Power Politics

The late IB Cohen was one of the most influential science historians of the 20th century, establishing the History of Science department at Harvard University and writing a number of memorable books. His final work, The Triumph of Numbers, just recently published, although narrow in scope, concerns itself with the impact of mathematics upon the course of science and history. In the style of an accessible lecture, Cohen explains the evolution of numbers as the framework of rigorous academic science; he provides a detailed look of the development of the mathematical infrastructure underpinning modern social science, and shows just how important this foundation is.

Cohen’s essay takes the reader on a tour of the relationship between mathematics and science through history, lavishing most of his attention on the period from the Scientific Revolution to the close of the 19th century. He shows how the Scientific Revolution was the period in which mathematics and the physical sciences became inextricably linked, and how the new attributes of this melding (particularly falsifiability) came to define the scientific method. Even more, he examines how numbers began to infiltrate the framework of governance and ordinary life. Practical considerations (such as operating militaries) gave impetus to the yet undeveloped field of statistics and analysis. As this field progressed, visionaries such as Quetelet (the founder of modern statistics) adopted mathematics to the study of the social sciences, fundamentally improving it. Cohen masterfully chronicles the course of this change, as well as the powerful figures like Dickens who stood in opposition to its path

Yet it is not the general theme of the book that most caught my attention. Throughout the essay, Cohen incorporates small segments discussing some of the more interesting applications of mathematics to society. Two of them in particular had me fascinated.

The first concerns the application of arithmetic to the issue of morality. Francis Hutcheson, one of the influential philosophers of the Scottish Enlightenment, devised algebraic expressions to “analyze the moral sense” (69). Cohen cites the example of Hutcheson’s attempt to compute the degree of morality of an action through the following equation: B = (M +- I) / A. “B” represents the virtue of the action, “M” is the quantity of good produced by the act, “I” stands for the self-interest in doing the act, and “A” is the doer’s natural ability to do good. Hutcheson’s equation and other work, rooted in virtue ethics, was nevertheless a precursor to Jeremy Bentham’s conception of utilitarianism. It represented an attempt to qualify virtue, and made the claim that happiness (public good) could be directly equated with virtue. Although the practicality of the model is questionable, it does mathematically represent some common sense representations of virtue. It shows, for instance, that “if two people have the same natural ability to do good (A), the one who produces more public good (M) is more benevolent (B). Conversely, if two people produce the same amount of public good, the one with more ability is less benevolent (since it was in that person’s ability to do more” (70). Hutcheson eventually came to the conclusion that virtue is the ratio of the quantity of good over the number of beneficiaries.

The second describes a dispute between statistician Quetelet and noted philosopher Comte. Quetelet called the application of mathematics to the study of society “social physics”; Comte, on the other hand, termed the scientific study of society “sociology.” Yet the difference was more than superficial; Quetelet and Comte had devised directly opposite systems for the study of society.

Comte believed in a pyramid of knowledge, with mathematics as the base, physics built on mathematics, then chemistry, then biology, and finally the crown of knowledge, sociology. This scheme implied a historical hierarchy since physics depended on mathematics, just as a true or “positive” science of chemistry needed physics for its construction. In a sense Comte’s scheme implied that to have a science of society, a sociology, a science of the behavior of human beings, it was first necessary to have a science of individual behavior, a “positive” science of biology

Quetelet’s approach was just the opposite. In his system there was no need to have a positive science of biology before creating a social physics. For him this new science was not reached by induction from the study of the behavior of individuals (sociology). Rather, Quetelet went directly by means of statistics to a science of collective behavior. (144)

Quetelet’s system of statistical analysis eventually superseded Comte’s conception of induction from the individual. As systems analysts have shown since, the emergent properties and extreme complexity of systems such as human society cannot be discovered through Comte’s approach. Quetelet rightly prevailed, despite his reliance on probabilities and chance.

For the discriminating reader looking for a book on the evolution of mathematics in analyzing society, this essay would make an excellent selection; it’s well written, reads quickly, and incorporates some gems of the past that have gotten lost in the modern shuffle. A fitting tribute to Mr. Cohen’s career indeed.

Attn: Posting for the next two weeks will be very sparse.

Early last year, I wrote up an entry about Singapore’s decision to replace its aging fleet of A-4SU aircraft. The A-4SU, a light ground attack fighter, was designed almost half a century ago, and is comparatively poor performing when faced against more modern jets. In light of recent advances in air combat platforms and doctrine, Singapore has decided to replace the Super Skyhawk with a heavier multirole aircraft.

It has already narrowed down a field of six platforms to three (the F-15T, the Rafale, and the EF-2000), and the three platforms are currently undergoing rigorous trials. The favored platform, the F-16, was removed from consideration during the first round because the RSAF (Republic of Singapore Air Force) didn’t want to be bound too heavily to one platform / manufacturer.

In my post, I predicted that the F-15T would not be selected, and the RSAF would select the Eurofighter instead of the Rafale. My prognostication was off; the Ministry of Defence (MinDef) has decided to drop the EF-2000 from contention [Bloomberg, Jane’s, News Asia]

Singapore will buy either Boeing Co F-15s or Dassault Aviation SA’s Rafale jets for its air force, having decided to exclude Typhoon jets made by Eurofighter from a contract estimated to be worth as much as $1.5 billion.

The island-state plans to buy 10 fighters to replace a squadron of A4SU Super Skyhawks, with the option of buying 10 more. It will no longer consider the Eurofighter’s Typhoon aircraft, the Ministry of Defence said today in an e-mailed statement, confirming an earlier report in Defense News.

Singapore, which has the largest defense budget in Southeast Asia, has been modernizing its defense forces amid the global threat of terrorism. The city-state, a staunch ally of the US, has said its jet-fighter purchase will be dictated solely by pricing and operational needs rather than by politics. The contract may be worth between $1 billion and $1.5 billion, analysts have said.

In fact, having examined the information that has now come to light, I must concur with MinDef’s decision.

There are a number of reasons that the city-state decided to drop the EF-2000 from contention. Foremost were price, reliability, and the timeframe. The Eurofighter project has been beset by delays, and the EF-2000 itself has had trouble performing up to expectations. Singapore was probably worried that the EF-2000 would not be delivered on time, and could be a problematic airframe in its early years. The city-state is looking for a small but potent force of proven aircraft that could be adopted for rigorous usage, and so this probably hurt the EF-2000 in the eyes of MinDef. Furthermore, the aircraft is very expensive and not price competitive; Singapore, although it tends to prefer gold plating, probably felt that the Typhoon was too much of a powerhouse fighter and not tailored for the less intensive place the new fighter will occupy. The fighter also came under intense scrutiny because it didn’t fit the mission parameters very well. The Eurofighter was designed as a purely air superiority fighter, and robust air to ground capability (the exact function Singapore was primarily interested in) was added only as something of an afterthought; sources inside the RSAF noted that the EF-2000 may not have been capable of mounting some of the city-state’s advanced weapons.

One analyst suggested that the American defense lobby played a significant role in the decision, although I’d say that role was, if anything, a lesser consideration (something that coaxed an already skeptical MinDef into fully abandoning the Typhoon).

The decision “illustrates the power of the American lobby, which you shouldn’t underestimate,'’ said Andrew Brookes, an analyst at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies. “Unless Eurofighter produces the right product at the time and for the right price, people aren’t going to buy it, especially with American competition.'’

In any case, the question now posed to Singaporean defense planners is whether to go with the Boeing F-15T or the Dassault Rafale. The news media, unfortunately, provides little insight into the question. The issues that derailed the Eurofighter bid hold much less importance for the remaining two fighters. Both are complete and (relatively) mature programs that have a demonstrated ability to adhere to a strict cost plan. There’s also precedent in favor of both.

South Korea in 2002 selected Boeing, the second-largest US defense company, for its jet-fighter program. Boeing in May 2002 cut the price of 40 fighter jets sold to South Korea by $239 million to $4.23 billion, for delivery to start this year. Boeing also agreed to shift production worth $3.56 billion to Korea, amounting to 84 percent of the total value of the F-15K program, meeting the government’s 70 per cent requirement. The US company beat Dassault, Eurofighter and Rosvooruzhenie, Russia’s defense export agency.

The French, on the other hand, were able to successfully penetrate the big-ticket Singapore market before.

The American lobby theory is somewhat more applicable; as precedence has shown, however, operational requirements and geopolitics overpower even the most effective political lobbying group (not to mention that France also has organizations lobbying on its behalf).

Reuters offers just a small snippet on the factors that will affect the decision

Singapore-based sources told Reuters the French jet would probably be competitively priced, but that Boeing could benefit from Singapore’s close links to the United States.

In the end, the decision will almost certainly come down to three factors: performance, price, and geopolitics. I believe that under these criteria, the Rafale jet is superior to the F-15, and will thus be adopted by the RSAF. Nevertheless, I would not be too surprised should MinDef opt for the F-15T instead, based on the French fighter’s poor export record and a desire to further solidify defense cooperation with Washington.

Price: The per unit cost of the Rafale is estimated to be somewhat lower than that of the F-15. I’ve heard assessments ranging from 70 to 110 million dollars, although “competitive” export pricing and similar discounting arrangements can probably shave off a significant percentage from that. Based on exports of the F-15K to Korea (the most applicable model to this situation), the Eagle will be priced at approximately 105 million dollars, with some other discounts probably thrown in. Singapore is considered to be a rigorous international standard bearer for defense acquisition, and its choices are given significant weight in government circles around the world. For Dassault, winning this competition gives it an opportunity to win larger contracts elsewhere (the Rafale has, to this point, fared very poorly on the international market). For Boeing, a win would extend the F-15 production line for years, and open up opportunities for additional future sales. Thus both companies will be willing to shift a considerable percentage of production and fabrication functions to Singapore, making economic imperatives less important in the RSAF’s decision. The French fighter’s better cost competitiveness gives it the edge in this category.

Performance: Performance is harder to measure and quantify than cost. Both the Rafale and the Eagle are highly capable platforms; the F-15 has been proven in combat, while the Rafale has demonstrated its strength in simulations. The Rafale, however, is more suitable for Singapore performance wise. The F-15 is a heavy fighter that specializes in long-range (using missiles and beyond-visual-range tactics) combat. It’s old and doesn’t efficiently integrate modern fighter technology. Singapore is a compact island state that requires a maneuverable ground attack fighter. The Rafale is more maneuverable than the F-15 and thus better suited for the combat environment. Furthermore, Singapore operates a separate fleet of aircraft for air superiority; the Eagle’s air attack functions are overly powerful at the expense of ground attack capabilities. The Rafale is more technologically advanced and modular, leveraging the latest advances in fighter technology; unlike the F-15, the Rafale will be able to hold its own against any fighter deployed by the Chinese (in the Southeast Asian theater) or the Malaysians for the coming few decades. For Singapore, the Rafale performs better and with greater effective longevity than the F-15T.

Geopolitics: The geopolitical factors influencing the contest, while relatively clear cut, favor both the French and American planes. The lure of totally cementing defense cooperation with the United States, along with effective US lobbying and diplomacy, encourage Singapore to go with the F-15. Singapore is already a strong American ally, and occupies an important position in the American regional power bloc. This alliance brings a number of benefits, including bilateral trade, security guarantees, and a position of influence. By going with the F-15, Singapore would cement this alliance with interdependence and extensive force interoperability. Effective American diplomacy and lobbying have improved Singapore’s perception of the benefits of such a move, and are a factor coaxing MinDef in Boeing’s direction that should not be underestimated. Yet selecting the F-15 has drawbacks as well. Singapore would become dependent on the US arms industry, and that would both limit its future foreign policy options and make it vulnerable to a change in American strategic posture. More importantly, the city-state would be forced to accept a fighter platform that is less effective and more expensive than the Rafale. Going with the French, on the other hand, has its own benefits. Singapore would diversify its stock of fighters, making it less dependent on the United States and giving it a greater freedom of action in the foreign policy sphere. It would purchase the clearly superior platform, which would complement its defense posture well. The drawbacks are limited. The Singapore-American alliance is already exceptionally strong, and this competition is unlikely to influence it in any substantial way; the island-state is already signed up as a participant in the Joint Strike Fighter program (a much more strategically important defense acquisition plan), and Washington is well aware of the strategic realities of the international market (i.e. sometimes it’s unfavorable, and a nation simply has to work around that).

Singapore is a sophisticated player in the realm of international politics. MinDef understands the strategic realities, and its tough-minded realism minimizes the influence of lobbying efforts. The RSAF will choose a fighter based on the real metrics of performance, cost, and geopolitics; these criteria naturally point to the Rafale. Although it wouldn’t be too much of a surprise should Singapore opt for the F-15 (American diplomacy has proven highly effective in this arena), neither is it very likely.

A tide of hard-edged nationalism has been sweeping over Japan and China lately. Although in many ways a natural product of the friction generated by China’s rise, Beijing and Tokyo have been carefully cultivating these feelings of nationalism in order to advance their own political objectives. Both governments have played a central role in perpetuating and increasing national fervor, believing themselves capable of shaping, controlling, and regulating it. Yet, as the experiences of the 20th century have taught, nationalism is a dangerous and utterly irrepressible force; once the line between benevolent (liberal) nationalism and militarism has been crossed, it’s very difficult to go back to the status quo. The two Asian powers still have an opportunity to contain it, but the effects of renewed nationalist antagonism will reverberate for years to come.

Japan, under the leadership of Junichiro Koizumi, has been forced to deal with the rapid rise of China. Tokyo had previously been the chief power in Asia, but China’s increasing economic, political, and military clout threatened Japan’s dominance. Beijing’s drive to modernize its aging military threatened to displace Japanese military supremacy, while China’s regional ambitions compromised Japanese energy security. In response, Koizumi and the Japanese elite decided to move away from the pacifism that had characterized the nation’s foreign policy since the close of the second world war, and with Washington’s approval assumed a much more assertive security stance. In order to gain the support of the Japanese people for this grand undertaking, the government decided to instill a sense of nationalism not seen since the time of imperial rule.

The government utilized several avenues to accomplish this. Perhaps the most important was the Japanese press. As that Financial Times piece explains, government control over the media has allowed Tokyo to use the press as a tool for promoting policies and encouraging nationalism. With Tokyo also wielding influence through its close relationship with Japan’s elite corporations, the government has the opportunity to sway the body politic to its side.

Few of Japan’s 20,000 reporters have a university training in journalism and most get just two weeks of corporate “training”. Journalists typically view their job as company work, with their obligation to the employer. The result is one of the least independent news media in the democratic world. For example NHK, Japan’s and the world’s largest broadcast company, was recently exposed for censoring a programme about “comfort women”, Japan’s second world war sex slaves. Two days before the programme was broadcast, top brass of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party expressed displeasure. According to a producer-turned-whistleblower, NHK scrambled to cut the survivors’ wrenching testimony, splicing in a preposterous academic describing the victims as prostitutes. Media denials of war atrocities, the use of “comfort women”, the Nanjing massacre, and sometimes even the Holocaust are politically useful because key LDP founders were in the imperial government. The party inherited its mantle and has almost continuously held power for five decades. Media whitewashing of the war legacy thus helps bolster LDP legitimacy, while friendly reporting on current issues furthers LDP policy objectives. These include a permanent seat on the UN Security Council and rewriting Japan’s pacifist constitution.

Nationalism of a more militant variety was perpetuated by Koizumi’s frequent visits to the Yasukuni shrine, where he honored legitimate Japanese heroes as well as a number of class-A war criminals (the class-A designation was only applied to the very worst offenders). These visits stirred up nationalism at home, and provoked Japan’s neighbors into anger at Koizumi’s perceived disregard for the atrocities that had been committed by those he honored. Some radical Japanese prefectures, seizing upon Koizumi’s legitimization of militant nationalism, boldly endorsed their own form of extreme nationalism. The Shimane prefecture went so far as to aggressively proclaim Japanese sovereignty over the disputed Takeshima islands, sending Korean-Japanese relations into a tailspin.

Finally, the government enacted the most controversial measure of all. Seeking to root a favorable sense of Japanese exceptionalism into the minds of Japan’s students, so that the next generation of Japanese will be more culturally prideful and more nationalistic, Tokyo decided to revise the textbooks used by junior high school students [permanent link].

Their students learn history through government-approved textbooks that are, especially with nationalism rising in all three countries, useful tools in shaping national identities. Since the textbooks require the central government’s imprimatur, they are taken as a reflection of the views of the current leaders. […]

The extraordinary fury at Japan stems not just from its 20th-century atrocities, but from what its neighbors describe as its increasing attempts to evade past wrongdoing. And they have a point. A look at the new textbooks and those from two previous cycles, 2002 and 1997, shows an unmistakable backpedaling on some of the most contentious points.

The most glaring example surrounds the issue of “comfort women,” the euphemism for the women, mostly Asian, who were forced into sexual servitude by Japanese authorities during World War II. In 1997, all seven textbooks included passages about them, explaining, for instance, that Japan “took away young Korean and other women as comfort women to battlefields.” In 2002, the number fell to three out of eight; this time, only two out of eight acknowledge the comfort women, and none use that term. […]

Nobukatsu Fujioka, the founder of the nationalist Japanese Society for History Textbook Reform, said that textbooks focusing on Japan’s alleged wartime wrongs were unhealthy for the country’s students.

“I established this association because I thought it was a serious problem that this masochistic education is making the youth lose their pride and confidence in their own country,” said Mr. Fujioka.

This new strain of Japanese nationalism, however, pales in comparison to that being promoted in China. Beijing views Chinese nationalism with two aims in mind. First, it wants to quell internal dissent by focusing popular energy against a common historical nemesis - Japan. Second, the Chinese government sees the value of nationalism in accomplishing its foreign policy aims, and has sought to leverage it extensively for that purpose. China has historically been the nexus of power in East Asia, and, as it once again rises to a position of great strength, a measure of national pride is to be expected. Friction between China and Japan in the political arena has similarly generated a natural undercurrent of nationalism, which has been exacerbated by the Japanese militant nationalism described above. Yet the extremely vehement Chinese nationalism that has manifested itself over the past few weeks is almost entirely a product of Beijing’s design. Observers note that through careful prodding, calculated sanction of violent protests, and even tacit support, Beijing has built up massive nationalist opposition to Japan. Through political and educational indoctrination, the Chinese central government has instilled a raw sentiment of rage against the Japanese, and it took only a bit of stoking for this to turn into a national outburst of collective anger.

This nationalism was first used to check Japanese ambitions for a permanent seat on the UN security council. Nationalists, encouraged by Beijing, went on a petition drive and managed to collect more than 20 million signatures in opposition to Japan’s bid. Violent protests erupted across the country, with demonstrators destroying Japanese cars and property; at one point, thousands of protesters surrounded the Japanese consulate and began pelting it with rocks and other objects. The nationalists soon turned their attention to more historical grievances, demanding that Japan recognize and apologize for atrocities it committed during world war two. In the coming months, it wouldn’t be surprising to see Beijing arouse public hostility once again, perhaps in opposition to Japanese drilling in the disputed East China Sea.

Following two day emergency talks, it appears that both sides are retrenching, rather than agreeing to a compromise [Financial Times, NY Times].

Japan reiterated its demand for an apology, saying the Chinese government failed to control the crowds. Although Chinese leaders have described the protests as spontaneous outbursts, authorities here normally exercise tight control over any show of political sentiment; police were seen cooperating with protest leaders in several cities.

“The primary responsibility” for the rise in tension, Takashima said at a news conference, “lies on those mobs that attacked Japanese Embassy and diplomatic installations and injured Japanese nationals.”

But Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing said on Sunday that China had no intention of apologizing for the violence, and Tang repeated that refusal Monday, saying the burden was on Japan to address its past more completely, Takashima said. He said the Chinese leaders pointed in particular to a textbook recently approved by the Japanese Education Ministry that, according to Chinese reports, refers to the Nanjing massacre of 1937 — in which historians estimate that 200,000-300,000 people were killed — as an “incident.”

Until this dispute is resolved, it’s highly likely that Beijing will continue to use mass nationalism as a foreign policy tool against Japan. Resolution, however, may come more quickly than either Japan or China is willing to admit.

The most significant threat that nationalism poses to both countries is a deterioration in bilateral trade and cooperation. Policy functions in both China and Japan are firmly controlled by the government, and nationalism holds little sway compared to the strategic calculus; neither will let it get in the way of foreign policy. Revolution in China is similarly unlikely. The government has recognized the dangers of uncontrolled nationalism, and has responded by using its influence to curtail demonstrations and rein the movement back in. Although it appears that Beijing has lost control of the rampant nationalism spreading through the country, it still retains enough power to crush any internal dissent. Party officials in Beijing have wisely decided to bring the national fervor under some degree of central control.

Nevertheless, neither Beijing nor Tokyo has the ability to dictate what products consumers purchase, and therein lies the risk. The tepid Japanese economic recovery is tied to robust Chinese consumption, and the staggeringly massive trade flow between the two states greatly benefits both. Should this trade flow be staunched by nationalism, it could very well lead to renewed economic stagnation in Japan, and produce a major drag on the Chinese economy. Very undesirable outcomes. Fortunately, widespread economic fallout has not yet appeared, although the warning signs are there.

The sharp deterioration in Sino-Japanese relations, compounded by blanket media coverage of angry Chinese rioters hurling stones and excrement at Japanese targets, is damaging business sentiment towards China, according to Japan’s External Trade Organisation.

Head offices of Japanese companies with manufacturing plants or subsidiaries in China had become cautious about the safety of their Japanese personnel and about possible damage to their sales, Tomoharu Washio, director-general of Jetro’s overseas research department, said.

“Unfortunately, Japanese coverage of the riots has been very sensationalist, so the parent companies’ risk management teams have been getting in touch with their people in China and setting off a chain reaction,” Mr Washio said. “Now everyone has become a little bit more nervous.”

He said manufacturers were so far largely unaffected, in spite of weekend reports of an anti-Japanese strike at a plant in Guandong province belonging to Taiyo Yuden, a manufacturer of electronics parts. But consumer companies were worried about the possible spread of boycotts, he said. “From what we are hearing, [new] advertising and public relations activities have stopped,” he said. 

The potential for the political crisis to spill over into business was underlined on Monday when the Nikkei index fell 3.8 per cent, dropping to below 11,000 for the first time in four months. Although the fall reflected wider fears about weaker US demand, and the poor performance of the electronics sector, the China issue has poisoned market sentiment, according to some analysts. […]

All Nippon Airways, Japan’s second-largest airline, said at least 1,000 Japanese daily were cancelling flights to China. “Most of the cancellations are coming from group tours,” Mineo Yamamoto, the airline’s president, said at a press conference in Tokyo. “Business passengers are still flying.”

Peter Morgan, economist at HSBC, said the biggest threat was a disruption to Japanese manufacturing plants. Much of Japanese production in China is re-exported to the US or Asian markets, potentially compounding the effect to Japanese companies’ profits, he said.

The potential economic harm to both nations is great enough to transcend this political strife. Eventually, probably sooner rather than later, the two sides will be forced to reconcile. Unfortunately, any agreement they come to, while strong enough to defuse the current crisis, will almost certainly leave in place the groundwork for a future flare up. Japan will continue to promote aggressive nationalism, and Beijing will continue to indoctrinate its population against Japan. As the two powers compete for dominance in Asia, these strains of nationalism will clash once again. It would behoove both China and Japan to prepare for that day, so that they can contain nationalism within the political sphere alone. Letting loose the force of nationalism upon economic relations would only hurt everyone involved.

Upon first hearing of his nomination to be UN ambassador, I was supportive of John Bolton. I saw in him an assertive nationalist who had the daring and courage to stand up to UN corruption and vigorously root it out. Although I knew Mr. Bolton was hardly a good diplomat, I considered this a small price to pay for honest reform. My instincts were further confirmed by positive press attention (including from the Financial Times), as well as a letter signed by a number of prominent foreign policy luminaries, including Kissinger, Eagleburger, and Haig. At that point I considered the case closed.

The first inklings of doubt came during Bolton’s confirmation hearing, where former diplomats categorized him as a poor manager and abusive toward employees. I quickly dismissed this as insufficient evidence against him. After all, his purpose at the UN was to mount a reform campaign; his management skills were of secondary importance. Furthermore, Bolton’s opponents couldn’t establish a direct pattern of abuse. Again balancing the costs and benefits (and giving the President the power of discretion), I continued to support the Bolton candidacy.

Yesterday, however, I saw a deeply disturbing article in the Washington Post that made me seriously question Mr. Bolton. The article described how Bolton tried to suppress intelligence reports that ran contrary to his own opinions, and thus deprived key policymakers of important information that they needed to be aware of.

John R. Bolton — who is seeking confirmation as the next U.S. ambassador to the United Nations — often blocked then-Secretary of State Colin L. Powell and, on one occasion, his successor, Condoleezza Rice, from receiving information vital to U.S. strategies on Iran, according to current and former officials who have worked with Bolton.

In some cases, career officials found back channels to Powell or his deputy, Richard L. Armitage, who encouraged assistant secretaries to bring information directly to him. In other cases, the information was delayed for weeks or simply did not get through. The officials, who would discuss the incidents only on the condition of anonymity because some continue to deal with Bolton on other issues, cited a dozen examples of memos or information that Bolton refused to forward during his four years as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security.

Intra-agency tensions are common in Washington, and as the undersecretary of state in charge of nuclear issues, Bolton had a lot of latitude to decide what needed to go to the secretary. But career officials said they often felt that his decisions, and policy views, left the department’s top diplomat uninformed and fed the long-running struggles inside the agency.

The worst was yet to come, however.

After reading the article, my interest was piqued as to what other substantive charges there were against Bolton. Unlike the critiques of his management style, these charges held real weight and importance. I came across a blog entry from Obsidian Wings, which provided an additional source of very damaging allegations against Bolton. This article persuasively made the case that Bolton acted in direct contravention to stated American policy aims. He became so intransigent, in fact, that US high officials informed the North Koreans that his voice carried absolutely no authority. That article should be read in full, because it utterly destroys the logic of a Bolton ambassadorship.

The purpose of the UN ambassador is to act as Washington’s representative to Turtle Bay. The ambassador does not make policy, but merely executes it. These reports conclusively demonstrate that Mr. Bolton is unable to act as a diplomat, and would actively sabotage any policy he disliked. Considering the power and influence of the US ambassador, this would be disastrous.

Washington needs to appoint an aggressive but responsible reformer to positively change the UN. It is now clear that John Bolton does not fit the bill, and it would be a poor choice indeed for his appointment to go forward.

(I’m becoming more impressed with Wolfowitz, however, as he prepares to assume control of the World Bank.)

Thomas Friedman’s latest column [permanent link] is very good, if somewhat sparse. His argument–that the Bush administration should do more to support science and technology in the US–is sound. His empirical evidence is also persuasive.

The piece first cites the expensing of stock options, “which is going to inhibit the ability of U.S. high-tech firms to attract talent - at a time when China encourages its start-ups to grant stock options to young innovators.” Not to mention that stock options only actually effect financial change upon the company when exercised, and some of them are left permanently idle. His strongest points, however, revolve around the amount of Federal spending being dedicated to science research.

The Bush team is proposing cutting the Pentagon’s budget for basic science and technology research by 20 percent next year - after President Bush and the Republican Congress already slashed the 2005 budget of the National Science Foundation by $100 million.

When the National Innovation Initiative, a bipartisan study by the country’s leading technologists and industrialists about how to re-energize U.S. competitiveness, was unveiled last December, it was virtually ignored by the White House.

The government must fund basic science research because it’s a public good that private sector investment undervalues. Cutting funding for research reduces the pool of university science from which private industry draws innovative ideas. The US economy is powered by technological advancement–it’s one of the key forces in free-market capitalism–and falling behind to Asia will undermine its strength and vigor.

Friedman points to a Foreign Affairs article arguing that the US has fallen behind in broadband adoption rates. The evidence is compelling.

The United States is losing considerable ground to Japan and its neighbors, and they will be the first to reap the economic benefits of these technologies. It is these countries, rather than the United States, that will benefit from the enhanced productivity, economic growth, and new jobs that high-speed broadband will bring. In 2001, Robert Crandall, an economist at the Brookings Institution, and Charles Jackson, a telecommunications consultant, estimated that “widespread” adoption of basic broadband in the United States could add $500 billion to the U.S. economy and produce 1.2 million new jobs. But Washington never promoted such a policy. Last year, another Brookings economist, Charles Ferguson, argued that perhaps as much as $1 trillion might be lost over the next decade due to present constraints on broadband development. These losses, moreover, are only the economic costs of the United States’ indirection. They do not take into account the work that could have been done through telecommuting, the medical care or interactive long-distance education that might have been provided in remote areas, and unexploited entertainment possibilities.

Unfortunately, however, broadband penetration isn’t a very good comparison index between countries. Japan and South Korea have a significant advantage because of the small and compact nature of their societies (and geography). The United States is geographically expansive, diverse, and in many cases spread out. Broadband is very important, as the above cited article makes clear, but, nevertheless, Mr. Friedman could’ve chosen a more applicable empirical study.

The author of the broadband article has a number of sensical recommendations that the White House would be wise to adopt. Mr. Friedman’s policy prescriptions include greater spending on basic science, a renewed commitment to economic competitiveness, and a realistic emphasis on how both business and government are necessary for moving forward.