extremely dangerous. But, of course, not storming the facility left the hostages in great peril. I don’t think Putin can be faulted for deciding as he did. What he can be faulted on is the situation in Chechnya.
Unlike the American presence in Iraq, the Russian occupation of Chechnya is truly a quagmire. Every day, troops are killed in combat and in ambushes. Russian equipment, vehicles, and helicopters are wrecked. Dwindling Russian capital reserves are exploited to fund the war, depriving money from more useful endeavors. The war motivates terrorists to strike at the civilian population of Russia, whether it be in Moscow or North Ossetia. The benefits are minimal; strategically, Chechnya is mediocre place to contest. True - it’s something of a gateway to the oil of the Caucuses. But there are other areas just as sufficient, and much more amenable to Russian control (such as the secessionist provinces in Georgia).
Moscow planned to use Chechnya as a vehicle for exploiting the oil wealth of the Caucuses. However, this plan has clearly failed, and is costing Russia far more than it gains. The lives, resources, and capital saved far outweigh the loss of face that would come with a withdrawal and the imposition of isolation (that is, closing off the border). Russia could then focus on more promising avenues for accessing the oil, such as Georgia.