Power Politics

The Financial Times supplement also included a good article on the revolutionary new Littoral Combat Ship, which is currently being designed to serve as the core of the Pentagon’s brown water force. While the blue water naval threats of the future (primarily consisting of great powers such as China and India) must be countered by the continued development of conventional large displacement vessels, most of the naval threats faced by the United States in the future will be brown water, which necessitate different doctrines and platforms. Whether operating against rogue states and pirates, or clearing a minefield close to shore, the LCS can and will be instrumental in accomplishing the objectives of brown water warfare.

The LCS is required because of the intrinsic insufficiency of conventional surface combatants against brown water threats. Most of America’s current fleet is incapable of operating effectively close to shore. Relatively slow, large displacement vessels are vulnerable to fast-attack boats, shallow mines, and entrenched diesel submarines. Furthermore, the current spectrum of US assets lacks the capability to efficiently vanquish the threats of the brown water. Blue water vessels are too large to feasibly police and protect busy sea lanes, for example, and require significant overhead. Coastal mine-clearing and special operations support are far too unwieldy to be practical with many of today’s conventional assets.

With a base price of just about $250 million, the hull is much less expensive than the multi-billion dollar blue water combatants. Further, the design is highly modular, and each hull can be fitted with a panoply of “mission modules” capable of undertaking a variety of tasks. This flexibility enables a detachment of LCS’s to perform the roles of dozens of vessels, all with minimal overhead and resources.

There are two competing designs for the contract. One, by Lockheed Martin, is a conventional single-hull design capable of accommodating mission modules, cargo, and a helicopter landing pad. The other, a joint venture between Austal and General Dynamics, is a futuristic trimaran that “offers greater stability at high speeds”, and a sophisticated control scheme. I personally support the Austal design. It’s an advanced and capable design, with a number of significant benefits over the conventional single hull. Perhaps most importantly, it’s extremely stable, which is critical for the rapid attack combat and pursuit that the vessel will be required to engage in. The trimaran design also reduces hull surface area, allowing for more economical propulsion. The ship is more resilient, since the damage to one of the hulls can be compensated for by the others. Finally, some engineers have suggested that it may be possible to vent engine exhaust between the hulls, and thus reduce the thermal signature of the ship when viewed from the side.

As for the risks in developing such a radically new design, they are actually quite minimal. The RV Triton, a British demonstration vessel for the technology, has performed very well in trials. The technology has also been around for a long time, and innumerable papers and analyses have been done confirming the feasibility of the trimaran warship. In addition, Austal, one of the shipwrights, specializes in the construction of high-speed vessels of this type.

Perhaps most importantly, however, is that there is plenty of time to iron out any design problems before the ship enters service. The navy should take the risk and go with the Austal entry, because nothing ventured means nothing gained.

The Financial Times recently (December 1st) featured a survey on the state of the global defense industry. Included among the excellent articles were two concerning future military procurement and naval force structure. In particular, I was struck by the current American budget crunch that has cost the US military dearly in terms of its new classes of high performance combat platforms.

People close to Pentagon budget-makers say knives are still out on the air force’s most prized programme, the F/A-22, in spite of the fact it has finally moved into production.

The US Navy has reportedly submitted a budget request for 2006 that would see no funds going to the destroyer programme.

It is also said to call for a reduction in the number of aircraft carriers from 12 to 11.

As I have previously argued, the US military needs to maintain the F/A-22 air dominance fighter program. At a time when states such as Russia and France are exporting air superiority fighters on par with and even superior to America’s 5th generation entry level fighter (the F-32), the United States cannot afford to field a force of merely adequate aircraft. If the need ever arises to confront a state such as China or India, or even a rogue state armed with advanced interceptors, the F/A-22 will enable the United States to win easily and decisively. The country could certainly win with less capable airframes, but any war would be less decisive, and with far greater combat casualties. Furthermore, anything less than complete air dominance would jeopardize the war effort, since America has come to depend so much on airpower (and its benefits) for crushing the enemy. Compromising the ability of the air force to maintain air dominance easily and decisively is entirely unacceptable.

The reductions in blue-water naval power are similarly disturbing. The US carrier force forms the backbone of American force projection overseas, and Washington depends on it to enforce its interests abroad. Any war against a decent military foe requires the extensive use of carriers for rapid and effective resolution. If the the fleet is reduced by one, the navy will have seriously crimped the amount of active military power that can be sustained over time, which would enable rogue states to make trouble during a US war (this would give Washington little recourse against them - unless the President is willing to deploy an expeditionary strike group and attack). While the strategic bomber corps may be the muscle behind the leviathan, the navy would be wise to remember that without a strong backbone, the US military loses a great deal of flexibility. Surely, funding a single extra carrier group is worth it.

As for the destroyer program, I believe that the design speaks for itself. The new DD(X) and CG(X) family of vessels will be, along with the carrier force, an integral component of any future military doctrine, and for good reason. Their capabilities are so impressive that even contemplating scrapping the program is unacceptably short-sighted.

Since its independence from the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan has maintained favorable relations with nearly all of the world’s powers. When disputes have arisen between Astana and its neighbors (most prominently over the Kazakh-Uzbek border), Kazakhstan has sought to resolve them diplomatically. Boasting the most powerful economic engine in Central Asia, the state is an anchor of stability in a region bubbling with tension. Kazakhstan is blessed with lucrative petroleum reserves and a rich supply of natural resources, as well preeminent access to the Caspian sea energy deposits. Its geopolitical import has made it (along with neighboring Uzbekistan) the focal point of American policy in the region, and Washington has a considerable strategic and commercial interest in Astana.

Kazakhstan is uniquely suited to being one of the key players in the intense international competition to secure and develop expansive new sources of hydrocarbons and other raw materials. In addition to possessing rich oil reserves capable of sustaining production in excess of three million barrels per day, Astana has nearly a trillion proved cubic meters of natural gas. Its large supplies of copper, chromium, magnesium, titanium, and zinc continue to be an important source of revenue. It also has geographical control over the very lucrative deposits of oil and natural gas in the disputed Caspian sea; although these fields require expensive investment and development, they are one of the few unexploited reserves capable of compensating for the loss of large older fields, such as those in the Middle East. The domestic economic situation is unusually conducive to foreign investment as well, and a political commitment to capitalism has facilitated the economic rise of the nation. A number of oil conglomerates and financiers (both private and state) are betting heavily on the success of the Kazakh fields, and are building up the infrastructure necessary to sustain high oil production quite rapidly.

Kazakhstan is also a key geopolitical player in the volatile Central Asian region. Its strong economy and peaceful foreign policies have contributed greatly toward stabilizing the area, which is rife with simmering issues that have the potential to quickly explode into massive conflagrations. The economic prosperity enjoyed in the republic has also diffused into neighboring areas, raising general economic success and promoting stable national governance. The Kazakh-Uzbek joint-efforts to advance the development and political stability of the region, forged after the paradigm shifting September 11th attacks, are essential to peaceful regional cohesion. If either Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan collapses, so will Central Asia. Kazakhstan is also an important base for the United States in the war against Islamic fundamentalism. As well as providing an area for American forces to stage from (or simply fly-over), a strong Kazakhstan provides a model of ethnic cooperation and stable governance for the people of the region to adopt (or believe in).

Kazakhstan under President Nazarbayev has maintained relative neutrality, having generally good relations with the major foreign powers, and cooperating with its neighbors during territorial disputes. The government naturally leans toward Moscow, of course, since much of its economy depends on Russia (it presently relies on the Bear to export its oil, as the only available pipelines go to Russia’s Black Sea outlet). However, it’s making a concerted effort to break free of that reliance, particularly when it comes to oil exports. Astana has been working with China to build a high capacity pipeline for transporting oil to the east, which is almost complete. The government is also looking to construct other pipelines, and to possibly distribute oil through Azerbaijan. Mr. Nazarbayev’s opportunism and neutrality manifest themselves in the scope and variety of the joint-endeavors his state undertakes. The government, for instance, assists Moscow in launching space vehicles, works with Washington in the war on terrorism, and sells raw materials to Beijing. Clearly, Mr. Nazarbayev is no one’s stooge.

The United States government recognizes the strategic importance of Kazakhstan, and liberally distributes aid to Astana as a consequence. In total, more than 130 million dollars of aid is given annually. Washington has also made Astana a partner in the war on terrorism, and works with the government to defeat Islamic fundamentalism (the republic, for example, has contributed specialized military engineers to assist the war effort in Iraq). If anything, Washington should increase aid to the state (and in general, for that matter), perhaps to 200 million or more. Categorical aid is the optimal tool for building Kazakhstan into a responsible regional guarantor of stability and expansion. Nonetheless, Washington must be sure to target the aid very specifically, and ensure that Astana continues to make the structural economic reforms necessary for sustained growth. The country needs to develop infrastructure, as well as strong institutions of learning and good governance; this is what aid should primarily be targeted toward. The United States must also use its leverage as a patron of the country to prod it toward meaningful political reform. However, even so long as Washington simply ensures that the political evolution of Kazakhstan is not interfered with, the opposition parties will eventually achieve enough support and traction to make the system truly competitive.

For those seeking more information: See the December 15th Financial Times supplement on the country, as well as this informative page.

From the Financial Times comes an excellent article on the state of Japanese defense modernization. As I have noted before, the issue of Japan’s increasingly conventional security posture will be one of the most important factors influencing the Asian power dynamic in the long-term.

Japan’s military forces are currently structured to repel a great power invasion (in particular an invasion from the former Soviet Union). In recognition of the changing threats facing Tokyo now that the USSR has dissolved, Japan’s new five year review calls for force restructuring and modernization aimed at countering rogue states and fighting in asymmetric conflicts.

The number of tanks will be cut from 900 to 600, the number of destroyers from 60 to 57 and the number of fighter aircraft from 300 to 260. The Ground Self Defence Force - the army - will be cut from 160,000 to 155,000.

That will allow a slight reduction in the overall budget, by 3.7 per cent to Y24,240bn ($231bn, €174bn, £120bn) over the next five years. But there will be more spending on surveillance technology, missile defence, IT and anti-terrorism squads.

This is certainly a prudent step to take, especially in light of the new threats posed by international terrorists and states like North Korea to Japanese interests. However, I would caution Tokyo not to lose sight of the larger strategic picture. China remains Japan’s single most significant threat and competitor, and it is essential that the Japanese maintain a dominant naval force so that they can compete with Beijing on equal terms. Reducing the size of the navy (and particularly the air force) is a seemingly counterproductive move that has to be followed by an increase in the quality of the military in order to compensate for the loss in quantity. However, considering Japan’s recognition of China as a nation of “concern,” as well as the fact that modernization inevitably involves cost-cutting and restructuring aimed at boosting efficiency, this move seems to be a boon for the archipelago-state.

Pascal Lamy, the former European Union trade commissioner, has been nominated as the European Union candidate to head the World Trade Organization once its current head (Thai Supachai Panitchpakdi) leaves in August of 2005. He’s facing competition from a number of candidates, including Uruguayan Carlos Perez del Castillo, and Brazilian WTO ambassador Luiz Felipe de Seixas Correa, although Mr. Lamy is presently the acknowledged favorite.

The United States government should support Mr. Lamy’s candidacy, rather than nominate its own candidate or endorse one of the others. Mr. Lamy has proven himself to be a competent technocrat with the intelligence to run the WTO well and the political clout to push trade deals through. He already has the guaranteed support of the European Union, while the other candidates have fractured support from a fractured base of developing countries whose interests will not coalesce any time soon. He has a track record of promoting free trade, and will better emphasize the interests of developed countries in agreements (rather than risk the organization devolving into a tool entirely of the G-20). The fact that he’s European will smooth over the diplomacy of trade negotiations, and facilitate multilateral consensus over bitter partisanship.

The United States has already acknowledged this through the words of US trade architect Robert Zoellick. While failing to explicitly endorse Mr. Lamy (keeping Washington’s options open), Mr. Zoellick made it clear that the United States is leaning in his direction.