Power Politics

The final Commentary essay I wish to explore concerns the topic of Europe, a close focus of this blog. Professor Arthur Waldron pens a provocative and very intriguing look at what the future holds for the European continent. I hardly agree with the entirety of what he wrote, but his article is thoughtful and insightful.

1. His point about the van Gogh murder was exactly right. It caused the Europeans to recognize the threat of Islamic radicalism, and forced them into (at least temporary) action.

2. I also agree with his point about the new threats facing Europe, and how Europe’s current toolkit of soft power will be insufficient in dealing with them. “In short, the new European Union is forming itself smack in the cockpit of geopolitical danger. At the same time, it lacks either the material or the diplomatic wherewithal to deal with this danger in a forceful or unified manner.”

3. Following from that, then, comes the inescapable conclusion that the countries of Europe will be forced by circumstance to rearm. Although a trivial EU peacekeeping force has been established, I’m skeptical that the Europeans will integrate significant forces under the banner of collective security. Will collective security apparatus be established and used? Certainly. However, just as Britain and France are doing, I suspect individual European nations will choose to build up their own individual forces based on cooperatively developed technology and platforms. That way, European forces can have synergy in joint operations while retaining national ownership.

4. I’m unconvinced, though, that the European economy is, as the author asserts, in a good position to rebound. As I see it, Europe will not easily escape from future economic stagnation. While Waldron’s argument that the resources of Europe are actually quite good is sound, an economy depends on far more than just good inputs to perform well. Does education and the intelligence of the labor force have a significant impact on economic performance? Absolutely. I feel America has a great deal to do in this regard. However, that’s not the be all and end all determinant of economic growth. A favorable regulatory regime, a dynamic capital market, and a strong structural foundation are equally critical. In the first two areas (especially the first), the US enjoys an advantage, while in the third I would argue that the US enjoys an advantage as well.

5. Promises of reform are just that, promises. The European electorate is vociferously opposed to fundamental reform, and Germans have protested vigorously against even relatively mild labor market reform in Germany. Politicians will be extremely unlikely to undertake fundamental reform in such a political climate, especially considering the very socialist flavor of political culture on the continent. I think that while governments will indeed apportion more funding to the military, they will do so in the context of a sluggish economy. After all, Europe can afford to support greater budgets as is.

6. I also find the author’s optimism that Europe will eventually unify to be misguided. As I see it, the various nations of the continent consider their sovereignty paramount. So while a country like France may accede to joining a politically-natured EU, it will put national concerns about supranational dictates. The EU, for example, had laid out budgetary rules for its member states to follow; France disregarded these rules as inconvenient and refused to obey the wishes of the EU. That’s not to say politics in Europe won’t be grounded in international agreements and bodies. Just that the system of state sovereignty will continue to exist and operate.

Also in Commentary magazine, Victor Davis Hanson has an excellent essay on American policy options in the Middle East. Although I don’t agree with all of it, he makes a very persuasive case that the benefits accrued by the invasion of Iraq are broader than most observers think. This piece unquestionably hits the mark in a number of significant ways.

Without a doubt, Saddam’s Iraq was the most challenging of all the Middle East rogue regimes. The next step, reforming or changing the governments in Lebanon, Syria, and Iran demands its own flexible strategy and its own proper diplomatic and military calculus. But, contrary to the imagining of critics, the post-Iraq reformation of the Middle East will not necessarily have to be accomplished by the invasion of tens of thousands of American troops. Other remedies may well suit our national and humanitarian interests—strategies opened up, ironically, by our previous determination to use our ground forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as by our will to see the process through to its end, without hesitation, apology, or compromise.

Yet it’s not his conclusion that I’d like to discuss, but one of the strategies he advocates for use against Middle Eastern states.

If Americans have learned anything from the careers of Qaddafi, the Saudi royal family, Saddam Hussein, and the Iranian clergy, it is that huge petroleum profits accruing among illegitimate autocrats are a recipe for global terrorism and regional havoc. One way to end the present pathology is for the United States, accepting that concerns for our national survival can sometimes trump the logic of finding the cheapest energy source, to develop a policy that helps drive down world petroleum prices. Another option is far more aggressively to promote democratic reforms among the petrol sheikdoms themselves. A third is to do both. Given the entry of India and China into the world petroleum market, fostering tighter global demand while potentially circumscribing our own clout, the hour is more urgent than ever; but the Middle East is also, and once again thanks to the ongoing reform of Iraq and Afghanistan, more fluid and perhaps more promising than ever.

Mr. Hanson, I’m afraid, overestimates the amount of practical leverage held by Washington over this issue.

Mr. Hanson advocates that Washington develop a policy to reduce global oil prices. Yet he provides no concrete plan. Unfortunately, the world oil market is extremely convoluted, and the traditional laws of economics hold less sway than in other areas. The intersection of nationalism and commerce has produced a system where price direction is often inaccurate and the market cannot effectively respond to price signals. Geopolitical concerns have led governments to lock in long-term contracts and alliances with stable price regimes. The United States, for instance, consumes oil shipped from a number of specific sources, but would be unable to purchase oil from sources locked in by China. The international market primarily comes into play with the oil produced by countries such as Russia that refuse to enter into ironclad long-term partnerships. This oil is mobile and priced at market level. However, the amount of slack in the oil market is declining fast.

Supply and demand in the oil market respond very poorly to price signals. Supply is actually used to manipulate prices, rather than being a function of prices. Since oil is so essential to the economy, demand is for all intents and purposes unaffected by small changes in price. However, demand is rising rapidly now due to industrializing China and India. This has reduced the ability of suppliers to manipulate prices, and now they are being forced to pump all out. Soon, it’s possible that demand will eclipse maximum supply, causing a sharp rise in oil prices. Thus, American efforts to either reduce demand or create excess supply will fail. Demand is an economic function, and cannot be changed without long term planning at great expense. Supply is already being maximized. In any case, if the United States lessens its oil purchases from the Middle East, another buyer will merely step in.

Because of competition from China and India, the US has lost sway over oil prices. Only an international consensus by the great powers could even attempt to bring down oil prices, and that’s not going to happen.

The cover story for this month’s Commentary magazine is about what author Podhoretz terms World War IV: the war against radical Islamism. In the article, “The War Against World War IV,” Podhoretz undertakes a broad defense of Bush’s grand strategy against its innumerable critics. The essay itself is quite intriguing and certainly worthy of its prominent status. The writer’s points on the need for democratic transformation, Bush’s resoluteness, and his various attacks on Bush’s critics are all valid. However, I do disagree with Podhoretz on several counts. Most importantly, I question the feasibility of his argument. As I see it, he merely evades discussing feasibility concerns, and never tackles the issue head on.

My first point of contention is with his belief in the ability to democratize by force.

As for democratization, Kesler is of course right: it is a hard thing to do, and it cannot be done overnight. But recognizing this truth is a very far cry from suggesting that it cannot be done at all unless the most stringent conditions are met. The conservative skepticism Kesler preaches on texts from Montesquieu and John Adams is all very well in the abstract; in practice, decades need not be required to get a process under way—to clear the ground and sow the seeds and help to water them as they flower and grow.

Mr. Podhoretz’s wishful thinking in this area–that it’s feasible to install democracy by force–is unfortunately misguided. Constitutional democracy, the model of governance that Washington should seek to encourage abroad, depends on a very conducive political cultural and strong national institutions to support it. Over the course of history, the transition to democracy has been difficult, and true constitutional democracy has only manifested itself after decades or centuries of institution-building, and then only then in areas with a friendly political culture. Whereas areas such as Britain and America have a rich heritage of liberalism and strong political institutions, areas such as Iraq and Syria have an immature political culture and weak political institutions. In India, the path to democracy was paved by centuries of European influence that exposed Indians to new ideas and built up political infrastructure and institutions. In Africa, democracy faltered precisely because it lacked cultural and institutional support.

The most feasible model of democratization is using commerce, ideological exchange, and education to build the groundwork for a gradual introduction of democracy. A climate of economic prosperity and geopolitical stability has traditionally been very conducive to the transition to representative government. A rising bourgeoisie seeks a more active role in governance, and indeed demands good governance; political security allows the country to focus inward, rather than on defeating external threats. Furthermore, Washington cannot expect these democracies to be formed exactly along the lines of liberalism. As Edmund Burke noted, collective groups of people develop differing traditions and precepts over time. Asian democracy is a good demonstration of this. Politics in Asian democracies certainly revolves around voting, but takes on a decidedly more authoritarian flavor than in the West. Fostering democracy in the Middle East involves long-term strategy and nation-building that allows each state to develop its own unique brand of the system. Cataclysmic change generates a strongly reactionary response and instability.

My second point of contention is with his belief that the Bush doctrine signifies a “revolutionary change in the rules of the international game.” This belief bears some merit when applied to terrorism; Bush’s response to radical Islamic terrorism is unprecedented, especially for the United States. However, Bush’s other policies are nothing new. Preemptive war has always been a mainstay of international relations, and wars of aggression have far from disappeared. Promoting democracy and good governance, as well as a capitalist international order, were all among the goals of the old British Empire. The only new facet here is the nature of the danger; a transnational and highly dangerous nemesis. Even then, this threat is somewhat transitory. Soon enough, Al Qaeda will fade into the background (save for if they launch a massive casualty attack with CBRN weaponry) and great power politics in Asia will take center stage.

My third point of contention is with his optimistic view of Iraq’s future.

Suppose, then (as I do), that in a year or so, a duly elected coalition government is in place in Baghdad; that it is guided by a constitution guaranteeing political freedom and minority rights; that the economy is improving; that Iraqi soldiers and policemen have taken over most of the responsibility for dealing with a severely weakened insurgency; that the number of American troops has been reduced to the size of a backup force; and that fewer and fewer Americans are being killed or wounded. What then? Will the realists and their liberal allies bow to this reality? Will they be mugged by reality?

I hold no such optimism as the author does. While I sincerely hope that Iraq becomes a successful democracy and a strong American ally, the signs I see aren’t promising. In fact, the situation is so messy and dynamic that I don’t think any commentator can reasonably know what the future holds. Attacking one’s opponents on a precarious supposition is bad form, and I’ll await the outcome to make a final judgment as to whether Mr. Podhoretz was correct. I’m not hopeful.

My fourth point of disagreement is with the way Podhoretz deals with the issue of opium in Afghanistan. In criticizing the response of the media to elections in Kabul, he suggests they spend less time talking about opium and more time talking about the political triumph of elections. While it’s true that the media gave far less coverage to the election than it deserved, the opium issue is much more important than he makes it out as. Afghanistan’s future in many ways depends on eliminating or at least curtailing the opium trade. This is probably the single most critical issue that must be dealt with in rebuilding the country. It rightfully deserves extensive media attention.

His views on the topic of North Korea are particularly wrongheaded. First, he attempts to disprove the argument that “no viable military options” exist against North Korea.

But can it, I wonder, really be true that no “viable military options” exist for preventing Iran from getting its evil hands on nuclear weapons, and North Korea from deploying or threatening to deploy the ones it evidently already has? Can it really be true that it is beyond the wit and the capabilities of the most powerful nation in the history of the world to devise and execute a strategy for averting something very close to a mortal danger?

This is a perfect example of argument by fallacy. The central argument–that the United States is so powerful it must be able to use a military option–is a fallacy of substitution. General power is not the same as the ability to defeat North Korea in a feasible manner. Podhoretz must actually give a method of defeating North Korea feasibly to disprove the argument that “no viable military options” exist.

The problem for Podhoretz is that no viable military options actually do exist, as I’ve noted before.

In essence, this option consists of the overwhelming application of airpower followed by a rapid ground advance from both coasts of the Korean peninsula. As they argued in a Wall Street Journal editorial piece, “we judge that the U.S. and South Korea could defeat North Korea decisively in 30 to 60 days with such a strategy.” However, this plan has several significant flaws. First, their optimism that overwhelming U.S. airpower would be able to counter North Korea’s impressive 11,000 pieces of artillery is misplaced. While American airpower is certainly dominant, the U.S. presently lacks the capabilities to accomplish such a feat. While high endurance UAVs could saturate the battlefield and provide real-time intelligence on the location of Pyongyang’s artillery batteries, it would take time to vector airborne assets to those locations (the endurance for even the most advanced tactical fighter is relatively short, and it takes time for a fighter to move within range of a target).

Meanwhile, the North Korean batteries would be able to pound Seoul and industrialized South Korea with tens of thousands of rounds. The ensuing carnage would kill hundreds of thousands, destroy tens of billions of dollars of wealth, and instantly depress the global economy (to a significant extent). North Korea may also (its nuclear missiles are hidden) launch a nuclear attack against American forces in Japan and Korea, resulting in thousands of American deaths, and devastating damage to the world economy. U.S theater missile defense assets in the area employ primitive kinetic energy kill vehicles, and may or may not successfully defeat a North Korean launch.

The military option is thus overly risky and too costly to be used. The economic damage wrought by even a slightly imperfect campaign would far exceed the dangers of a nuclear North.

In that essay I also disprove his later contention that Bush is actually preparing to launch a military strike upon North Korea.

However, it is what the author did not address in the essay that is most interesting. Podhoretz completely avoided the domestic side of feasibility. Whether or not the Bush doctrine works effectively is in reality unimportant. What is important is that Bush’s policies have overtaxed the country fiscally and militarily. Bush simply does not have the financial resources to continue to fund an aggressive foreign policy. He simply does not have the troop strength to fight any more voluntary wars. (Not to say that he won’t continue to implement his grand strategy of democratization in a more moderate way). Which is why, despite his resoluteness, Bush has, indeed, been “mugged by reality.”

The French Defense Minister lays out an interesting argument in the Financial Times, suggesting that lifting the European arms ban on China would actually make China weaker. She also reinforces the more conventional arguments heralded by the British, which suggest that the rescinding of the ban would be largely symbolic, by framing it in the context of integrating China further into the international community. Paris argues that closer cooperation is the most effective way of bringing Western political norms to Chinese society and government.

From the perspective of Europe, some of these arguments make sense. Unlike the United States, Europe isn’t strategically or militarily invested in Asia. Whereas the colonial empires of old have divested themselves of Asian geopolitical concerns, the United States has become heavily involved in regional power politics. Europe’s relationship with Asia is focused heavily along the lines of exchange, both economic and political. Chinese military power doesn’t very much concern the Europeans until the point where it becomes so overwhelmingly dominant as to invite war. However, with the United States and India also maintaining sizable military forces in Asia, Europe can feel relatively secure that shifting the military balance in China’s favor wouldn’t dramatically alter the balance of power. In fact, if anything it would contain American influence and solidify a balance of power, which in Europe’s view would likely lead to greater stability.

Her argument that rescinding the ban would lead to greater international cooperation with the Chinese also bears merit.

“The embargo was made about 15 years ago, and the evolution of China and of its international relations have been very significant since then,” she said. “We cannot have relationships with China in all these fields - economic, medical, research and so on - and conserve the embargo as it is today.”

While it’s not clear that reestablishing defense cooperation would do much more to contribute to Sino-European collaboration than extensive economic ties already have, it is clear that normalizing defense relations has to be a component of bringing China into the modern fold. Chinese international leadership and economic ties will come of their own accord, when Chinese interests dictate it. However, in the interim, smoothing over China’s international integration is essential. The greater the cooperation between Europe and China, the more effective European soft power will be in infusing liberal values into China. The more liberal and well governed China becomes, the more peaceful and positive a role China will play.

The British argument that lifting the ban would be largely symbolic, at least when it comes to the sale of advanced arms, is also persuasive. The UK notes that the existing arms embargo lacks legal importance, since national codes implemented across the continent are even stricter. The immediate effect of repealing the ban would be only to replace it with a similar prohibition. That regime would, however, be much more flexible and responsive to changing conditions. Meaning that over the medium-term, European countries could begin to scale back parts of the ban, while maintaining those parts covering more advanced exports. This flexibility, Britain has assured Washington, would be used very cautiously. Thus, from the perspective of flexible and pragmatic policymaking, lifting the arms band would empower the Europeans to more easily adjust their China policies in response to changing policy directives and events.

Ms. Alliot-Marie’s argument, however, falls flat on the issue of Chinese military industry.

“China is rapidly developing its industry, and today our experts say that in five years China could make exactly the same arms that we have today. And they will do it if they cannot import. So maybe if we can sell them the arms, they will not make them. And in five years’ time, they will not have the technology to make them.”

First of all, I don’t know what “experts” she has consulted with, but their findings fly directly in the face of the facts. Chinese doctrinal reform and information integration (communications, command, control, computers, etc.) is progressing at a steady clip, but not nearly to the level that Western militaries have attained. Recent French military reform, in fact, puts that country far ahead of China for both now and the immediate future. Not to mention the vastly superior armed forces of Britain, which are even farther ahead. China will be lucky to find doctrinal parity with 2005 French or British forces circa 2015. Not to mention platforms, of which European designs are far superior (China may be able to catch up by 2020, depending on how well it learns from the Russians). In the realm of avionics, electronics, and such, Europe is by far ahead, and will remain so for the indefinite future. By selling advanced arms the China, France would allow the country to make a giant leap, especially as far as the equipment fitted into Chinese platforms is concerned.

Plus, her analysis of Chinese strategic intentions is off the mark. Beijing wouldn’t simply buy European products and abandon its domestic defense industry. It would buy European products in the short term, and focus its own military-industrial complex on modernization and research. Meanwhile, the Chinese would deconstruct and reverse engineer the European designs. Just as they have done with Russian arms, the Chinese would integrate them into their military forces, while preparing to incorporate the best features into new Chinese designs. This would ultimately propel the Chinese arms industry along faster, not hamper its rise.

The one very prominent negative to rescinding the arms embargo is the American response. The United States has, in various ways, threatened punitive measures against Europe should the ban get lifted.

Ms Alliot-Marie’s comments come ahead of next week’s visit to Europe by President George W. Bush, when the arms embargo is expected to be on the agenda. Powerful members of Congress, including Duncan Hunter, House armed services committee chairman, have warned of a backlash if the embargo is lifted, which could include legislation blocking military co-operation with European allies.

Should Washington follow through on its threats, the results would be very negative indeed. The recent optimistic upswing in Euro-American relations would be chilled, and important cooperation in the military and security realms would be imperiled. Yet for precisely these reasons, among others, it is unlikely that Washington will take action. Severely chilling the transatlantic relationship is not in Washington’s interest unless it’s over a very critical policy issue, and the Bush administration in its second term has shown a predisposition toward elevating the transatlantic relationship and restoring some of its prestige. Cutting defense cooperation is similarly disadvantageous to both the United States and the White House. Punitive measures are further unlikely to be taken due to the relative benignity of repealing the embargo. As the British argue, the true consequences of the act are not very severe.

Further mollifying Washington are the defense politics involved. European defense contractors are hesitant to sell advanced arms to China, and with good reason. For one thing, Washington could rather mildly restrict defense technology sharing with European companies. Or, more devastatingly, shut them out of future US defense contracts at a time when European access to the Pentagon is growing rapidly. Faced with this specter, as well as the fact that China has no qualms about stealing technology, the lifeblood of the defense sector, the European giants will tread very lightly. There’s no question that they’ll start selling basic arms to China, and probably more as well, but nothing of the kind that would seriously worry US defense planners.

Will Washington be concerned with increased European military-industrial cooperation with China? Absolutely, and with good reason. But almost certainly not concerned enough to jeopardize gains in transatlantic relations.

Thus, on balance, it would be in the best interests of Europe to repeal the ban and replace it with tiered national regimes. That would give the European states the flexibility to more accurately adapt policy to their foreign objectives, while in addition minimizing the downside. At the same time, a broader policy of cooperation with China (including on defense matters) is a better way to transfer liberal values and institutions than by shutting China out. The fact is, Europe simply can’t compete in Asia using hard power. Only the US can do that. The Europeans can, however, use their impressive arsenal of soft power in order to advance the institutions of good governance.

I’ve focused much attention over the course of this blog on the competition between China and other East Asian states for energy. Mostly I’ve dwelled on the geopolitical manuevering between Beijing, Delhi, and Tokyo over external resources in Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. However, I’ve neglected to touch upon China’s drive for sustainable energy sufficiency by way of civilian nuclear power. Because, in addition to liquified natural gas and oil, the Chinese want to supplement their energy stock with nuclear power. They have made great progress in this regard, pioneering new technology, and have become the new nexus of the nuclear industry, just as France had been before.

So when the news came out that China is prepared to go ahead with construction of an advanced nuclear reactor that’s theoretically unable to meltdown and highly efficient, my interest was piqued. The Chinese have already constructed a testbed prototype of the “pebble reactor” design. If the project works out, it will spark a renaissance in the nuclear industry worldwide.

The new reactor design, originally funded in Europe but dropped in the late 1980s, is considerably safer and more efficient than the light-water reactors comprising the mainstay of the current stock of nuclear power plants.

The technique uses as fuel thousands of small graphite balls flecked with tiny amounts of uranium, instead of the fuel rods in conventional designs.

With the fuel sealed inside layers of graphite and silicon carbide, the depleted waste is relatively easy to dispose of, at least in theory. The core can be bathed in inert helium, dispensing with the need for superheated water. The helium expands in the turbine, generating power. Pebble beds are considered much safer than traditional designs because the dispersal of fuel means meltdown should be impossible.

The cost and economic feasibility of the new design as compared to other processes of generating energy, however, remain unclear.

Experts argue over nuclear power’s cost. Plants require vast upfront investment and the cost of safeguarding them pushes up the overall bill. Add to that the costly business of dealing with waste and decommissioning the plants at the end of their lives and the sums start to look alarming.

It is difficult to judge whether the plants represent value for money. Public sector investment clouds the picture. France’s nuclear industry is often cited as an example of how affordable it can be, but the fact that it is state-owned makes that difficult to ascertain. China’s nuclear scheme is another case in point.

That said, the potential upside is enormous. Geopolitically, widespread adoption of nuclear technology would ease the pressure on oil prices, adding to economic growth and perhaps leading to defused tensions between China, Japan, and India. It would allow the Chinese (and others) greater flexibility in their policies toward the Middle East and other oil producing regions. Perhaps more importantly, it would help to avert the dangerous environmental crises looming because of the extensive use of hydrocarbons. China, facing severe long-term environmental problems relating to its large population and rapid industrialization, would, in particular, benefit. Dependence on hydrocarbons is dangerous for the Chinese government, as policymakers must balance environmental problems (a long term threat to the country)with economic grwoth (a very important short term priority). If a significant swath of the nation’s power generation could be supplied by either nuclear or hydroelectric facilities, the government could have its cake and eat it too. Economic growth could be maintained, whilst polluting power plants could taken offline.

Unlike coal and gas, nuclear power does not emit greenhouse gases and therefore offers the potential for continuing energy-intensive ways of life without the associated cost of climate change. A few environmentalists - most famously James Lovelock, originator of the Gaia theory, which states that Earth behaves as if it were a living organism - have even spoken out in favour of nuclear power as a lesser risk than fossil fuels. “Given the risks from climate change and the challenges that face all of the low-carbon and no-carbon supply options, it would be imprudent in the extreme not to try to keep the nuclear option open,” said John Holdren, Heinz professor of environmental policy at Harvard University.

However, the nuclear industry requires “concerted efforts to address concerns about cost, susceptibility to accidents and terrorist attack, management of radioactive wastes and proliferation risks”.

Placed into the context of China’s overarching energy policy, the development of nuclear power is merely one in a number of programs being undertaken by Beijing to secure energy. Much of China’s energy policy focuses externally on competing with Japan and India to acquire exclusive access over energy contracts and resource deposits. However, as Chinese policymakers realize, depending only on external resources is fraught with danger. Not only does China risk incurring an economically painful shortfall if supplies don’t pan out, but it also places itself at the mercy of maritime supply lines. Should war ever break out, or even should terrorists decide to attack large commercial shipping interests, China’s supplies may be cut off, inducing serious economic turbulence. China has ameliorated these risks in various ways (building up a strategic oil reserve and tentatively discussing the idea of international maritime joint-security, for example), but the fact remains that dependence leaves China vulnerable.

That’s why the development of nuclear power is so strategically important for the state. If China is successful in fielding commercially viable models of these new nuclear reactors, it can gradually ween the country off of volatile foreign fuel sources. When combined with the massive hydroelectric projects Beijing is sponsoring, the country can successfully emulate Japan’s model of building a robust defense against supply shocks. And whereas Japan relies more on efficiency, China can incorporate both fundamental architecture and increasingly efficient products. Plus, as noted earlier, nuclear power is much less taxing on the environment than traditional hydrocarbon power. If China can avoid having an ecological meltdown as it risks right now, it’s less likely to implode economically in the future. In addition, the less oil that the Chinese consume the less upward pressure there’ll be on petroleum prices. Meaning that China will be able to acquire the oil it does need at a lower cost.