Following more than a decade of political isolation and punitive sanctions, Libya was recently welcomed back into the international community. Lengthy negotiations culminated last year in an agreement between Libya and the United States to normalize relations. Washington has proceeded to drop many of its sanctions against the African state (although it maintains Tripoli on its official list of terrorism sponsoring nations), in exchange for innumerable goodies. Among the first of these benefits was well deserved compensation for the victims of the Lockerbie bombing from the Libyan government. This, however, was just the start. Libya has, more importantly, agreed to become an American geopolitical ally. Desperately in need of western expertise and investment, Tripoli has opened itself up as a market for investment and weaponry. Under Qaddafi, the government has also indicated a willingness to move toward increasingly freer markets. Plus, the United States continues to hold the terrorism list trump card, which it will certainly use as leverage to extract even more.
The benefits of warm Libyan-American relations are perhaps best illustrated by the success of US firms in acquiring petroleum concessions from the Libyan government. American firms won rights over ten of the fifteen exploration areas being offered. Furthermore, talks between US oil companies and Tripoli over the properties the firms were forced to abandon in 1986, “have resulted in a tentative agreement and could be approved by Mr. Gadhafi’s government within a month.” Libya has significant untapped oil and natural gas reserves, and, since exploration has virtually ceased since sanctions were imposed, great upside in the quantity of recoverable reserves.
Not only will American oil firms (and thus the US economy) benefit from access to Libya, but so will the global economy. An increase in the supply of hydrocarbons will necessarily relieve the pressure of cost push inflation that threatens the world market. While most industrialized nations are well protected from such inflation (due to structure economic features), other countries are not. Lowering the price of oil will spur global growth. Furthermore, bringing Libyan oil production back up to three million barrels will erode OPEC’s market share and reduce OPEC pricing power. Not to mention that due to ease of shipping and quality, Libyan crude is significantly less expensive for American buyers than Saudi oil.
While some criticized the deal struck between Washington and Tripoli, through its results it is clear that it’s been a boon for both sides. Hopefully this will prove to be a durable model for other international pariahs (notably Iran, but others as well) to follow.
One of the rumors that’s come up at this week’s World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland is a Sino-European deal over arms sales. As the speculation goes, the Europeans would lift their arms embargo against Beijing in exchange for the revaluation the Yuan against the dollar. In that way, China would gain access to high-quality Western weapons and combat systems, while the depreciation of the dollar vis-a-vis the Yuan would take pressure off the Euro, which has borne the brunt of the greenback’s decline.
While the article points that this is just a rumor at the moment, this “rumor” makes a lot of sense. The one stumbling block for the deal is Washington, which is very concerned about Beijing acquiring state of the art weaponry. The US is particularly worried because China may not only have access to European platforms, but also to the avionics, software, and electronics that go into these platforms and vastly enhance combat performance. If China is able to obtain this type of technology, it could reverse engineer it and leapfrog ahead in its military modernization. After all, China currently has uninhibited access to former Soviet platforms - it’s the stuff that goes into these platforms that China lacks.
If a deal is struck, it would most likely be a compromise between what Washington wants and what Europe wants. Instead of fully rescinding the arms embargo, European governments would maintain national restrictions that prohibit the export of advanced arms to countries like China. This would safeguard the most advanced Western technology, while allowing the Chinese access to basic technology and platforms. European defense companies would still profit richly from the deal. China, for its part, would then likely refuse to float the Yuan in the international currency market. Maintaining that as leverage for future negotiations, the government could instead do a careful revaluation of the Yuan against only the dollar. Washington, despite rhetoric to the contrary, would likely accept such a compromise without a negative affect on Euro-American relations. So long as Washington keeps pressure on European governments to uphold strict bans on the export of advanced arms, its strategic goals would be well accommodated.
While reading this week’s print issue of Business Week, I happened across an advertisement by prominent Morgan Stanley strategist Byron Wien. The ad featured the ten surprising events that Mr. Wien believed have a 50% or greater chance of occurring in 2005. Considering Mr. Wien’s industry prestige and influential position as Morgan Stanley’s US Senior Investment Strategist, I was surprised by the preposterousness of some of the predictions.
For example, he suggests that there will be a very sharp drop in the value of the US currency. While no doubt the dollar has been on a general downtrend, it’s very unlikely that the greenback will tank mightily this year. Especially since this year looks like it may see a slight resurgence of the dollar after its significant decline last year.
His prediction of how the Fed will act this year, like his forecast last year, seems off the mark. Alan Greenspan, the powerful Fed chair, for example, does not seem to want high interest rates, even coming in consistent increments. Suggesting that the Fed will raise rates 25 basis points at every Fed meeting for the entire year is overconfident, and the outcome is unlikely.
Finally, and most shockingly, he forecasts “a second Russian Revolution.” Having some knowledge of the country, I was flabbergasted that he believed such an event would occur more likely than not. While the signs of instability and discontent are there, Mr. Putin is currently very secure in his post and will continue to be for the foreseeable future. He may not be the greatest leader Russia has had, but he’s popular and has strong alliances with influential businessmen and high government officers. The Russian public is in no mood for a Revolution, and in any case the leaders of such a movement are either on trial or living out of the country. Perhaps if social conditions deteriorated markedly and Putin’s public relations skills went to the dumps it could occur. But that’s not going to happen.
The Ukrainian presidential election of 2004 marked a pivotal turning point in relations between the Bear and the West. It marked a direct collision of Russian President Putin’s ambitions in Eastern Europe with the Western effort to overhaul the region’s institutions and build stronger ties. It demonstrated both the power of ideas and the power of legitimacy. It provided evidence of increasing Russian weakness as well as increasing Russian strength. Most importantly, it has irrevocably altered the regional balance of power, shifting it decisively to the west.
The course of the election was deeply influenced by the politics of the previous government. Elected in 1994 after the failure of the previous administration to successfully pass economic reforms, President Leonid Kuchma remained in office for two full terms. During his tenure he stabilized Ukraine’s economy and has been generally successful in warding off inflation. Politically, Kuchma sought to centralize executive power and passed authoritarian legislation in aim thereof. He was a reportedly corrupt ruler, and is said to have admitted so on several occasions. He and his group of associates grew rich during Kuchma’s time in office, and they remain influential and politically well-connected. Although Kuchma could have legally stood for another term last year, he declined to run. Instead, he supported a handpicked successor, Victor Yanukovich.
The crucial contest pitted him against another seasoned political veteran, reformist ex-Prime Minister Victor Yushchenko. The lines were clear from the start: Yanukovich represented the Kiev old guard, who sought closer ties to Russia, while Yushchenko was the bold reformer who saw Ukraine’s future lying westward. Yanukovich had the backing of both Kuchma and President Putin of Russia; he had the resources of the entire Kiev establishment at his disposal. Yushchenko was backed almost universally by the West, although the upcoming American presidential contest precluded active U.S. involvement. Yanukovich was expected to win the first round handily, if not with a majority, which would have avoided a runoff round entirely.
However, marshalling the strong support of the electorate, Yushchenko soared past all expectations and prevailed in the first round. Yushchenko now squared off against Yanukovich in the runoff round. Kuchma and the establishment, concerned about a possible Yushchenko victory, aided Yanukovich in the second round. When the closely watched vote swung strongly for Yanukovich and the central electoral commission declared him the winner, most resigned themselves to accepting the seemingly concrete but fraudulent results. Yet Yushchenko immediately organized massive street demonstrations and a brilliant public relations campaign. Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians poured into the streets in protest over the fraudulent election, demanding justice and decrying the electoral manipulation. High level diplomatic representatives from European Union, with the support of Washington, arrived in Ukraine with a message of support for Yushchenko. Meanwhile, the White House began to put pressure on the Kremlin to relax its support of Yanukovich. Initially, Moscow refused, and instead intensified its rhetorical support for the beleaguered candidate. On December 3rd, the powerful Supreme Court declared the election invalid.
Realizing the futility of continued support for Yanukovich, however, Moscow backed down. Kuchma, whose main goal was to retain some political influence after leaving office, wanted to avoid civil war at all costs. So he decided to acknowledge the need for a revote while at the same time calling for constitutional measures to limit the power of the presidency. It’s reasonable to conclude that Yushchenko and Kuchma came to some degree of understanding, with Yushchenko agreeing to protect Kuchma in exchange for Kuchma’s support. In any case, the tide had by now firmly turned against Yanukovich. During the revote that took place in late December, Yushchenko crushed his rival by a wide margin, and he assumed office soon after.
The Kremlin went into the election with a vested interest in a Yanukovich victory. Unlike Yushchenko, a bona fide supporter of an alliance with the West, Yanukovich intended to continue Kuchma’s “multivectored” foreign policy that emphasized close ties with Russia but not complete dependence. Yanukovich would have likely worked closely with Putin in regional initiatives, and supported Russia’s ambitions in Eastern Europe. Russia would have had preferential access to the Ukrainian market, as well as greater control over the Black Sea. Furthermore, Ukraine would have acted as a strong buffer state, shielding Moscow from American geopolitical pressure while allowing the Russians a platform for expanding their regional influence. The Kremlin also had a lot to lose. If Ukraine joined NATO and fell under the sway of Washington, America would be able to project pressure directly into the heart of the Bear. It would also enhance Washington’s ability to influence the course of events in both Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, areas Russia has traditionally exercised authority over. Perhaps most importantly, the loss of Ukraine would end any Russian ambitions in Eastern Europe. Russia would be reduced in influence and clout at a time when it desperately wanted to establish itself as a renewed great power.
In its attempt to keep the birthplace of Russian civilization under the influence of Moscow, the Kremlin adopted an ambitious program of sophisticated political lobbying. Its new foreign policy toolkit included many of the soft power tactics pioneered by the United States, principally organized around using legitimacy and campaigning to sway voters to its side. The election, in the words of Peter Finn, a veteran Washington Post correspondent, “showcas[ed] Russia’s emerging ability to use campaign consultants, electioneering and political spin beyond its borders to pursue its long-term objective of retaining influence in former Soviet republics.” Taking its cues from American initiatives, Kremlin consultant Sergei Markov says, Russia was “supporting foundations, analytical centers, round tables. It’s how contemporary foreign policy is pursued. And it’s exactly what we’re doing.”
The geopolitical impact of the election is very significant. Most important is its chilling effect on Russo-American relations. Russia put its chips heavily in a Yanukovich victory, and when that didn’t materialize its gambit backfired. The Kremlin was forced to lose face by withdrawing its previously adamant support for Yanukovich, and its influence over Eastern Europe fell markedly. In fact, in an apparent gesture of deference toward the United States and its new influence, Russian officials publicly declared that the state would reduce its interventions in the region. Because Russia lost Ukraine, and consequently the rest of Eastern Europe, previously sacred ground, to Washington, it decided to retaliate in-kind.
Lacking the resources to take on Washington directly, the Bear flexed its muscles through other avenues. Soon after Yushchenko was assured victory, Putin met with the Indian government in order to emphasize his influence with that powerful state. He also recently visited Latin America, which Washington considers (through the Monroe Doctrine) to be exclusively under American jurisdiction, and signing economic cooperation packages and arms deals. Beijing and Moscow conducted historic joint military exercises for the first time since the fall of the Soviet Union, and Putin underlined his friendly relationship with Beijing by floating the idea of selling advanced strategic bombers to the Chinese. Finally, very recently, Russia authorized the sale of advanced weapons to the Syrians, including surface-to-air missiles capable of downing the best Israeli jets. This was a direct slap in the face to America, and demonstrated that the Kremlin was not toothless when it came to pressuring American allies. The overall string of events was designed to send a powerful message to the White House: Russia is far from dead, and interference in Russian foreign interests can and will be reciprocated.
On a more local level, the election will have vast repercussions for the country of Ukraine itself. Turkmenistan, for instance, seized upon the political chaos to coerce Kiev into paying 30% more for natural gas. Yushchenko will undoubtedly herald in an era of close cooperation with the West, beginning integration into the European trade zone and possibly joining NATO. Relations with Moscow will chill, of course, but Russia will remain an important influence in Ukrainian politics. The new president has a big task ahead of him, but also an ambitious plan for the country. During his term he’ll have to tackle government corruption, continue Kuchma’s privatization efforts, and simplify the country’s regulatory and fiscal laws.
Post Script: So, in the end, how did my predictions actually pan out?
As I noted before, I correctly predicted that “the final outcome of the election will remain unclear until well after the completion of voting.” I also correctly predicted that while Putin was heavily invested in seeing Yanukovich prevail, he acceded to American pressure and backed off of his support of Yanukovich once it was clear Yushchenko would win.
More importantly, I predicted both a Yushchenko win and a smooth transition to power for Yushchenko. Both of these predictions have panned out.
The Reign of Terror, lasting from September 1793 until the downfall of Robespierre in July 1794, was the culmination of the French Revolution. The most radical segment of that watershed event, the Reign of Terror saw thousands killed as the revolution spiraled out of control and collapsed. Led by Maximilien Robespierre, the Committee of Public Safety (CSP) orchestrated the Reign of Terror as a means to reassert central authority over the rebellious provinces of France and, more radically, as a tool to inculcate within the French body politic virtue enough to sustain a social democracy. However, the period was characterized by the breakdown of Parisian authority, as rogue generals and individual committee members alike took it upon themselves to carry out what they considered the interests of France. The Reign of Terror ended with mixed results: while the various insurrections were successfully suppressed, the government devolved into a form of dictatorship entirely antithetical to the original ideal of social democratic governance.
Proponents of Robespierre’s role in the reign of terror justify his actions on both utilitarian and deontological foundations, and there are three primary arguments in favor of the man. The first is the direct utilitarian case, which argues that the dire circumstances facing France during the time of the Terror necessitated the use of extreme measures to unify the nation. The second is the personal-motivation case, which contends that since Robespierre was morally pure and truly believed his actions to be morally righteous, he was conducting himself justifiably. The final justification is based on the philosophy of Rousseau, as well as Robespierre’s own attempt to fuse terror and virtue under the framework of Montesquieu. Essentially, it is argued, Robespierre’s attempt to foster a social democracy for France was the right thing to do, and its failure has little bearing on the justification of the act.
At the time of the Terror, the country of France was in serious peril. In April 1793, the brilliant French general Dumouriez, responsible for turning the tide of the war and crushing the Austrian forces in Belgium, defected to Austria. The coalition, now bolstered by forces from Britain, Piedmont, and Spain, smashed the French armies in Belgium and the Rhineland. Coalition troops penetrated the French lines at the Pyrenees and Alps, and Austrian troops massed in northern France. The besieged French military was under assault “on five different fronts and bereft of effective leadership.” Furthermore, political turmoil within France engulfed the country in a bitter civil war. Simmering rural discontent over the secular policies enacted in Paris ignited into an armed insurrection in March 1793, when the central government established a program of military conscription. Four departments in western France, led by Vendée, began a protracted rebellion that eventually cost tens of thousands of lives and threatened to sever the region from the control of the French government. Later, after the expulsion of the Girondins from the Convention, the great provincial cities of Lyons, Marseilles, Bordeaux, and Toulon also rebelled. The nation was also struggling under an acute economic crisis. Assignats, government bonds backed by confiscated Church property (issued in order to return the national treasury to solvency), became common paper currency. Unrestricted printing of these notes led to accelerating currency depreciation, which triggered massive hyperinflation. Chronic food shortages compounded this problem by introducing added demand-pull inflation and “made life unbearable for the urban masses.” Military logistical efforts were similarly complicated by grain shortages.
Under these conditions, proponents of Robespierre argue, it was necessary that the Revolutionary authorities enforce drastic measures in order to ensure the survival of the French state. Were the coalition not countered by the citizen-army of conscripts raised during the Terror, foreign nations would have trounced the floundering government and desiccated France. It was only through the heavy-handed universal draft implemented by Robespierre and his allies that the country protected its territorial integrity and repulsed the foreign aggressors. Furthermore, without the internal crackdowns, order in France would have collapsed. The central government would have lost its sovereign authority and legitimacy as the country destabilized and a power vacuum was created in its wake. France would have been irrevocably altered, its institutions left in shambles and its territory cannibalized by the attacking coalition. Similarly, they contend, the macroeconomic stabilization policies implemented during the Terror (such as the Laws of Maximum) were essential to curbing the hyperinflation rampant during the Revolution. They cite the mild disinflation experienced after the passage of the acts and the accelerated hyperinflation that took hold after the laws were repealed to show that the committee’s economic policies successfully lifted up the poor. If the hyperinflation were left uncontrolled, it would have led to another ruinous fiscal crisis that would have debilitated the central government in its fight against the coalition. Furthermore, it was primarily through the CSP’s economic policies that French purchasing power in both the private and public sectors was maintained. If purchasing power continued to collapse, the economy would have reverted to an inefficient barter system. It was only Robespierre’s dramatic action, advocates argue, that forestalled these crises and preserved the sovereignty of the French state.
The second core thesis in defense of Robespierre revolves around his personal purity and incorruptibility. Defenders of Robespierre make the case that, since Robespierre acted only in the best of intentions (advancing what he considered the common good), he was justified in his actions. Because he was doing what he thought was right, they argue, he should be absolved of the guilt stemming from the consequences of his actions. Proponents of this view argue that Robespierre was an incorruptible man of virtue, a passionately committed idealist who fought his campaigns with an arsenal of words and ideas. Throughout his career, they say, he aspired to be the personification of an ideal – not just a man, but an instrument through which the philosophies of Rousseau would be purely implemented. He was possessed of absolute personal integrity, living with sincere simplicity and refusing to accept positions of prestige and power.
Proponents build this case, that Robespierre was a man of supreme personal integrity and virtue, from a vast assemblage of empirical and anecdotal evidence. First, they note, Robespierre was hardly power hungry. He rejected a nomination to run for mayor of Paris, as well as a powerful and influential ministerial post that was offered to him later. Even as he sat on the CSP, he never officially held a position above the other committee members, nor did he try to consecrate himself as ruler of France. In fact, during his reign on the committee he was ultimately planning to cede power to a democratically elected government that he envisioned ruling France. He never saw himself as a governor, but instead as a watchdog of the people. Second, unlike many of his contemporaries, Robespierre refused enrich himself off the revolution. Caring little of his own personal welfare, he lived at a friend’s house during the Revolution, and was entirely absorbed by his intellectual work. He did not take bribes, and even his most strident enemies considered him incorruptible. After corruption was exposed within the Jacobin club, he opened himself up to public examination, and was found to be completely free of corruption after facing extremely rigorous scrutiny. As Professor David P. Jordan notes, “Robespierre owed much of his authority to his refusal to indulge in [expedience and opportunity].”
It follows, they argue, that Robespierre was justified in his handling of the Terror. His personal integrity and incorruptibility constitute conclusive proof that his aim during the Terror was entirely moral in nature, based on an altruistic sense of serving the greater good rather than personal enrichment. Under a system of virtue ethics, whereby an individual is evaluated based on moral character rather than actions, they conclude that Robespierre was justified in his undertakings by the virtuous content of his character.
The final argument put forward by Robespierre’s supporters is perhaps the strongest one, a synthesis of deontology and utilitarianism that the Incorruptible himself put forth as a philosophical justification of the Terror. Essentially, it is argued, Robespierre’s actions were both moral in nature and intended squarely to achieve beneficial ends. His measures were ultimately aimed at inculcating public virtue and preparing the country for an enlightened social democracy, proponents contend. In this way, Robespierre’s ends (the creation of a virtuous body politic to run a virtuous social democracy) justify the means he used to achieve them. However, Robespierre went beyond merely justifying the Terror as a necessary but ugly measure. He seized on Montesquieu’s analysis of governance and extended it. Whereas the Baron believed that virtue (the trait of a republic) and terror (the glue of despotism) were mutually excusive, Robespierre unified the two. Robespierre argued that terror is an ethical way of instilling virtue. Every act, he noted, that “tends to excite love of country, to purify mores, elevate souls, direct the passions of the human heart toward the public interest, ought to be adopted or established by you.” Thus, Robespierre’s ends not only justify the Terror, but so do his means, which were inherently good. Terror, writes Robespierre, “is consequently an emanation of virtue.” As David Jordan writes, “this is more, far more, than treating Terror as an expedient, an outgrowth of the violence that inescapably accompanies revolutions; nor is it Terror as a domestic self-defense. This is Terror given a theoretical and moral legitimacy that men do not want to admit or be reminded of.”
Opponents of Robespierre have assembled a plethora of formidable counterarguments to counter the assertions of Robespierre’s defenders. These range from decrying the brutal murders perpetrated by his CSP to condemning the man as a tyrannical dictator. Spanning a broad philosophical foundation, criticism of Robespierre has emanated from the entire spectrum of political thought.
Perhaps the strongest argument against Robespierre is the humanitarian criticism. During the Terror, his detractors argue, Robespierre ruthlessly slaughtered thousands of innocent victims. In a vain quest to fulfill his ambitions, he steamrolled over his opposition and unjustly killed those who got in his way. He was a savage authoritarian who exacted capital retribution against his political foes and used the Terror as a political instrument to eradicate his adversaries. Despite the lofty goals he may have sought to achieve, these critics argue, the means he used to realize them are entirely unjustifiable. Under the rubric of pure deontology they fail, because it is a fundamental tenet of human ethics that human life is sacrosanct and not to be taken unjustly. Under Kant’s categorical imperative the Terror is also untenable, since universalizing Terror would mean the end of rational, progressive humanity. Finally, detractors contend, the Terror was unjustifiably through utilitarianism. Attempting to create a social utopia is itself a foolhardy waste of resources, and the lives of thousands are an unacceptable price to pay for it.
Opponents of Robespierre also paint him as a dictator and argue that he compromised his ideals in order to seize power. He came to power through shady backroom dealings, they contend, and then came to dominate the Committee. He quickly shed his professed beliefs in Rousseau and adopted the language of dictatorship. He used fear to manipulate the people and consolidate support behind the Terror. He wielded the guillotine as a political weapon against his opponents, and used the political machinery of the Revolution to sustain his power. He used measures such as the Laws of Maximum in order to secure the approval of the sans-culottes mob, which menaced the National Assembly into maintaining him as a member of the CSP month after month. His tyranny, they argue, destroyed French political institutions, and killed fine patriots and innocent peasants alike.
Others decry the ideals of social democracy that Robespierre championed and the way he went about achieving them. Conservative thinkers like Edmund Burke condemn the Revolution’s radical departure from tradition as dangerous to order and the public good. They believe that change must be made and institutionalized gradually, and that Robespierre’s attempt to inculcate virtue through Terror was always doomed to failure. By ignoring the political culture and traditions of France, Robespierre unjustifiably embarked on an inhumane program of terror that was bound to fall short, they say. Other thinkers oppose Robespierre because his goals were incongruous with what they consider good governance and good policy. His socialist economic beliefs and strong support of direct democracy, they contend, would have been ruinous for France.
As always, the truth lies somewhere in between. In justifying Robespierre’s conduct, his supporters focus too much on the man and not enough on his actions. In denouncing Robespierre, his critics unfairly subscribe to the specious caricature promulgated by the Thermidorians. In truth, Robespierre was the epitome of the idealistic civil servant. He was a virtuous and admirable man who fought for what he believed in. However, a justification that does not make. Robespierre’s Reign of Terror was brutal, abhorrent, and completely unjustified.
In considering Robespierre’s culpability for the cruelties of the Terror, it is necessary to determine what exactly he did and did not do. The governance structures of the Revolutionary authorities were complex and multifaceted. In fact, the CSP itself rarely exercised the kind of central authority many have attributed it. In Paris, the CSP had to share authority with the Committee of General Security, another powerful revolutionary organ, and the two often clashed over jurisdiction. Outside of Paris, the CSP had little direct authority. It issued orders to regional generals and commanders, who then executed those broad directives as they saw fit. Most of the peasant massacres were in fact carried out not under the command of Robespierre, but under the supervision of bloodthirsty rogue generals such as Fouché and Javogues who were considered terrorists even in their own time. On the CSP itself, it is doubtful that Robespierre held the sort of dominance his critics contend that he did. Individual members out on field missions, which Robespierre rarely participated in, often made fundamental committee policy. Robespierre never held a special title on the committee, and was legally on par with any other member. Furthermore, the committee was factionalized and Robespierre served as a faction leader, where he acted as a disruptive rather than cohesive factor. His power over the committee was a product of persuasion and good debating, not overwhelming dominance.
However, while Robespierre was not nearly as culpable for the excesses of the Terror as many of his critics allege, neither was he as pure as his advocates believe. He did indeed use the machinery of the CSP in order to quash his political opposition and enforce his beliefs. He brutally suppressed those who criticized him, and unjustly executed thousands of Parisians following the passage of the Law of Suspects. He was also responsible for drafting many of the laws that facilitated the peasant massacres and injustices, and issuing the directives that empowered regional commanders to repress the peasant population. While the scope and magnitude of his cruelty has been greatly exaggerated, still much of the reckless inhumanity of the Terror is directly attributable to Robespierre himself.
Robespierre rightly concurred with Voltaire that the pen is mightier than the sword. An eloquent orator, Robespierre fought his campaigns with an arsenal of words and ideas. His compelling suasion greatly empowered him, and gave the Revolution the definitive intellectual bite that made it such a pivotal event in human history. As such, he recognized the threat that powerful intellectual enemies represented to what he was trying to build and accomplish. In his eyes, “words were revolutionary weapons. He saw no reason why such weapons should not be confiscated.” During a time of revolution, when the enemies of progress had to be suppressed at all costs, Robespierre believed that counterrevolutionary ideas, the same as counterrevolutionary violence, were unacceptable. In this way, he had a much more sophisticated view of political freedom than that of his most ardent detractors. Yet the threat to France had long subsided by the time the Terror really began to accelerate, which Robespierre refused to understand. Robespierre’s political repression thus fell not under the umbrella of emergency circumstance, but under political tyranny. He suspended the fundamental right of free expression without just cause, and consequently led France further down the path of death and oppression.
The utilitarian arguments in favor of Robespierre’s conduct are somewhat misleading. By the time of the Law of Suspects when the Terror got truly out of hand, the threat to the state had long since passed. In any case, it was mostly Lazare Carnot and his conscripted army that saved the day and repelled the invaders. While ending the civil war raging in the country through all means necessary and proper was a reasonable goal, Robespierre took this far out of hand. He capitalized on the opportunity to implement his radical agenda of fostering public virtue through terror, and far exceeded the bounds of maintaining stability. The virtue ethics arguments justifying Robespierre’s actions are similarly flawed. The key point to make here is that while Robespierre was certainly a moral individual, his personal virtue does not justify the crimes he perpetrated. It is more important when determining justification to evaluate one’s actions based on their objective consequences and attributes rather than on the motivations behind them. Finally, Robespierre himself errs in connecting virtue and terror. While he may in fact be right that terror can lead to virtue, he is mistaken about the fundamental value of both. Using terror to brainwash the body politic into being virtuous – forcing the people to be free – is a hollow achievement at best. If the elusive concept of public virtue even exists, changing human nature through force only results in a society of brainwashed, broken individuals who are neither truly independent nor happy. Successfully forcing true Rousseaun virtue upon people is a pipe dream, and using the brutal tool of terror in order to attain it is both inhumane and irrational.
As David Jordan aptly observed, “Robespierre saw a world remade, a world filled with men rededicated to the common good. He viewed basic, revolutionary change as a moral matter. The task of the Revolution was to change human nature itself.” Yet, while Robespierre’s motives were pure and noble, he ended up pushing measures far beyond the pale of rational governance. He was truly a misguided idealist who became carried away with a revolutionary zeal to remake the world. Robespierre never deviated from his belief that what he did was for the good of the entire nation.
Yet, as Karl Marx so aptly observed, “the road to Hell is paved with good intentions.”