Power Politics

In the meantime, Powell hopes for a glorious coup with which to end his stint as secretary of state. Nailing down a meaningful agreement between the Palestinians and Israelis would certainly fit the bill. Unfortunately for Powell, if there were ever a moment when that wasn’t possible, this is it.

– Strategic Forecasting: Geopolitical Diary

The BBC reports that “with 71% of the votes counted, Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych had won 49% of the votes against Mr Yushchenko’s 47%.” Widespread electoral fraud, manipulation, and intimidation has been reported. Several exit polls gave Mr. Yushchenko a significant lead, however, it appears that Mr. Yanukovich may win a slight majority of the preliminary popular vote count. This election is definitely headed to the courts and the insiders.

More details when they emerge.

Update: Interfax has more detailed statistics. This is unfortunate.

Update 2: More information. In particular, note that Mr. Kivalov will be sleeping for the next few hours. That means few updates between now and then. Also note that he spoke with Yanukovich over the phone about the results - perhaps he believes Yanukovich has the election wrapped up, or intends to help him in the count.

Update 3: 73% counted. “According to the Ukrainian Central elections Commission’s official data, 73.3% of votes at the Ukrainian presidential elections’ second round have been counted. According to the current results, Viktor Yanukovych collected 48.9% of the votes while Viktor Yushchenko has 47.47%.”

Update 4: Yushchenko parallel count shows massive lead for the liberal-minded candidate.

Update 5: Official margin reduced. “Currently, 74.4% of votes at the Ukrainian presidential elections’ second round have been counted, Viktor Yanukovych remains ahead with 48.78% of the votes, Viktor Yanukovych has 47.6%, an Interfax correspondent reported from the Ukrainian Central elections Commission. The margin between the candidates’ ratings has decreased to 1.18%.”

Mr. Sandefur disputes my thesis that the world order is amoral by arguing that “there is a universal moral standard by which the acts of nations can be judged.”

I lay my opposition to Mr. Sandefur’s stance on several grounds. First, while I tend to agree that there is moral imperative in the state of nature to respect the natural rights enjoyed by mankind, I must emphasize that there is a difference between what ought to be and what is. Second, it important to distinguish between a nation-state and a person. Through centuries of evolution, the nation-state has turned into an impersonal institution that is finely tuned for advancing the interests of the body politic. Its policies are derived from a complex system of bureaucratic and legal structures that combine to have emergent properties unique from any individual actor. Comparing the morality of the general population with the morality of a nation-state is an exercise in futility, since the two are different beasts entirely. Whereas the individual may assimilate an act of immorality as a violation of the ethical standard of reason, the nation-state will view it through the institutional perspective of utility and consequences. While the bodies politic themselves of nation-states may view international affairs through the lens of morality, the actual formulation of policy is fairly well insulated from these views (particularly overseas). An outraged populace is only an effective agent of change when the circumstances are so extreme as to elevate its discontent into a political force with real power.

Thus, the evidence Mr. Sandefur provides to reinforce his first contention (that there is a “universal moral standard”), while valid, does not address the pertinent issue. The ideological presumptions intrinsic in the Declaration of Independence are declarations of what ought to be, not necessarily what is. However, simply because a state is prohibited from an act, of right, does not necessarily make that act rare or reviled (by other nations). The Declaration was a political document aimed at formally pronouncing American independence, and persuading the French to support the act of revolution. It failed to accomplish even that modest objective, however, since the other European powers had more practical concerns in mind. Other European powers eventually came to actively support the American cause as a way of combating their European enemy, Britain. The American Revolutionary War, in fact, runs to counter to Mr. Sandefur’s assertion, since the primary motivations were amoral (and the British did have their allies, despite whatever injustices they may have perpetrated).

Mr. Sandefur then contends that it’s not true “that a nation that tries to act in conformity with the international moral order gets left behind.” He begins by acknowledging that “many nations” (including undesirables such as “China, Cuba, North Korea, [and] Iran”) act without thought to the “natural moral order.” However, he then argues that the United States is unique in having “tended to abide by the natural moral order,” and has profited greatly because of it. John Mearsheimer, however, demolishes this contention in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, concluding that “American foreign policy has usually been guided by realist logic, although the public pronouncements of its leaders might lead one to think otherwise.” In World War II, the United States fought the axis to preserve the balance of power and prevent the emergence of a dominant European or Asian power (as well as to effect gains in power). The US fought alongside tyrannical powers such as the Soviet Union to accomplish this goal, facilitating the expansion of their power to further American interests. The Cold War was also a product of underlying power realities. To contain the Soviet Union, American policymakers supported a great number of evil regimes and perpetrated a great number of what you would consider immoral acts precisely because the philosophical element of the fight was relatively unimportant. And in the period leading to World War I, the United States opposed Germany, which was widely considered a progressive constitutional state far more enlightened than many of its peers.

As for Mr. Sandefur’s argument that American benevolence have earned it “many dear friends, both on the national level and on the individual level (i.e., refugees),” I believe the situation is much more clouded. While it’s true that the principles the US has traditionally stood for (liberty, opportunity, and individualism) has earned it respect and admiration, response to American foreign policy has been decidedly ambivalent. Whenever American policy was beneficial to a nation, the populace of that nation held favorable views of the US. Whenever American policy was unfavorable to a nation (well exemplified by the growing resentment of American power across the world), the populace of that nation was generally hostile to the United States. In addition, as I noted above, the views of nations are very divergent from the views of the individual. Nations have not looked differently on the United States based on morals or values; instead, nations have changed their position towards Washington based on how it related to their strategic interests. European governments, for instance, have not based their policies towards the invasion of Iraq on morals. Instead, they have cooperated with or antagonized the US led effort based on their strategic interests. In any case, as I noted earlier, the opinions of the body politic harbor little significance in the scheme of things.

Mr. Sandefur also believes that when the United States has contravened the “international moral order,” it has suffered a loss of prestige. Strictly speaking, this is an accurate assessment. Prestige as a measure of moral standing and cultural rectitude suffers when a country violates the natural rights of humankind. However, prestige is necessarily subordinate to power and wealth as guiding factors in foreign policy. Having national prestige is nice, but it’s of little value to the practical concerns of international affairs. Acquiring power, on the other hand, often requires breaking natural law. World history is replete with examples of nations profiting greatly from contravening this order. History is also illustrative of how abiding by moral values is a dangerous proposition (consider my previous example of 16th century Spain, which collapsed due to King Philip II’s strong tilt to morality in foreign policy).

Unfortunately, in the state of nature, men (and particularly nations) transgress this law of reason whenever it suits their purpose, and most others lack the morality to act against them. Again, I assert that the amoral nature of real world politics necessitates consequentialism, lest a nation relinquish its competitive advantages and fall prey to a more amoral power.

(Cross posted at Freespace)

Although tomorrow’s Ukrainian contest is perhaps best marked by its dynamism and uncertainty, here are a few predictions on the outcome.

The final outcome of the election will remain unclear until well after the completion of voting. The fairly evenly divided popular vote will provide ample opportunities for institutional insiders to manipulate the results and bargain over the outcome. The plethora of legal challenges sure to ensue will complicate the matter even further. In the end however, there will almost certainly be a smooth transition to power for the winner.

Both Washington and Moscow are heavily invested in seeing their favored candidates emerge victorious. Careful scrutiny will be applied to the situation by both governments, and the two have been engaged in tussle over the loyalties of Kiev insiders. Moscow, however, has acceded to US pressure in recent weeks and backed down from its hard support of Yanukovich in the interest of bolstering relations in more critical areas (such as accession to the World Trade Organization). If Yushchenko appears to have the edge after preliminary insider negotiations are over, Putin may very well back down and concede the election to him.

In recent weeks, many government insiders have shifted their allegiance to Mr. Yushchenko, or at least granted him more respect. This is evident in the revised first round vote count, which changed the official winner from Yanukovich to Yushchenko. Whether or not a critical mass of insiders defect to Yushchenko, or even whether President Kuchma himself leans toward the candidate, remains to be decided. However, with Washington’s increased focused on the contest, I believe a critical mass will be swayed to Mr. Yushchenko’s side.

In the end, due to a variety of factors (not least active American efforts in favor of Yushchenko), I suspect Yushchenko will narrowly edge out Yanukovich, and become the next President of the Ukraine. Here’s what happens next.

(Cross posted at Freespace)

As a libertarian on domestic policy and a consequentialist on foreign policy, many would contend that my policies suffer from ideological dissonance, and lack a common philosophical thread. However, when one looks at it from a very broad perspective, a common philosophical tie emerges that connects these seemingly disparate world-views together. They key to understanding where I come from is to understand the nature of both the international and national systems.

In the national system, the government derives its power from the social contract accepted by both the body politic and the government. The government is granted hegemony (in this case implying a monopoly on the initiation of force) in exchange for acting as a fiduciary agent to secure the individual’s right to life, liberty, and property, as well as to accomplish other goals that the body politic considers legitimate. While philosophers have argued that the body politic retains ultimate sovereignty, and has the right of revolution against a government that breaks the social contract, in practicality the government assumes the power to use national sovereignty with great flexibility.

Since the government has hegemony over its domain, it has the power to institute the system of laws and codes it feels is most appropriate (subject to considerations of legitimacy which are irrelevant to this discussion). Thus, the government can freely adopt policies of libertarianism without the risk of facilitating the private violation of natural rights (since any violation can and will be contained and prosecuted). If one accepts the concept of natural rights (which has been promoted with far greater eloquence than I can hope to achieve by intellectual geniuses like John Locke), it’s clear that the government should implement policies congruent with securing these rights.

The international system, however, is multipolar. There is no one country with global hegemony - and the fundamental policy of power balancing ensures that it is highly unlikely one will ever rise. Countries, as self-interested institutional actors, are almost always seeking to maximize their power, wealth, and prestige. Nations act amorally, and regard the concept of natural rights as little more than paper conveniences. If a country tries to act with morality as its guiding force, it loses power and gets left behind. There is no universal power to secure the rights of all people; it can be said that countries are in a state of nature.

So consequentialism in foreign affairs is necessitated (in my view) by the nature of the highly competitive, amoral Hobbesian world order. Countries can and will try to reduce war and promote economic trade — a beneficial outcome for sure. However, the system will remain dangerous for even the greatest power. One does not have to look to deep to see the lessons from the decline of a great 16th century power, Spain. Spain was reduced to at best a third-rate power, and has never truly recovered since. A national government, as an agent of the people formed to advance the interests of the body politic, has a responsibility to ensure that the nation does not fall prey to foreign nemeses, and instead does the best job it can for its citizens.

(Cross posted at Freespace)