Power Politics

As I have noted previously, India is currently undergoing a sea change in economic, military, and foreign policy. The strategic balance in Asia has shifted away from the bipolar Soviet-American order, and is now a multilateral situation in flux. China, as well as the American power axis that includes Japan, Australia, Singapore, and South Korea, is seeking to dominate the region. India is now in a position to vie for regional power itself, and is seizing upon this opportunity to match and perhaps exceed China as a great power.

One of the core elements in India’s grand strategy to dominate the region is the development of a strong and well disciplined military. In particular, constructing a dominant navy is essential for India if it wishes to project power beyond its borders and challenge China. This is due to a number of reasons, primarily economic and geopolitical.

Geographically, India lies at the western edge of the concentration of power in Asia. For India to vie for control of Southern Asia with China and the United States, the ability to hold key control points in the Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea is imperative. Control of the Bay of Bengal will leave New Delhi in a strategically advantageous position relative to Malaysia, Indonesia, and Singapore / America. It will also enable New Delhi to relatively easily stage forces into the Southeast Asian arc of instability (the group of states such as Burma and Thailand that are unstable politically), thus protecting Indian commercial interests in the lucrative Asian sea lanes. Control of the Arabian Sea, particularly through the Lakshadweep islands is equally critical. That will allow India to maintain a secure corridor for the direct import of oil from the Middle East, preventing a rival power (such as Pakistan) from using the disruption of oil as a weapon against the rapidly expanding Indian economy, and enabling New Delhi to stage forces farther out into the west.

Also importantly, developing a strong Indian navy would allow New Delhi to work with the United States (and potentially China) to facilitate safe and productive commerce in the region, through policing the sea lanes, integrating politically unstable countries into the modern political order, and acting as a balancing force in the very intense competition to gain the rights to highly lucrative resource concessions in the waters off the Asian continent. Possessing extensive amphibious assault capacity will let Indian policymakers participate in endeavors such as a potential war with Iran or peacekeeping in Africa that are key to maintaining and expanding a stable world order. Active hard-power participation in world affairs would grant New Delhi sway in decisions of great international importance.

The Indian navy, while capable of conducting blue-water operations, is marred by several serious flaws. Foremost, many of India’s surface combatants are at the end of their useful service lives, and outmoded compared to those of New Delhi’s regional competitors. Second, the indigenous shipbuilding industry (which India used to construct most of its navy) is languishing under government control. India lacks the industrial capacity and managerial efficiency to replace its aging vessels in the short term. Finally, the sea domain over which New Delhi must maintain a strong naval presence (including India’s exclusive economic zone, as well as the Indian Ocean as a whole) is vast. A truly massive capital investment will be required to acquire enough ships to firmly secure the waters, and India’s forces will be stretched quite thin until that time.

For India to successfully modernize its navy and constitute a force formidable enough to stand up to China, New Delhi must be willing to incur great costs, both financial and political. First of all, the government must be willing to allocate tens of billions of dollars over the next decade exclusively to naval procurement. It looks as if the government intends to meet this goal (or some target like it). In the latest budget, funding for the defense ministry spiked by approximately 18%, with more increases promised. Second, the military must be willing to purchase vessels from foreign defense contractors. At this point in time, India’s domestic shipbuilding industry cannot meet the needs of the navy; it simply is not sophisticated enough. In time, India’s rising strength will lead to a rising defense sector, and then the government will be warranted in purchasing from domestic contractors. Now, however, India should select from the spectrum of European and American vessels to empower its navy. There is a political cost attached to the move, but decidedly worth it.

India would probably be best served with a mix of European and American ships. The new European frigates have proven to be inexpensive, reliable, and of high quality, so New Delhi will probably want to go with those to form the core of its near coastal patrol force. For its blue water navy, the government has already decided to purchase the new Delhi class destroyer. However, although the Delhi is a fine ship, the small production run means India should also select a complementary destroyer to form a core of a flexible blue water force. Here an American or British design would be optimal, since cost is less of a factor than performance. As for a carrier, India should study the Russian ship it recently acquired, and then draw up a domestic design. Failing that, the new joint-development project between France and Britain to create a modern strike carrier would serve New Delhi’s needs well.

The Indian military must also contend with the issue of optimizing its forces to fight the asymmetrical war plaguing the contested northern region of Kashmir. This is an especially timely issue because rebel forces in the region have been devastating Indian patrols ill-equipped for the paramilitary work they’ve been assigned. The organization of a dedicated anti-insurgency division specially equipped and trained to fight against rebel forces, as recommended by a slew of high ranking former flag officers, is a step that India must and will take toward stabilizing the Kashmir area. Not only will this force be useful in combatting the Kashmir rebels, however, but New Delhi will almost certainly find use for it abroad. Whether it be stabilizing Southeast Asia and protecting merchants from pirates, or peacekeeping in the Middle East, counterinsurgency units are intrinsically valuable. Thus, India will be able to contribute to protecting the global commercial order, as well as able to use its troops as leverage in extracting concessions from other great powers (such as the United States).

Finally, the question of what group exercises control over the Indian nuclear arsenal has come up for debate. The military (which presently controls the ballistic delivery vehicles) argues that control of the arsenal should be consolidated under a single authority, and then placed directly under the command of the armed forces. This, it contends, would simplify and streamline the critical nuclear command structure. Many elements of the civilian government (which currently has authority over the nuclear warheads themselves) believe that control should rest with India’s political leadership. They argue that civilian leadership is more responsible, and less likely to authorize the use of nuclear devices (since it lies outside of the insular military culture).

Just as in the United States, Russia, Britain, and other nuclear powers, India should delegate supreme command authority to its top political leadership. This organizational scheme has a proven track record of stability and cautiousness, and prevents an insular military culture from self-reinforcing the idea that a preemptive nuclear strike is necessary. It’s also a significant component of the necessary division between the military (an instrument of the government) and the foreign policy establishment (the policymakers of the government). When left unchecked, the defense establishment often encroaches upon foreign policy decisions and artificially shifts the cost-benefit calculus in favor of force.

1. Poland, Hungary, Sweden, and Lithuania fail to pass the financial tests required for entry into the eurozone. Meanwhile, Greece acknowledges that its deficit numbers for 2001 that enabled Athens’ entry into the eurozone were “misreported.” The actual deficit was higher. These two stories illustrate why the European Union, while a potentially effective forum for facilitating intra-European commerce, will not supersede the current order of nation-states in Europe. Not only do great powers such as France ignore its edicts when advantageous, but also the serious lack of control that the European Commission exercises over the fiscal policies of member states makes effective intergovernmental integration impossible.

2. India’s government again demonstrates a commitment to free market reform. This time, New Delhi has made it clear that foreign investment is encouraged, despite opposition from the communist elements of the governing coalition. This is a very positive sign for future Indian economic development.

3. A leading international think tank, the IISS, has published a report in part suggesting that the war in Iraq has emboldened Iran and North Korea to produce and proliferate nuclear weapons. The report’s findings, at least when it comes to North Korea, are flawed, however. While it is true that Washington’s expenditures on the war in Iraq reduced the money available to finance other operations, and many military assets were diverted to support the war, these have had an insignificant effect on the Korean situation. Already American options were pretty much limited to containment - an outcome the Bush administration planned and designed for. Additional financial resources would have made little difference in how the crisis played out, and a more powerful concentration of military power on the peninsula would not have upset the stalemate already established. In fact, the Iraq conflict negatively affected the Korean nuclear crisis little, if at all.

Thanks to the remarkable vibrancy and transparency of its recent Presidential election, Jakarta has successfully completed the transition from a dictatorship to a healthy democracy. No longer is the political situation in flux; the electorate has strongly unified behind former General Yudhoyono, who won the election with a powerful mandate for reform. The charismatic President-elect has promised to reduce corruption in Jakarta’s institutions and build upon the framework of the previous administration in bringing Indonesia forward. Mr. Yudhoyono has a difficult task ahead of him, but he has already shown through his cabinet portfolio that he is an effective political operator willing to compromise on some issues in order to better promote his broader agenda. Mr. Yudhoyono has chosen to appoint capable pro-reform technocrats to key oversight posts, and also appeased the powerful Golkar party by selecting conservative candidates for less important positions.

The greatest challenge facing Yudhoyono is promoting government transparency and reducing corruption. Indonesia is plagued by severe government corruption and inefficiency, and lacks the just legal system necessary to facilitate robust economic expansion. Yudhoyono made this issue a focal point of his election campaign, and has demonstrated an honest willingness to follow through on his promises. If he is able to strengthen the power of the central government (essential for developing standardized rule-sets that facilitate commerce) while at the same time protecting the institutions of democracy, then ameliorating the scourge of corruption is within the realm of possibility. Once a good measure of transparency has been brought to the country, foreign investors will be more confident about Indonesia as an investment opportunity. Increased foreign investment (and thus greater taxable inflows) is critical to all of Jakarta’s other goals; it greases the wheels of the economy, and coaxes the development of internal Indonesian financial institutions.

Mr. Yudhoyono also faces the very delicate issue of Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Indonesia is a highly heterogeneous mixture of polities, each with a unique political and social culture. A few of these provinces are hotbeds of Islamic fundamentalism and fertile grounds for terrorist groups. These terrorists not only use Indonesia as a base of operations to stage against their external enemies, but seek to install a favorable central government in place of the current pro-globalization order. This makes the country a significant target for terrorism, and indeed recent acts of terror have been a drag on the economy. Mr. Yudhoyono must balance the concerns of Jakarta and foreign capitalists with political stability in the country as a whole while dealing with the situation. Push too hard for one side and the entire country risks collapse. The best way for Jakarta to deal with the situation is to maintain stability for the moment, while enacting the reforms discussed in the preceding paragraph. By strengthening the central government, Yudhoyono can gain additional power and leverage over the provincial authorities that are lax in cracking down on fundamentalism. By also fueling economic growth, Mr. Yudhoyono can earn the prestige and respect that are integral to securing local loyalties.

As far is military policy is concerned, Jakarta will probably focus on improving its air and sea capabilities more than anything else. Recent regional militarization by neighbors Malaysia and Singapore (as well as India, China, and Japan) virtually requires that Jakarta develop a strong naval force to secure its interests in the Strait of Malacca. If Mr. Yudhoyono is also successful in luring foreign capital to the archipelago, then the greatly increased inflow of liquidity will enable the government to invest enough in weapons to maintain parity with both Singapore and Malaysia, as well as to assert control over regional bodies of water.

The advanced naval and aerial platforms that Indonesia may eventually decide to procure will of course come from foreign suppliers. European, American, and Russian contractors will all be in contention. Although Russian platforms are highly capable, the suspect support from Russian companies and significant force integration issues will probably eliminate them from the competition. This leaves the United States and Europe.

Perhaps the best way to sway Indonesian contracts is by maintaining warm relations with the new government in Jakarta. Indonesia will be more inclined to go with American producers if it will help bolster the Indonesian-American geopolitical relationship. Maintaining a strong relationship with the new government is in American national interests for other reasons, as well. Mr. Yudhoyono is ready and willing to reduce Indonesian corruption, continue free market reforms, and foster a positive investment climate for foreign capital. These reforms benefit the global economy. Yudhoyono’s reforms also aim to curtail Indonesian based terrorism, the benefits of which are obvious. If successful, the new administration will set a very positive example for other Muslim countries to follow in embracing globalization, and empower a massive labor force of 200 million to begin building wealth.

Mr. Yudhoyono represents a credible chance for constructive reform in Indonesia; Washington should throw its support behind him.

Irrespective of whether Germany actually deploys troops to Iraq, it is pertinent to ask what type of contribution Berlin could make to the reconstruction effort. The limited financial aid, debt forgiveness, and troop training support presently provided is of valuable, if small, service to Iraq. However, any future contributions Berlin may make to the reconstruction effort will be necessarily very limited. This is due to several factors. Primarily, Germany’s inability to lend extensive support comes from its lack of financial liquidity. The country is not only running a massive deficit, but is having a hard time financing that deficit as is. With the specter of an overwhelming tide of social benefits claims from the growing class of elderly ever-present, and the cost of the troubled reuinification large, Berlin simply cannot afford to draw itself even deeper into debt. Secondarily, the poor quality of the conscripted German armed forces, their logistical inadequacy (Germany lacks the resources to forward-deploy thousands of troops for an extended period), and the capabilities gap between German and American forces all make a large German presence not only unfeasable, but unwise. Especially considering their merely mediocre performance in Afghanistan.

Thusly, the price to the United States of German help in Iraq would have to be extremely low to justify the marginal benefits. Plus, Germany would almost certainly refuse to arrange troop deployments unless the benefits Berlin accrues are extensive enough to compensate for the heavy burden imposed on it. The simple fact is that the interests of Washington and Berlin do not converge on the issue, and neither side would benefit from a distorted arrangement designed to facilitate the deployment of German troops. Neither a Kerry administration nor a Bush administration would be wise to pursue this avenue of diplomacy.

Some suggest that Mr. Kerry will indeed be able to secure to military support from the German government. Through superior leadership, that blogger believes, “Kerry can […] convince our allies that is in their interest to get involved in Iraq and in our interest to make the sacrifices necessary to obtain their help.” This sentiment sounds good in theory, but the author fails to demonstrate how Kerry could feasibly shift Berlin’s cost-benefit calculus enough to make military deployments optimal. He argues that Germany is “reluctant” to dispatch troops “because the Bush Administration has [offered] no incentive for them, and made it politically untenable, for them to do so.” “Moreover,” he stresses, “the Bush Administration has been entirely unwilling to share anything other than the burden.”

He argues that to correct these purported failures of leadership, “[the United States] must be willing to offer up a certain amount of military, political, and economic control to those countries in exchange for their badly needed help.” Yet he provides few details on how this is to be accomplished. If the United States were to offer Germany some measure of control in exchange for the deployment of German ground forces, the United States would be relinquishing too much power over the situation (a high price to pay for rather limited benefits). If the United States offers other incentives, such as beneficial access to reconstruction contracts, Germany will be spending too much and gaining too little. A win-win situation cannot be established, and thus cooperation cannot take place.

Finally, the author’s suggestion that President Bush’s unpopularity abroad has made it “politically untenable” to contribute troops places far too much value on the opinions of the European electorate. Not only do insulated European foreign policy establishments tend to act in line with their national interests, but the nature of European democracy (party politics within the context of a political culture that is willing to grant a great deal of independence to the elected government) allows governments to enact hugely unpopular policies while retaining power (Spain’s government, for instance, strongly supported the Iraq war, which was opposed by nearly 90% of Spaniards, and did not suffer significantly). If German policymakers felt that deploying troops would advantage Berlin, they would have done so.

Other bloggers have seized upon the issue as a political lever (in addition to believing that Mr. Struck’s comments should be taken at face value). Stretching the truth, that blogger argues that “everyone with any knowledge of diplomacy and foreign policy seems to believe that [Europeans would be more willing to help]” Kerry than Bush. While sweeping generalization are almost always flawed and inaccurate, this one is particularly misleading. While it is technically true that most commentators believe a Kerry administration would be more willing to compromise and collaborate with the Europeans, this doesn’t mean relations would improve substantially were Kerry to be elected. Fundamental strategic divergences cannot be repaired on a whim, and European-American relations would continue to be strained with Kerry in the White House.

The blogger also believes that, should President Bush “bring the allies issue up in tonight’s debate,” the minister’s comments “have given Kerry all of the ammo he needs to hit that one right out of the park.” While undoubtedly Germany’s carefully executed campaign to reinforce Kerry’s flank will be beneficial for the senator, the President has many strong counterarguments that would achieve parity with Kerry’s assertions during the debate. The issue is something of a nonissue, however, since the candidates will not be arguing over foreign policy during this final debate (it will be exclusively over domestic policy).

Perhaps most tellingly, Chancellor Schroder has issued a public statement clearly stating that German troops will not be deployed to Iraq.

Hoping to influence the coming American elections in favor of Senator John Kerry, the German government has sent out feelers about a possible deployment of troops to Iraq should Mr. Kerry emerge victorious. Peter Struck, German defense minister, noted in an interview with the Financial Times that while “at present I rule out the deployment of German troops in Iraq[…], there is no one who can predict developments in Iraq in such a way that he could make a such a binding statement [about the future],” hinting that the election of Kerry may lead to a significant German presence in Iraq. Referring to the Senator’s plan to hold an international conference on Iraq’s future, Mr. Struck went on to say that “this is a very sensible proposal. The situation in Iraq can only be cleared up when all those involved sit together at one table. Germany has taken on responsibilities in Iraq, including financial ones; this would naturally justify our involvement in such a conference.” While Mr. Struck never went so far as to endorse Mr. Kerry, his remarks constitute a clear gesture of support for the candidate.

That Germany is issuing such feelers is not a surprise. Berlin has a strong interest in seeing a President with more friendly views of the core European powers come into office. A small measure of support designed to bolster Senator Kerry on one of his weaker points is well worth the incurred cost of minor consternation from the present administration. If there is a positive response to this feeler, Berlin may even take a more unambiguous stance in the near future.

A more pertinent question, however, is how German policymakers actually would react to a Kerry victory (or for that matter a Bush victory as well). The geopolitical reality of the situation (the most important factor for Berlin) would not be radically altered by a President Kerry; indeed, apart from additional international window-dressing and perhaps a more rapid troop withdrawal, Kerry’s handling of the situation would mirror the current administration’s quite closely. While the election of a more friendly Atlanticist to the oval office may spur some of the German body politic to push for increased involvement, the majority of the electorate will remain solidly opposed. In effect, Berlin’s interests (both politically and strategically) in the reconstruction of Iraq would remain unchanged.

Such a condition would merely serve to reinforce the status-quo, which is is still highly preferable to the German government. Berlin recognizes that while it has an interest in nurturing a stable and productive Iraq, it lacks the resources to make a sizable contribution toward achieving that goal (policymakers face several daunting challenges far more important to them than Iraq, including the failure of reunification and a struggling economy). Thusly, the government has adopted a program of buck-passing (letting Washington do the heavy lifting with America’s considerably greater resources), while also providing limited support (through initiatives such as troop training and equipping the reconstituted Iraqi armed forces, both of which it can do very effectively). This enables Germany to satisfy its strategic objective of building a productive and stable Iraq at minimal cost and minimal risk. Without a significant change in the geopolitical map, there is little reason for Berlin to enact significant policy changes.

There is, of course, another avenue for Gerhard Schroder to pursue, which is the grand bargain. The present administration’s geostrategic calculus (de-emphasizing the value of the core European powers, minus the United Kingdom) makes it unlikely that Berlin and Washington could reach a grand bargain should Mr. Bush be reelected. However, the election of Senator Kerry (an Atlanticist at heart) would pave the way for a possible agreement. Such a grand bargain would involve Germany providing extensive support for the war in Iraq, as well as acceding to American demands on a host of less visible issues (such as the European arms embargo on China), in exchange for American endorsement of Berlin’s bid for a security council seat, and an agreement by Washington to constrain its use of hard power in the world in a variety of ways.

The path of the grand bargain, however, is fraught with peril and treachery. First of all, a President Kerry would (despite any rhetoric to the contrary) at core be defending American interests in the world. This means that whatever Atlanticist leanings he may have, he won’t agree to a grand bargain unless the United States benefits from it. Any German contribution to the reconstruction effort, even a numerically substantial one, would necessarily be limited in benefit. The military capabilities gap between Berlin and Washington (and the low quality of the conscripted Bundeswehr) render a large deployment of German troops unfeasible and unwise. The financial constraints Berlin is operating under (massive deficits, without the benefit of a constant flow of liquidity from Asia as enjoyed by the United States) preclude large scale financial or economic assistance. Thus, to pass muster, a grand bargain would have to be none too ambitious in scale. This would dramatically reduce the benefits Berlin would accrue from it. Secondly, even strong American support of a permanent German seat on the United Nations Security Council would not guarantee success. Italy, for example, has a vested interest in either joining the UNSC itself, or preventing Germany from joining. The complicated geopolitics of the situation mean that a reorganization of the UNSC may not even come up for vote (especially since expanding permanent (veto-wielding) membership dramatically would render the council almost entirely impotent). Thirdly, Berlin would be hard pressed to design mechanisms capable of containing American hard power, and would be pressed harder still to implement them in a way that the United States could accept. While forcing Washington to sign a panoply of pre-existing international treaties would probably accomplish the task, such a proposal would never pass through the US Senate. Thus a grand bargain becomes a very unlikely, although possible, move in American-German relations.

Most likely, the benefits that Berlin accrues through the status-quo will convince German policymakers not to significantly modify the nation’s Iraq policy.