Power Politics

Bill Gertz reports today that a prominent Chinese democracy activist believes that the threat of nuclear war between China and the United States is “substantial”. As one of the “leading international advocate[s] for political reform in China,” Wei Jingsheng is a strong opponent of the Chinese government; his authority must be taken with a large grain of salt, since he has ulterior reasons to engender American hostility to the regime in Beijing. Nevertheless, Wei is a noteworthy observer of Chinese politics and raises some interesting points during the interview.

Mr. Wei said he has heard from government officials in China, including some within the military, who are worried by the growing chance of a nuclear war.

Among Wei’s arguments, this is one of the weakest. He is asking the reader to accept, on his word, that some in the Chinese government are “worried by the growing chance of a nuclear war.” Since this is an unverifiable claim, it’s impossible to say if it’s right or wrong. However, as I noted above, Wei is no impartial scholar; he has a direct interest in portraying Beijing as a serious threat. While there may be some truth in the statement, it’s unpersuasive in proving his larger contention. China, like any great power, has sought and will continue to seek to guarantee its security. In the modern age, nuclear weapons are a vital component of great power security, as India has recently demonstrated. There is nothing unusual or particularly concerning about China now building up its arsenal, which has been woefully inadequate for some time. Wei’s contacts, if anything, are most likely opposed on ideological grounds to this nuclear buildup and just expressing their concern and opposition.

Recent Chinese military exercises and a Chinese general’s threat to use nuclear missiles against U.S. cities are two signs of the danger, said Mr. Wei, who has an office in Washington.

Regarding the former, it’s difficult to twist the exercises into a portent of nuclear danger. The military exercises were clearly designed, in part, to send a message to the United States. But it’s far from clear that the message threatened any sort of war. Rather it signaled that Washington ought not press China militarily; it was a demonstration of China’s military deterrent. China, if anything, wants to avert a direct war with the United States, not start one.

As for the latter, I previously covered that here. Even if Zhu was acting under the authority of the central government, however, it still wouldn’t augur a heightened risk of nuclear war; it would then be another example of deterrence, trying to avoid any sort of war by threatening the use of nuclear weapons.

“In the past, China may have felt that it was not time for them to confront the U.S.,” Mr. Wei said. “Now, things are different. Now the Chinese feel that they need to use these kind of nuclear threats. China is very serious about that. The nuclear threat from China is a substantial threat, not theoretical.”

Wei is absolutely correct that the Chinese have been hesisant about directly confronting the United States; in a way they still are, although that’s beginning to change. As China has grown in power and strength, it has been less concerned about American coercive diplomacy. Beijing is more willing now to come into opposition with Washington when its national interests are at stake. Talking up its deterrence capabilities is an example of this, because having a nuclear deterrent gives China greater freedom of action. A deterrent is, by definition, however, used to prevent military action. The Chinese are not looking to provoke a war, they are looking to force Washington to back down.

Politically, differences between Mr. Hu and Vice President Zeng Qinghong, who in the past was considered a Jiang loyalist, appear to have been resolved temporarily, Mr. Wei said.
The accommodation appears related to a decision to use force in the future against Taiwan, Mr. Wei said, adding that Mr. Hu favors a conflict as a way to consolidate power over the military.

Wei expects the reader to accept this rather shocking conclusion just on his word. Coming from a biased source without verification, that would be incredibly unwise. Let’s see some proof first.

China’s leadership is divided by factions headed by Mr. Hu and former President Jiang Zemin, Mr. Wei said. Additionally, there are elements within the military who think that a war to retake Taiwan should begin as soon as possible, Mr. Wei said.
“There are many conflicts within the military,” he noted.

There are have been many conflicts within the American military too; MacArthur’s desire to attack the Chinese with nuclear weapons during the Korean war comes to mind. Yet despite the fact that the United States gives its theater commanders a great deal of operational authority, that idea was dramatically crushed. In China, the central government maintains a far stronger grip over the military, and the prospect of a rogue military officer being able to force a great power war is relatively small; even if somehow a war came about that way, the Chinese leadership would quickly put an end to it before nuclear weapons became involved.

Mr. Wei also said that social unrest is growing rapidly in China and that hundreds of demonstrations in recent months have weakened Communist Party rule.
In Chinese history, he said, unrest has been a sign that a ruler is about to fall, prompting concern among Beijing’s communist leaders.

This is Wei’s most persuasive case. Indeed, the only credible factor that could lead Beijing to invade Taiwan would be the threat of a revolution. Yet even supposing a war over Taiwan broke out (possible but nevertheless highly unlikely), there’s little reason to think that China and America would get entangled in a nuclear war. Neither side would have an incentive to broaden the war to anything even approaching that.

In the end, the fact is that China’s leadership is rational. There is absolutely nothing to gain out of a nuclear exchange, and a great deal to lose. The prospect of Hu or his successors bringing the country into a nuclear war with the United States is so remote that it’s barely worth discussing. Wei raises some interesting points, but is ultimately unpersuasive.

The Deccan Herald reports that India is developing a three-stage indigenous intercontinental ballistic missile.

India will soon develop an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) with a flight range of 9,000-12,000 km.

According to sources in the ministry of defence (MoD), based on the experience with the Agni, the medium range ballistic missile (MRBM), the MoD is pressing for the creation of an ICBM.

The ICBM would probably be a three-stage ballistic missile with solid fuel rockets in the first and second stages, and a liquid propellant rocket in the third stage. The launch weight of the missile may reach 270-275 tonnes and an impact error of around 2 to 2.8 km, the sources said.

The missile may have a 2,490-3,490 kg releasable front section with two to three warheads of 15-20 kilotons each, the sources added.

There are plans to use the second stage propellant engine of the Vikas booster rocket during the development of this missile to increase its flight range. The ICBM is likely to be test-fired by 2008 and is expected to be added to the Indian armed forces’ deterrence arsenal by 2015.

Defense Industry Daily argues that, contrary to what the Herald has reported, the ICBM will probably have an impact error substantially less than the cited 2 to 2.8 kilometers.

Note that CEP impact errors of this magnitude make such missiles useful for city targeting only - this is not precise enough to attack hardened bases, especially given 15-20 kiloton (kT) warheads that are roughly the size of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs.

Those figures may also be wrong, as even basic modern inertial guidance plus stellar update should provide CEPs of under 1 km. By comparison, current Chinese CSS-9 (DF-31) ICBMs have an estimated CEP of 0.3 km, and the late 1980s technology Russian SS-18 Mod 4 ICBMs had an estimated CEP of 0.5 km. Even Russia’s SS-9 ICBM, which was phased out by 1979, had an est. CEP around 1.2 km. As one might imagine, the U.S. D-5 Trident II submarine launched missile has an est. CEP around 0.1 km, as do its land-based Minuteman III ICBMs.

There are two important details to note here. First is the stated range, 9,000-12,000 kilometers. I’ve created a graphical illustration of the targets within range (supposing the launching point is Hyderabad, which is where analysts speculate the ICBMs could be based), which I suggest you take a look at. The red circle represents the area that can be attacked if the ICBM ends up having a range of at least 12,000 kilometers, which is likely for several reasons. First, the planned timetable for the development of the ICBM is rather lengthy. Although testing will begin in 2008, deployment is not projected to occur until 2015. This will give Indian engineers a great deal of time to refine and enhance the missile’s design; in fact, the Herald article notes that there are already plans to try to increase the ICBM’s range beyond the original plans. Unless the Indians run up against significant stumbling blocks (unlikely but possible), the range might in fact turn out to exceed 12,000 kilometers (and thus fall into the blue zone on the map). Second, the ministry of defence is already comfortable and familiar with the technology being employed in the new ICBM, and there are no serious technological hurdles that must be dealt with. Finally, in the future, this project will only become more important to Indian defense strategists, and will likely enjoy a considerable level of political support.

In any case, one can clearly see the sheer scope of the areas India would be able to strike with the new ICBM. Every major world and regional power (with the glaring exception of many countries in the Americas, such as the United States) would be vulnerable to Indian nuclear forces, including China, Russia, Japan, Australia, France, and Britain. If the Indians are able to extend the range beyond 12,000 km, the continental United States and Brazil would also be a viable targets.

The second detail to note is the payload. According to Indian sources, the missile will carry “two to three warheads of 15-20 kilotons each.” This is a substantial allotment of firepower; each warhead, as DID noted, is comparable to those used against Japan at the end of World War II. With two to three warheads on each ICBM, the devices are clearly designed to be city-killers; there will be no using these on the tactical battlefield. In fact, as India’s nuclear technology grows more advanced (perhaps with help from Israel, the United States, or Russia), it’s more than likely that the ICBMs will be upgraded with a heavier payload in the future.

The fact that India is developing highly destructive ICBMs with a global reach is an unsurprising but still significant milestone in its ascent to great power status. In the world today, there are only two countries that can be considered world powers but that lack nuclear weapons. In Japan, cultural and strategic factors have prevented it from becoming a nuclear power, but it retains the capability to rapidly field nuclear weaponry. In Germany, which may or may not be considered a world power, deeply entrenched cultural and strategic factors have also stopped nuclearization; this may someday change, however. In any case, India is not nearly as constrained. It already possesses short and medium range nuclear weapons (built in order to counter regional security threats from Pakistan and China), and has an active nuclear program. The development of a global strategic deterrent is the next logical step in this progression, especially as India moves into the elite realm of the powers of the highest order. Deploying a global nuclear deterrent is the key step in creating a strong national defense system, which will allow it to pursue its interests in a broader fashion while still protecting itself both from retaliation and the military designs of rival powers. New Delhi is recognizing its widening stature and responding quite rationally to insulate itself from the threats faced by the great powers.

This trend will only intensify as India grows more powerful and Asia more anarchic; expect to see a greater emphasis in India on global nuclear deterrence and defense in the future.

On August 22nd, prominent American conservative Pat Robertson called for the assassination of Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez, arguing that he “is a dangerous enemy to our south controlling a huge pool of oil.”

Mr Robertson made his comments on Monday on The 700 Club, a programme broadcast by his Christian Broadcasting Network. The preacher said killing Mr Chavez would prevent Venezuela becoming a “launching pad” for extremism.

“If he thinks we’re trying to assassinate him, I think that we really ought to go ahead and do it,” Mr Robertson said in reference to a claim Mr Chavez made in June that he had evidence that the US wanted him dead.

Robertson has since apologized for his comments.

The Venezuelan government, however, took advantage of the inflammatory remarks as a platform to attack the United States.

Jose Vicente Rangel, vice-president, said that how US authorities responded would demonstrate their commitment to fighting terrorism. “It’s deeply hypocritical to talk about fighting terrorism while at the same time, within that country, there are obvious terrorist statements,” he said. […]

In Caracas, Desire Santos Amaral, a pro-Chavez politician, called Mr Robertson a “fascist” whose opinions were “part of the policies of aggression from the rightwing in the North”.

Prodded by the media, American government officials censured Robertson’s comments. State Department spokesman Sean McCormack called them “inappropriate.” Defense Secretary Rumsfeld was similarly dismissive, observing that Robertson was a “private citizen” whose pronouncements hold no weight in determining state policy.

The media, however, seeking an explosive story, immediately catapulted this onto the frontpages. The Venezuelan government, having a talent for exploiting the fourth estate and propagandizing, immediately saw the potential here. By issuing a vitriolic announcement comparing the comments to terrorism, and making it seem that Robertson, always a firebrand, had directly influenced foreign relations, Venezuela leveraged the story to score political points against Washington. As the media coverage portrayed it, Robertson had materially injured American relations with Caracas. A Senator no less prominent than Judiciary Committee Chairman Arlen Spector complained that the remarks complicated joint-counternarcotics efforts between the two nations. And the Financial Times reported that “analysts said yesterday the incident would help to strengthen Mr Chavez’s profile in the region as a leader who provides a political alternative to US power.”

In reality, there is far less substance to this story than the prominent coverage has suggested. Robertson, though a noteworthy voice in the conservative camp, is a private citizen who has no role in determining United States foreign policy. His comments went blatantly against the White House’s legally and strategically established policy of not assassinating political leaders, and clearly were nothing more than his own opinions. The situation in South America, where a nationalistic Venezuela is launching a broad campaign against American power in order to advance its own regional interests and strength, has not been affected at all by Robertson’s statements. Venezuela still holds the same opinion of the US government, and its neighbors have not been influenced in the slightest. Chavez has consistently demonstrated his desire to be a countervailing power in the region, both rhetorically and strategically, and there’s absolutely no reason to think that this short-lived episode will “help to strengthen Mr Chavez’s profile in the region.” Such sentiments inaccurately draw conclusions from the Venezuelan government’s remarks (which were intended to score propaganda points, not change anything material), and ignore the fundamental geopolitics.

On August 22nd, Chinese energy firm CNPC officially announced plans to purchase PetroKazakhstan, a Canadian listed oil firm with major interests in Kazakhstan; rumors about the move have been circulating since the 16th, when the final details of the takeover bid were worked out. PetroKaz had previously been in negotiations with Indian firm ONGC, which partnered with the powerful Mittal family to tender a $3.8 billion bid. CNPC offered $4.18 billion, a substantial premium above the Indian tender. Although ONGC is considering a counter-bid, it’s unlikely that the firm could win a bidding war with CNPC, which is flush with money and backed by the Chinese government.

The contest over PetroKaz comes amidst a broader competition among the world’s most powerful industrial economies to secure energy resources abroad, one of the key geopolitical currents of the 21st century. India’s bid was both strategically and commercially motivated by a desire to gain access to the valuable Transcaspian oil network, which holds great future promise in terms of volume and location. ONGC had hoped to tap into a Chinese pipeline, which upon completion will be linked to PetroKaz’s fields, and divert part of the flow into India. It had also presumably hoped to use PetroKaz as a bridge to access lucrative Caspian oil concessions and deals. The Financial Times offers a good summary of India’s oil acquisition plans.

For China, the acquisition of PetroKaz was a golden opportunity that Beijing did not intend to miss. Unlike Indian companies, Chinese oil firms have been active participants in developing Transcaspian energy resources for some time now. As the International Herald Tribune reports, CNPC itself “has worked closely with the Kazakh government on several projects.” Analyst Shang Ma notes that “buying PetroKaz’s assets will simply add to its existing stakes in two major oil regions in the country, two refineries, as well as the 246km Atasu-Alanshankou pipeline.”

The Chinese opted to bid on PetroKaz in aim of two goals, one commercial and one political. Commercially, the assets of the Canadian firm dovetail perfectly with CNPCs infrastructure and overriding objectives; as PetroKaz’s chief executive told reporters, “there is a tremendous synergy between our assets and CNPC’s expertise, assets and markets.” Most obviously, CNPC will gain control over 150,000 barrels of daily oil production as well as potentially profitable exploration rights. However, most importantly, the purchase will significantly bolster Chinese energy security, as Stratfor aptly explains:

PetroKazakhstan’s primary assets are located in the Kumkol oil fields of central Kazakhstan. Compared to Kazakhstan’s other massive fields, Kumkol is a small fry. Singular major projects in western Kazakhstan have six billion barrels or more in reserves, while all of PetroKazakhstan’s Kumkol reserves — comprising more than 20 small fields — hold proven reserves of only 340 million barrels.

Thus, nearly all the heavy work has been done in Kazakhstan’s northwest. That’s where Chevron and Exxon are slaving away at the Tengiz superfield, and where a consortium of the world’s largest oil firms are trying to figure out how to tap riches buried deep under the Caspian Sea.

For energy-starved China, however, those fields are on the wrong side of the country. After several years of attempting to square the circle by helping export Kazakh crude west to the Black Sea with the intent of shipping it around Africa and Asia to China’s southern coast, China bit the bullet in early 2004 and began constructing a multi-billion-dollar, multi-thousand-kilometer pipeline to connect those western Kazakh fields with eastern China.

Enter PetroKazakhstan. The Chinese pipeline route runs smack through the middle of PetroKazakhstan’s Kumkol project.

This acquisition will shore up China’s control over the important trans-Kazakh pipeline, facilitating its construction and giving the Chinese leverage to prevent India from drawing on the oil flowing from western Kazakhstan. It will guarantee Beijing a secure and stable supply of crude to western China, as well as open up the potential for lucrative commercial opportunities in the future.

Politically, the purchase of PetroKaz will allow Beijing to exercise greater influence in Astana and comes as part of a concerted effort to displace the United States as the dominant power in the Central Asian sphere. By acquiring key infrastructure and oil concessions, China will naturally be able to extend its influence deeper into Kazakhstan. It will no doubt try to use its petroleum leverage to pressure Astana into favoring China and enacting favorable policies. By gaining a stronger foothold in the Kazakh oil business, Beijing will now be able to more effectively petition for further oil deals and involve itself more actively in the lucrative Caspian fields; the Kazakh goverment has often resisted selling Chinese companies stakes in its superfields. The IHT, for examples, notes the following case.

Cnooc and the third of China’s three state-owned oil companies, China Petroleum & Chemical, known as Sinopec, had tried and failed to buy into Kazakhstan’s huge Kashagan field two years ago. Their initial agreements to buy stakes were pre-empted by foreign operators in the field, who invoked clauses in commercial agreements for the oil field in an attempt to buy the stakes for themselves. The Kazakh government then invoked a legal pre-emption, claiming a partial stake for itself.

In any case, the deal appears to have government sanction. Central Asian analysts say that an acquisition of this magnitude would by default involve Astana and its assent. This makes great sense, especially given the Kazakh government’s acute understand of petrol politics. A government preemption would be very surprising news, and would change the tenor of the situation dramatically. Yet such a rejection seems to be a remote possibility at this juncture.

I have previously discussed the nature of Kazakhstan’s foreign policy, which can be best summarized as promoting neutrality and stability. Astana has eschewed taking sides in the great power rivalries immanent in the region, and has instead made it a policy to work favorably with all of the regional players in aim of stabilizing its neighbors. Astana considers itself the pillar of Central Asia, and has sought to be an interface to the area for interventionist powers. While this strategy has produced inconsistent results, smart leadership has turned Kazakhstan into a prosperous and powerful state. As I noted before:

Kazakhstan is uniquely suited to being one of the key players in the intense international competition to secure and develop expansive new sources of hydrocarbons and other raw materials. In addition to possessing rich oil reserves capable of sustaining production in excess of three million barrels per day, Astana has nearly a trillion proved cubic meters of natural gas. Its large supplies of copper, chromium, magnesium, titanium, and zinc continue to be an important source of revenue. It also has geographical control over the very lucrative deposits of oil and natural gas in the disputed Caspian sea; although these fields require expensive investment and development, they are one of the few unexploited reserves capable of compensating for the loss of large older fields, such as those in the Middle East. The domestic economic situation is unusually conducive to foreign investment as well, and a political commitment to capitalism has facilitated the economic rise of the nation. A number of oil conglomerates and financiers (both private and state) are betting heavily on the success of the Kazakh fields, and are building up the infrastructure necessary to sustain high oil production quite rapidly.

Kazakhstan is also a key geopolitical player in the volatile Central Asian region. Its strong economy and peaceful foreign policies have contributed greatly toward stabilizing the area, which is rife with simmering issues that have the potential to quickly explode into massive conflagrations. The economic prosperity enjoyed in the republic has also diffused into neighboring areas, raising general economic success and promoting stable national governance. The Kazakh-Uzbek joint-efforts to advance the development and political stability of the region, forged after the paradigm shifting September 11th attacks, are essential to peaceful regional cohesion. If either Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan collapses, so will Central Asia. Kazakhstan is also an important base for the United States in the war against Islamic fundamentalism. As well as providing an area for American forces to stage from (or simply fly-over), a strong Kazakhstan provides a model of ethnic cooperation and stable governance for the people of the region to adopt (or believe in).

Kazakhstan under President Nazarbayev has maintained relative neutrality, having generally good relations with the major foreign powers, and cooperating with its neighbors during territorial disputes. The government naturally leans toward Moscow, of course, since much of its economy depends on Russia (it presently relies on the Bear to export its oil, as the only available pipelines go to Russia’s Black Sea outlet). However, it’s making a concerted effort to break free of that reliance, particularly when it comes to oil exports. Astana has been working with China to build a high capacity pipeline for transporting oil to the east, which is almost complete. The government is also looking to construct other pipelines, and to possibly distribute oil through Azerbaijan. Mr. Nazarbayev’s opportunism and neutrality manifest themselves in the scope and variety of the joint-endeavors his state undertakes. The government, for instance, assists Moscow in launching space vehicles, works with Washington in the war on terrorism, and sells raw materials to Beijing. Clearly, Mr. Nazarbayev is no one’s stooge.

Many have suggested that government approval of the sale of PetroKaz to China signifies a shift from Astana’s traditional neutrality. To an extent, this is true. Washington’s promotion of democratic governance has caused great resentment among the Central Asian states (many of them being autocracies); it has allowed China and Russia, under the banner of the SCO, to make inroads across the region. In some cases, such as Uzbekistan, Washington’s policies have caused the government to turn away dramatically from the United States. In other cases it has caused a more moderate strategic realignment. In the case of Kazakstan, however, the promotion of democracy has done the least harm to bilateral ties.

There are several reasons for this. First and foremost, Kazakhstan is stronger and more stable than its regional brethren. With its durable ties to numerous states, corporations, and international institutions, Astana is shielded from the destabilizing effects of American policy. Washington, furthermore, has been less than enthusiastic about pressuring the Kazakh government to enact democratic reforms. With a growing economy and a relatively benign system of control in place, the government feels reasonably secure against revolutionary impulses.

Yet Astana is still an autocratic government, and it naturally fears revolution or social instability. Although the country is moving toward a system of elections, progress is slow and measured. President Nazarbayev thus has reason to be upset over America’s democracy policy in Central Asia; although it does not rise to the level of a serious threat, it is an unwelcome annoyance that agitates the central government.

In response to this pressure, Nazarbayev naturally pushed back. Although it is true that the oil deal will force a closer alignment between Astana and Beijing, it is not as significant as some suggest. Astana will still be able to maintain its political independence, and will seek to minimize China’s influence. It will still maintain favorable relations with the United States, although perhaps with slightly more caution. In reality, Nazarbayev is carefully protecting his government by creating an out; he is definitely not joining the anti-American axis.

The United States should recognize this and return to a policy of quietly promoting good governance; democracy will probably follow, if slowly. It should seek to strengthen ties with Astana, and carefully avoid weakening them in the future. Most importantly, Washington should see that Kazakstan remains an important strategic ally, and act accordingly as its interests require.

I have been a long-time critic of many aspects of the Bush administration’s foreign policy, particularly in relation to its endorsement of unothodox policy theories that are more flagrantly ineffective than visionary. Its commitment to neoconservatism and the invasion of Iraq, for instance, have been disasters for American power and resources. Its single-minded devotion to an unworkable national missile defense shield has been a waste of time and capital that unnecessarily strained relations with Moscow. An unwillingness to compromise over democratic ideals has cost the United States leverage and influence in strategically crucial Central Asia, while the mishandled reconstruction effort in Afghanistan threatens to leave the country in its traditional state of ruin. And so on.

Which is not to say that current administration has not had its share of successes. Its promotion of free trade agreements has been laudable. The Millenium Challenge Account and other forward-looking aid programs are a welcome addition to America’s effort in international development. The White House has also done a relatively good job at managing diplomacy in Asia; it has successfully strengthened ties with Australia, Japan, Singapore, and Indonesia. By adopting a reasoned and sensible posture toward Taiwan, the administration has averted conflict and laid the groundwork for future stability. With respect to the Middle East, the administration’s tactful diplomacy succeeded in forcing Syria to susbstantially reduce its control over Lebanaon. And so on.

Two articles in the Washington Times today boost the latter case considerably. The first is a report that the United States is ready to normalize ambassadorial relations with Libya. The second is a report that Washington is willing to work with the leaders of a recent Mauritanian coup. While neither of these stories is new, both offer potent examples of how traditional diplomacy is often more effective than the blunt club Mr. Bush has sometimes preferred.

Libya is perhaps the more clearcut case. In the 1980s, Tripoli was ardently anti-American, seeking to advance its interests in direct opposition to those of the United States. It sponsored terrorism, sought backing from the Soviet Union, and adopted a system of pan-African socialism. It was rightly considered an enemy, and President Reagan even ordered an aerial attack on the country after one of the terrorist attacks it had sponsored killed three American soldiers. Diplomatic relations were severed, and Libya became an international pariah. After its patron collapsed in 1990, Libya languished under strictly maintained international sanctions. With the disfunctional economy stagnating, military dictator Muammar Qaddafi decided to reverse his previous anti-Westernism and seek improved relations with the United States in the mid-1990s. Because his country contained significant deposits of both oil and natural gas, his diplomatic overtures received considerable attention in Washington.

President Clinton, in consulation with London, decided to conduct diplomatic negotiations aimed at normalizing relations. These proceeded apace for some time, and the Bush administration wisely decided to continue the policy when it arrived in office. The process finally brought results in 2003, when the two countries agreed to incrementally normalize relations. In exchange for Western investment and support, Qaddafi agreed to open up Libya’s hydrocarbon deposits and give American firms preferential access. He further acquiesced to paying generous punitive damages to the victims of the Lockerbie bombings, which he had sponsored. He also sought future business ties with the West, both to invigorate the Libyan economy and to modernize Tripoli’s decaying military. Parallel to this, though, Libya was quietly developing nuclear weaponry. When President Bush’s newly developed anti-proliferation regime successfully caught Libya importing nuclear materials redhanded, Qaddafi agreed to completely disarm and hand over all relevant information and resources to Washington. By using a combination of incentives, coercion, and multilateral security cooperation, the United States benefitted substantially. It gained access to a new and valuable source of hydrocarbons, brought an international pariah back into the international order, opened up a lucrative new market for sales and investment, prevented the emergence of a new nuclear power, and uncovered the AQ Khan nuclear proliferation network (which threatened to destabilize the world). This is the type of flexible and wise policy that produces results.

In Mauritania, another oil producing state, the United States had until quite recently support the leadership of President Taya. Taya was quite willing to act as a client of the US, and vigorously supported the war on terrorism (although he mostly used it as an excuse to jail Islamic dissidents). More importantly, his country was strategically located in West Africa, a part of the world that America will be increasingly dependent upon as a source of oil. Washington’s alliance with Nouakchott not only allowed it to exploit Mauritania’s indigenous reserves, but put it in an opportune position to secure and protect West Africa’s other deposits. Earlier this month, President Taya was ousted by a military coup. The officers released the Islamic dissidents and declared that they would hold democratic elections within two years. Although the freedom and governance of their country was likely indeed an important motive behind the coup (many military leaders are surprisingly supportive of wise governance), there is no doubt that petroleum was involved. The officers are likely hoping to be able to acquire a portion of the revenue that’s produced as the oil fields begin pumping. Yet the men are pragmatists, and were fully willing to resume cooperation with the United States. Although initially opposed to the ousting of Taya, the White House has been surprisingly flexible in dealing with the situation. Realizing that Taya was not coming back to power, the administration decided to drop its opposition to the new leaders and deal with them at face value. Instead of adhering to a destructive policy of refusing to cooperate with the new government, Washington has wisely come to terms with it. As with Libya, this pragmatism will yield significant strategic benefits.

Diplomacy, pragmatism, and the traditional tools of statecraft have served as the essential elements of successful foreign policy for centuries. This did not come to an end after the Cold War. As the neoconservative grand strategy unravels, it behooves the White House to return to the fundamental, and still superior, tools of foreign relations. Unsurprisingly, it seems that President Bush is wisely doing just that. And as the examples of Libya and Mauritania demonstrate, the administration can do it quite successfully.