Power Politics

The Washington Post has a report on the Pentagon’s recent moves to militarize space. The article is framed within the context of arms control, particularly as it relates to a set of recent conferences on space militarization. Representatives from Russia, China, and an assorted group of thinktanks have recently issued statements condemning Washington’s policy agenda in this area, and the article approaches the issue from that perspective.

In any case, the Post story touches upon one of the most important aspects of security policy in the 21st century: space. The global economy has increasingly come to rely on the use of satellites in Earth orbit for communications, commerce, and travel. This space infrastructure is also vital to American intelligence agencies and the armed forces. Satellite reconnaissance (although in some ways being eclipsed by the use of unmanned aerial vehicles) is essential for monitoring potential hostile agents, safely tracking troop movements and exercises, and a variety of other important intelligence gathering tasks. The US military is extremely reliant on space infrastructure; the functions of aerial attack, communications, command, logistics, and movement are all irrevocably tied into the constellations of US satellites. Should this space infrastructure ever be destroyed or suffer massive damage, the consequences to both the global economy and American security would be tremendously detrimental. Worldwide depression, massive US losses, and global destabilization are all within the realm of possibility. Meanwhile, the exploitation of space for offensive purposes promises to yield rich rewards; the Pentagon, for example, is currently exploring technology that would enable America to launch decisive aerial attacks both through space (originating in the United States itself) and from space.

The Pentagon is developing a suborbital space capsule that could hit targets anywhere in the world within two hours of being launched from U.S. bases.

It is therefore exceedingly critical that this space infrastructure be protected from all potential threats. Furthermore, considering the significant advantages granted to any military force through space infrastructure, the ability to deny a wartime enemy use of space infrastructure is similarly important. It is therefore in the essential national interests of the United States to develop systems of this nature, and thus to militarize space. Recognizing this truth, strategic planners at the Pentagon have mapped out a comprehensive future plan for satisfying American interests in space. Described in a series of recent documents (beginning with the 2002 report on national defense strategy and continuing), this map includes both offensive and defensive components.

A series of Pentagon doctrinal papers, released over the past year, have emphasized that the U.S. military is increasingly dependent on space satellites for offensive and defensive operations, and must be able to protect them in times of war.

The Air Force in August put forward a Counterspace Operations Doctrine, which described “ways and means by which the Air Force achieves and maintains space superiority” and has worked to develop weapons to accomplish such missions.

On March 1, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld signed a new National Defense Strategy paper that said the use of space “enables us to project power anywhere in the world from secure bases of operation.” A key goal of Rumsfeld’s new strategy is “to ensure our access to and use of space and to deny hostile exploitation of space to adversaries.”

The US push to militarize space is being rapidly propelled along due to two factors. First is the rise of China as a competitor in space. Beijing is actively seeking to neutralize the American advantage in space, and thus correspondingly to enhance its military power relative to that of the United States. Since Washington’s domination of space currently provides US forces with greatly augmented strength and capabilities, China can gain significantly by reducing Washington’s ability to leverage this advantage. An international agreement not to militarize space would leave the American satellite constellations vulnerable and unprotected, a weakness that China could then exploit with the anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons it’s certainly developing. Even the mere threat of downing the US satellite system could be enough to keep American out of a Chinese-Taiwanese war. China is also undertaking a crash program to exploit the benefits of space for itself. It’s participating in a European rival to the GPS system, working on developing space launch technology, and generally preparing to make its own forays into space. When its technology is sufficient, China will almost certainly make an attempt at militarizing space for Chinese interests. The US is concerned about this, and wants to head Beijing off.

The second reason is, as mentioned earlier, just how reliant the US government and economy have become on the space infrastructure.

The measures under consideration speak volumes about exactly how the government feels that American interests are at stake in space. These are not proposals to mount weapons of mass destruction or high powered armaments on space platforms; the former is politically unwise and untenable, the latter is currently unfeasible. These measures are reasonable responses to a realistic problems. The problems are the vulnerability of the satellite constellations and the future exploitation of space by China. The solutions are anti-satellite weaponry, satellite defenses, and the ability to leverage space for limited forward offensive operations.

Off topic note: Apologies for my absence — I’ve been writing a lengthy essay on China and North Korea, which should be ready for posting soon.

This past Saturday, the LA Times ran a front-page feature on reform at the United Nations (see here as well). The paper managed to acquire a draft copy of a 63-page report prepared by the UN that sought to define the organization’s role in the 21st century and put forth recommendations on how to improve its effectiveness. The document was structured around enhancing the UN’s role as the central forum for international security, reforming the human rights panel, improving accountability, and making the UN a focal point for international development efforts. As the NY Times puts it:

The plan, aimed in part at preventing new scandals at the much-criticized organization, will be presented to the General Assembly, the paper said, citing a draft copy of the reform plan it said it had obtained. United Nations officials were not available to comment.

The proposals are intended to maintain the United Nations as the main setting for world security decisions and to keep it dominant in development issues, the paper said.

The reforms must be endorsed by the General Assembly and by world leaders attending a United Nations summit meeting in September. They are seen in part as an effort to make the United Nations more relevant, the paper said.

As I’ve noted before, the United Nations is a organization with significant relevance internationally.

The function of peacekeeping can be distributed to pan-continental bodies such as the African Union (which has proven to be fairly successful compared to other attempts at establishing international security on the continent), but an effective global reserve force is an imperative. The United States has not the time nor the inclination nor the resources to act as the world’s gendarme. Instead it should delegate this function to a body like the UN, which can operate under an international mandate and specialize in civil affairs. In those cases where a suitable localized security organization cannot be used, the UN may then be able to step in. Furthermore, the UN serves a cornerstone setting for modern diplomacy. It’s a central forum for all of the world’s political actors to express their concerns and conduct negotiations. The United Nations is also a key player in refugee operations, coordinating NGO field missions and setting up camps. That’s a very messy role that is best handled by a specialized agency, and it wouldn’t be politically expedient for Washington to get directly involved in sensitive refugee questions.

That said, I’m somewhat skeptical of the continuing role the organization can play in international development and international security. As it stands, the UN isn’t a major, effective player in the realm of development. Organizations like the WTO, IMF, and World Bank account for the most significant activity in international aid and development. Aid initiatives are more often led under the auspices of individual nation-states (see the Millennium Challenge Account, for example) than under UN supervision. No doubt UN organs like the World Health Association are useful for combating disease and poverty; however, international development is in my estimation best left in the hands of the great commercial powers. The UN lacks the faculties and support to operate a multifaceted international development campaign tied to a grand strategy of progress on all fronts, which is exactly the type of campaign the US should be seeking to carry out over the next century. Furthermore, the UN is rife with incompetency and has proven itself to be miserable at achieving real economic progress (owing to its grand multinational nature, I think).

As for international security, the UN definitely has some role to play. At the least, any military operation given a mandate by the Security Council is granted an instant measure of legitimacy, particularly in the eyes of the public. This legitimacy can be capitalized on for purposes of public diplomacy. Plus, the nature of the organization means it’s an excellent forum for diplomacy and an outlet for small nation states. It allows otherwise insignificant states an opportunity to speak their concerns and present their case to the international community. Two countries at war or otherwise engaged in hostilities have a neutral meeting ground to discuss peace and try to iron out their differences with neutral mediation. However, the UN is no arbiter of international security and never will be. It can never compel action; at best, it can issue a mandate and hope a member-nation will take up the cause because its national interests happen to be aligned against the mandate’s target. Usually, however, the UN is simply blocked from any action. Clashing national interests mean that all but the most widely accepted resolutions are stopped, and, not getting what they want, often countries will bypass the organization entirely and simply go ahead with war. Until the fall of the USSR, the United States, Soviet Union, and others essentially ignored the UN in matters of war and peace. The UNSC is impotent when it comes to matters of force, and thus countries can and will use it merely to try to adorn their actions with the cloak of legitimacy. It cannot and will not extend beyond that.

As far as Security Council “reform” goes, in this case the solution is worse than the problem. The UN is seeking to expand the number of permanent seat-holders in the Security Council in order to more fairly represent global power in the 21st century. In theory, this is an admirable development. The Euro-American international order no longer accurately portrays the international situation. Asian countries in particular have grown in power and scale. Brazil and other former third world insignificant countries have risen to become international players. International security is very much a function of power, and thus the inclusion of the new core power-bases is an essential step. Yet within the context of the UN system this is an unmitigated disaster. If these states are inducted as veto-wielding members, current core members would lose influence and proceedings would grind to a halt. There would almost always be a country whose interests lay opposite the majority of other powers. Thus virtually nothing at all would be passed. Should these nations be inducted as non-veto-wielding permanent members, nothing would change. There would be more interests at the table to water down proposals, but the basic conditions would remain the same. In order to retain even minor influence, the UN security council cannot be reformed.

The new proposals concerning the human rights commission and accountability sound nice in theory. Yet already Annan has been forced to back down on the human rights issue, because a great many countries with UN influence wish the see the commission continue to be irrelevant, and they have enough power to force the provision to be watered down to the point of being meaningless. As far as accountability goes, a zero-tolerance policy was tried before in the Congo; it didn’t work. I’ll believe accountability when I see it. (Note, however, that with the US selection of John Bolton as US ambassador, I think real accountability may be possible. However, I doubt it’ll happen from within.)

I like the idea of an international convention against terrorism (although I think the definition of terrorism needs a little fine tuning). I also like the idea of “a commission for peace building to help stabilize, develop post-conflict societies.” These are areas where the UN’s international reach and civil affairs experience can be leveraged for the best possible results.

The New York Times reports that Washington is gearing up for a big clash over the 2005 round of base closure that will be coming to a head on May 16th. The previous round of base realignment and closure (BRAC) featured pitched Congressional battles, as interest groups around the country mobilized to protect local interests. This round will undoubtedly be characterized by vicious clashes as well, since, as the NYT reports, the affected areas are pulling out all the stops. Interest groups, high-powered lobbyists, popular governors, and frightened Congressmen will all be converging upon Capitol Hill in an effort to block the closures.

There is no doubt that at least some of the bases in question will remain open owing to political considerations. As noted in the article, the amount of pressure being applied to Congress over this is quite intense; the star-power of some lobbyists alone makes it an extremely tough fight for the Pentagon to win. Coupled with bipartisan skepticism and a vested political interest in preserving the bases as a source of dependable employment, these lobbying efforts will hold great sway. Unfortunately, since President Bush has decided to spend his political capital elsewhere, I’m not optimistic that a big dent can be made in this last scheduled round of BRAC. However, it looks like at least some of the decaying arsenal bases, as well as other bases serving a dated purpose, will be shutdown. Closing these opportune targets would be a big victory for military efficiency.

In policy terms, the BRAC process is highly beneficial for US forces. At a time when chronic undersupply problems plague forces in Iraq, and Congress has been forced to cut spending on key future defense programs because of budgetary constraints, squeezing out inefficiency at the notoriously poor-spending Defense Department is an essential goal. In fact, previous rounds of BRAC “yielded savings of $28.9 billion through 2003, with recurring savings of $7 billion annually after that.” That’s seven billion dollars more to spend on useful programs per year. Cutting nearly one fourth of the current basing scheme would yield even more savings above that. Even if nothing else changes, that funding can go a long way toward extra procurement, higher combat pay, and replenishing the depleted stocks of pre-positioned equipment.

BRAC also has benefits beyond monetary efficiency. For one thing, it improves interservice synergy and joint-interoperability by stationing units from different services on a single base. These units can practice together and perhaps break down some traditional interservice barriers. Furthermore, as noted by here, BRAC helps to solve the problem of encroachment. “Expanding populations are encroaching on many of America’s bases, and the result will be reduced training opportunities and reduced readiness. BRAC can help secure future training opportunities by closing those bases most affected by encroachment and expanding those that are least affected.”

As for the damage to local economies, it’s much more political than real. In the short term there will be acute structural unemployment as the local economy adjusts to the loss of the base. This will cause political pain for legislators. Yet, as proponents of base closure point out, “since 1988, 107,000 jobs have been created in the communities where installations were closed or realigned.” Private industry will propagate in the community and provide far better employment than the military base ever could.

Perhaps base closure could be accomplished gradually; a five year drawdown, for example, would minimize the economic hardship and thus protect incumbent politicians. Still, a short-term shutdown whose windfall can be immediately used for better purposes is preferable. Nevertheless, it remains clear that BRAC is an important legislative item, beneficial for both the country and the military.

An article in yesterday’s Moscow Times explores an issue left dormant for some time, but which nonetheless provides an interesting look at American foreign policy toward the former Soviet republics. At question is the 1997 sale of 21 advanced MiG-29C combat fighters to the United States by Moldova; in particular, a Moldovan court is exploring whether then-defense minister Valery Pasat defrauded the government from the full proceeds of the deal. The government itself only received $40 million from the exchange, which independent analysts valued at upwards of $80 million. Whether or not Mr. Pasat indeed defrauded the government (it seems that he probably did) is immaterial to this analysis, however. Instead, I’ll focus on the fascinating strategic dynamics surrounding the deal.

The US purchase was sparked by concern that the jets could ultimately end up in the hands of Iran. Iran had expressed interest in acquiring the planes, and American intelligence believed that the South Korean firm vying for the contract intended to resell the planes to Tehran after completing the purchase. Fourteen of the MiGs were hard-wired with nuclear launch capabilities, and Washington believed Iran would’ve used the jets to supplement its depleted stock of nuclear capable delivery vehicles. Yet Iran possessed 30 Su-24MK’s (figure 80% serviceable), which are far superior nuclear attack platforms; plenty enough to accommodate it’s strategic objectives in the region. More likely, Iran would have used the planes to reinforce its dilapidated air-to-air combat forces. According to the latest edition of The Military Balance, Iran’s stock of fighters is grounded in aging and outdated platforms. Perhaps Tehran’s most advanced fighters are its 25 F-14’s (60% usable) and 25 MiG-29A’s (about 80% serviceable). Yet these pale in comparison to modern fighter aircraft, and would be easily slaughtered in any air-to-air engagement with Israel, Iran’s primary enemy. The addition of 21 advanced MiG-29C’s, capable and modern fighters, as well as spare parts, would have helped to solidify Iran’s strategic position. Should Tehran have decided to intervene militarily in neighboring Iraq, for instance, the Iraqi air force would’ve been totally outclassed against the new MiGs. Plus Israel would’ve been much more hesitant in intervening, fearing the loss of some fighters to the Iranians. Thus the balance of power would have shifted.

Therefore, in service of containing Iran as well as acquiring a significant sample of relatively advanced Russian military hardware, Washington decided to intervene in the matter. The following deal was struck between the United States and Moldova.

Under an agreement finalized on October 10, the United States acquired 14 MiG 29Cs, described by U.S. officials as wired to permit delivery of nuclear weapons, six MiG 29As, one MiG 29B, 500 air to air missiles and all the spare parts and diagnostic equipment present at the Moldovan air base where the aircraft were stationed. In return, Moldova will receive a cash payment, humanitarian assistance and non lethal excess defense articles such as trucks.

This is an excellent example of very effective diplomacy on the part of the United States.

After learning of the deal, Washington swiftly informed Chisinau of its interest in obtaining the MiG jets. A generous package of cash remuneration, humanitarian assistance, and non-lethal excess defense articles was offered up in exchange for the MiGs and their ancillary equipment. The deal was negotiated under the framework of the cooperative threat reduction (CTR) program, which Moldova had recently been inducted into, and was comparable in structure and composition to previous CTR arrangements. To ensure that Tehran would be unable to secretly raise its monetary payment in response, the US also threatened harsh consequences in terms of trade and relations should the MiGs end up in Persia. Thus the relative cost-benefit scale was pushed sharply in Washington’s favor, for Moldova hardly desired to be on poor terms with the world’s dominant power. Chisinau also benefited in absolute terms, since the American package was quite lucrative. However, in the end, it was the United States that came out the big winner.

This was the first time, at least officially, that the US would be able to conduct detailed examinations and tests on the MiG-29C. The Fulcrum-C, as it’s known, is a formidable and very capable fighter. In terms of performance, it’s comparable to and with upgrades perhaps superior to the F-16; it’s a potentially lethal weapon in the hands of a well trained air force like that of India. However, these planes likely represent the greatest risk to US pilots when in the hands of a small third-world power. Since the US is increasingly moving toward a flexible and distributed deployment of naval units, the amount of airpower available to be concentrated over a specific low-importance area is decreasing. Units like the expeditionary strike group will have to fend for themselves. Thus the risk that a particularly good enemy pilot will be able to get a Fulcrum-C off the ground and take out an American jet becomes rather salient. Were this the only benefit, then it would be mostly insubstantial. In general, the real threat to American forces will come from the Su-27 and its successors.

The MiG-29C, though, also lends insight into other Russian designs. The deal permitted the Pentagon to study and analyze the structure, design, and features of the Fulcrum-C. The US this way acquired a greater understanding of Russian aircraft, as well as new ideas for future American platforms. Furthermore, once detailed examinations are complete, the planes can be used in OPFOR exercises. As the “real thing,” the MiGs will be able to supply participants with highly accurate insights into the combat capabilities and tactics of potential future adversaries. US pilots can train against the MiGs while strategic planners in the Pentagon use them to develop and test new tactics and strategies.

The balance of power in the Middle East was favorably preserved, the United States gained valuable insight from the study of the highly capable MiG-29C, and Moldova received a lucrative payment package; both sides went away better off. Now that’s what I call good diplomacy.

Update: This, on the other hand, seems to have been managed without sufficient tact.

Update II: Yes, definitely.

Over the past few weeks, President Bush has floated and then announced the new American diplomats set to serve in three consequential international posts. First came the decision that noted hawk John Bolton is slated to serve as the new United States ambassador to the United Nations. Yesterday, word came out that the President is going to nominate influential neoconservative Paul Wolfowitz as head of the World Bank. Finally, news that congressman Rob Porter is set to replace one of today’s preeminent American statesmen, Robert Zoellick (who’s moving to State), was recently reported by the media. These three posts are among the most important diplomatic positions in Washington, and matter a great deal in shaping the overall course of events.

Washington’s representative at the UN, who has an important role both as a diplomat and an influential figure in the organization, will face several pressing challenges over the next four years. First and foremost is tackling corruption and restoring credibility to the beleaguered institution. The corruption and decay within the UN is clearly evident in both the Oil for Food program and Sudan rape cases. An unresponsive culture without proper accountability has further compounded the problem, and the institution has been unable to rectify the ongoing Sudan situation. Peacekeeping and reconstruction efforts, which the UN prides itself on, are similarly troubled. As soon as difficulty emerged in Iraq, the UN packed up shop and left. The same thing happened just recently in Sudan. With its main security apparatus, the Security Council, entirely ineffectual, public confidence in the organization has sunk to extremely low levels. The UN is manifestly in need of reform, yet seems incapable of meaningful internal change.

While some in the administration harbor deep anti-UN sentiments, the organization has worth in a variety of endeavors. The function of peacekeeping can be distributed to pan-continental bodies such as the African Union (which has proven to be fairly successful compared to other attempts at establishing international security on the continent), but an effective global reserve force is an imperative. The United States has not the time nor the inclination nor the resources to act as the world’s gendarme. Instead it should delegate this function to a body like the UN, which can operate under an international mandate and specialize in civil affairs. In those cases where a suitable localized security organization cannot be used, the UN may then be able to step in. Furthermore, the UN serves a cornerstone setting for modern diplomacy. It’s a central forum for all of the world’s political actors to express their concerns and conduct negotiations. The United Nations is also a key player in refugee operations, coordinating NGO field missions and setting up camps. That’s a very messy role that is best handled by a specialized agency, and it wouldn’t be politically expedient for Washington to get directly involved in sensitive refugee questions.

Therefore, it should be Washington’s goal to mend, not rend, the institution. Despite the aura of audacity and outspokenness surrounding Mr. Bolton, he’s actually a very good choice on the part of the President as US envoy to the UN. Here’s why.

Bolton is as unabashedly willing to stand up for this nation’s interests as were Jeanne Kirkpatrick and Daniel Patrick Moynihan when they served previous presidents at the United Nations. He combines that laudatory trait with an understanding of what can and cannot be expected of the United Nations in today’s world. Those factors alone uniquely qualify him for the job Bush has given him.

Not only will Mr. Bolton stand up for America’s interests at the UN (and recognize exactly how the institution should be used), but he’ll also be a hard-charging advocate for reform. The UN lacks impetus to reform; its culture has decayed, and it’s stagnated from the lack of internal accountability. Because Mr. Bolton is so outspoken, he’ll challenge the UN when he feels its performance is not up to standards. He’ll provide constant and strong pressure on the organization to reform. He’ll demand accountability, and be an influential voice for change. This is good news for both Washington and the UN, which is in desperate need of reform.

One point that has been brought up against Mr. Bolton is that he lacks the diplomatic touch and credence of a John Danforth. This is undoubtedly correct. However, the only major issue I see being affected by that fact is policy toward Iran, which is a very sensitive diplomatic matter. Fortunately, Iran is an administration priority and thus being handled at the highest levels of government; difficult negotiations are taking place at the ministerial level, as opposed to the ambassadorial level. Before they go to the UNSC, the US and its European partners will almost certainly have hammered out an exact plan of action. Nevertheless, even if Mr. Bolton is a drag on UN diplomacy, the influence he’ll have on reform efforts at the institution easily balances that out.

The second post up for consideration, head of the World Bank, has received a lot of press attention today. Influential pundits have diverged on the issue, but it appears that most foreign governments are accepting Mr. Bush’s choice with resignation. Mr. Wolfowitz was not their preferred candidate, they say, but he’s not intolerable. I echo these sentiments. The World Bank is an important international body to be sure, especially with poverty reduction and stability through prosperity being important goals of the 21st century. Mr. Wolfowitz has the organizational experience and intellect to run the Bank, there’s no doubt about that. His experience in Indonesia and genuine commitment to fulfilling the role also point in his favor. However, I find him deficient in two key areas. First, he’s no international development export, nor a trained economist; he’s a political science specialist (albeit a very good one). I’d much prefer the Bank to be led by an economist who’s an expert in the field and knows exactly what has to be done; a technocrat, not a politicized figure. Second, Mr. Wolfowitz lacks credibility with other countries and does not have the diplomatic credentials for the job. So while I appreciate his emphasis on governance and political concerns, and I don’t doubt he’ll do pretty good work at the bank, I think there were many others who would have been far better in the role.

Finally, the White House announced tonight that Ohio Republic Rob Portman has been selected as the new US Trade Representative. His predecessor, Mr. Zoellick, was in this blogger’s estimation one of the great contemporary American statesmen. Zoellick was dealt a weak hand by the Bush administration, yet admirably negotiated several important free trade pacts. His cordial relationship with the Europeans helped take the edge off of international trade disputes. Now Mr. Portman will have to pick up where Mr. Zoellick left off; that is, he’ll have to get the free trade agreements like CAFTA through Congress. Fortunately, this is Portman’s area of expertise. He’s a strong free trader, and has close ties to the White House. He knows Congress well and wields influence within Capitol Hill. If anyone can guide these measures to passage, it’s him. I’m very encouraged by his appointment.

Two out of three, with the third being acceptable, is good enough for me.