Power Politics

1. U.S. to head to Moon for $104 billion. The Associated Press reports that NASA projections indicate that it will cost a total of $104 billion to send astronauts to the moon by 2018. That averages to approximately $8 billion per year. While some analysts contend that this is an exhorbitant sum that would be more prudently spent on domestic priorities, they underestimate the long-term value of the space program. It is indeed true that there are other pressing priorities requiring attention; culling the large federal budget deficit is perhaps the most prominent. Yet the government spends on programs that cut across the spectrum of human endeavors, and for good reason; there is virtue in moderation. For a country with a GDP exceeding $10 trillion annually, an $8 billion annual investment in reaching the moon is quite reasonable, especially considering the long-term payoff.

Exploring beyond the confines of the Earth is a natural impulse following in the best traditions of human progress; venturing to the moon is a prestige project that will bring recognition and national pride for decades to come. More pragmatically, maintaining a cutting-edge and vibrant space program will be useful for the economic and political competition of the 21st century. Having an edge in space technology will put the US at the forefront of research and innovation in this area, where it enjoys its greatest competitive advantages. Furthermore, as control over space and extraterrestrial bodies becomes an increasingly important and pertinent issue in the new century, the ability to actually make use of and exercise real authority there will become essential. A great power does not remain so on technological inertia, and investing in an active space program must be a key part of American policy in the 21st century.

2. Indonesia accelerates Aceh pullout. I’m pleased to report that, as I previously projected, the latest Aceh peace treaty seems to be sticking. The fundamentals point toward continued progress.

3. The AP reports that the US and EU are prepared to submit a Security Council resolution against Iran. Although I understand Western frustration with Iran, this is the wrong way to try to overcome obstacles in the nuclear disarmement talks. Submitting a resolution should only be considered if somehow the Russian and Chinese vetoes are neutralized, and accomplishing that would require far more diplomatic concessions than would be wise. Submitting a resolution only to have it shot down cannot have salutary effects on the effort to disarm Iran.

4. Singapore’s biotechnology push. I once again applaud Singapore for its visionary economic policies. Biotechnology will be perhaps the most important industry of the 21st century, and Singapore is in a prime position to capitalize on it. Its investments and friendly government policies will be rewarded bountily in the long-term. Singapore is perhaps the only managed market economy that has sustainably prospered, and this further demonstrates the government’s strategic acumen.

5. Clark seeks alliances after narrow victory. I must admit that I’m disappointed in the outcome of the New Zealand election. I have no complaints with Clark’s stewardship of the economy; she has down a magnificent job, although I suppose further reform would be beneficial. Nevertheless, her continuance of the government’s sadly misguided anti-nuclear policy is detrimental to both New Zealand and the United States. Auckland’s nuclear prohibition has complicated its security situation and prevented negotiations on a lucrative free trade deal with the United States. The island-state should instead adopt a policy similar to that of neighboring Australia, cultivating close relations with both Washington and Beijing but ultimately allying itself with Washington. Until the anti-nuclear posture is reversed, Washington should refuse to sign a free trade accord. Hopefully New Zealanders will come around soon enough.

KYRGYZSTAN: U.S. base can stay, but rent will rise. As the competition for influence, basing, and oil resources (the new Great Game) heats up in Central Asia, the Central Asian states themselves will be able to play the great powers off against each other. Kazakhstan, the most powerful state in the region, has done it best, but as this demonstrates the others will follow. So long as they remain geopolitically important points of contention, both the United States and China (SCO) will be willing to pay up. In this case, Bishkek knows that it’s an important operating theater for the United States, and so it intends to extract concessions for the value of the base. It’ll probably try the same trick again in other areas, most likely with success.

Singapore says in final negotiations with Boeing over F-15 order. Wrong again! I suppose I underestimated the sheer importance of the US-Singapore security alliance to the Singaporean government and thus miscalculated where the geopolitical influence would fall. I still think that the country would’ve been better off diversifying and getting the Rafale, but I was totally wrong in my prognostications on this issue. The readers who wrote in disagreement won this round.

Blair under pressure on launch aid for Airbus.

The UK government must decide urgently on providing hundreds of millions of pounds in launch aid to Airbus if it is to secure Britain’s role in the European aircraft maker’s next generation A350 aircraft project.

The decision is highly sensitive, as the granting of financial support will inflame the trade conflict between the US and the European Union over state subsidies to Boeing and Airbus for the development of large civil aircraft. […]

Government support, which could total up to £380m ($700m, €559m) is regarded by the UK aerospace industry as vital to protect UK technology and to maintain the central UK role in future Airbus programmes alongside France, Germany and Spain.

The special relationship between Britain and the United States is indeed the most important factor in British foreign relations. Nevertheless, maintaining its industrial and technological base (and remaining a strong supporter of European aerospace and defense) is an extremely important priority for Britain. I think they should give the launch aid, because Britain’s relationship with the US is durable enough to take the hit (Washington owes London, anyway).

The post-war Japanese political order, though nominally liberal, has in reality been among the most authoritarian in the democratic world. Policy has been drafted and enacted secretively by the political elite, and consensus policymaking has been the rule in governance. Like neighboring Singapore, the government has taken an active role in centrally planning a form of market economics; likewise, the government has also maintained an active role in regulating social conduct. Burkean analysts would ascribe this form of authoritarian democracy, a staple of Asian politics, as being rooted in fundamental cultural values (most prominently the Confucian system of ethics). I think that puts it best.

Yet, as Burke would be quick to recognize, culture is just a layer upon fundamental human nature; culture morphs, shapes, and regulates human nature, but cannot supersede it. And when confronted with a decrepit and stagnating system of government that has failed the people and is in desperate need of change, not even the strongest authoritarian streak will prevent the body politic from eventually challenging the status quo.

Junichiro Koizumi, who became Prime Minister in 2001, can be viewed as an expression of this deterministic process. For more than a decade, Japan had labored under economic stagnation and a failed political system; poor government planning and a fundamentally flawed system of political economy demonstrated clearly the need for change. Koizumi, following in the footsteps of Japan’s other great Westernizers, promised massive structural reform. With an unprecedented visibility in the media and popular perception, Koizumi pledged to restore good governance to Japan and restart the sagging economy. He exploited the techniques of mass electioneering, heretofore largely absent from Japanese politics, and received an unprecedented degree of public support and enthusiastic backing.

And so it was something of a disappointment when Koizumi failed to fully embrace his grand vision once in office. Instead, he started his term by adopting a policy of conservatism and incrementalism, embracing reform but unwilling or unable to impose a radical overhaul. He made economist Heizo Takenaka his point-man, first in reforming the badly debilitated banking sector and then in instituting a variety of sensible macroeconomic structural adjustments. The economy resurged, and has since entered into a period of growth that many analysts contend is finally sustainable. There is no doubt that sound economic reform and leadership on the part of Koizumi aided in the economic recovery; yet, as economists have aptly contended, the recovery was mostly the result of natural economics and private sector reform.

While Koizumi adopted a policy of incremental change in economic policy, his foreign policy has been characterized by anything but. Compelled by both the strategic environment and his own ideology, Koizumi has wrought dramatic changes in Japan’s security posture. He has forcefully promoted loosening the restraints on military action, and has sought to add a greater offensive component to the already powerful Japanese forces. He has placed a greater emphasis on the traditional tools of geopolitical statecraft, and has strengthened Tokyo’s security alliance with Washington. Cognizant of geopolitics, Koizumi has taken a more assertive posture toward China and particularly toward securing scarce energy resources. In effect, he has normalized Japanese foreign policy, turning the country from pacifism to a form of realism.

In 2004, Koizumi, in an effort both to repair the government’s fiscally unsound pension system and to deflect fallout from a growing pension scandal, put into law an ambitious pension reform scheme that reduced benefits in order to bring the system into sounder fiscal health. Although in absolute terms the reform effort was rather limited, it stirred great controversy in Japan; Koizumi’s approval ratings took a prodigious hit, but he survived. Nevertheless, this effort at ambitious reform foreshadowed Koizumi’s next political gambit, which was truly earth shattering.

In 2005, Koizumi took what seemed to be the biggest gamble of his political career. He introduced legislation to (albeit slowly) privatize Japan Post, one of the pillars of post-war Japanese society. To understand the sheer audacity behind the move, one must first understand exactly what Japan Post is. It is not just Japan’s national post office. It is also the country’s largest savings bank (and the largest bank in the world), responsible for financing many of the government’s favored initiatives. Through countless local branch officers, Japan Post became a key employer and a key pillar of social stability. Even more, it became the key to LDP electoral success. (The LDP has ruled Japan for the past fifty years, and is the party of Prime Minister Koizumi.) Local postmasters provided financial support to the party, and were instrumental in convincing local voters to simply choose the LDP ticket every election. This made the LDP almost invulnerable, and guaranteed it political dominance. By proposing to dismantle Japan Post, Koizumi sought not only to remove one of Japan’s key social institutions, but in the process also destroy the LDP’s lock on power.

Angry and embittered over the move, legislators in the Upper House threatened to reject the bill. Koizumi in return threatened to dissolve the Lower House and throw the country into political upheaval. LDP rebels rejected the legislation, perhaps believing him to be bluffing; Koizumi immediately dissolved the Lower House, and launched Japanese politics into turmoil. He threw dissenting LDP legislators (the old guard) out of the party, and sent in celebrity candidates (assassins) to defeat them in the polls. In a single stroke, he smashed the conventions of traditional Japanese politics and remade the LDP into a party modeled after his own vision.

In light of what happened, an interesting new possibility has emerged. First brought to my attention by Strategic Forecasting, it makes a great deal of sense. Keep in mind that Koizumi is an absolutely brilliant political strategist and sharp political observer. Then note that the greatest obstacle to his agenda has been the old guard of the LDP, who chafe at reform and adhere to the old political order. There was no conceivable way for him to rid the party of these rebels, who would vociferously block his major reform efforts at every turn… or was there? Recall what the contest over postal reform has done: it has smashed the old political order and enabled Koizumi to expel the old guard from his own party. In one bold stroke, it removed the greatest institutional stumbling blocks to massive reform. Stratfor’s view is that Koizumi might very well have engineered this fight from the start, holding back on major structural reform so that he could successfully eliminate the one big factor preventing it. This grand strategic view makes a great deal of sense logically and from what I know of Koizumi’s brilliance, and I must say I’ve been persuaded by it. Although I have always been supportive of the Prime Minister, this boosts my respect for him tremendously. He will easily be among the greatest Japanese Prime Ministers in history.

As far as Monday’s election is concerned, I wholeheartedly support Koizumi and the LDP. The LDP rebels are entirely out of sync with reality, and unfit to govern Japan. The DPJ (the opposition party) holds more promise, and has an even more boldly reformist agenda than Koizumi. Yet the party is weak in two areas. First, its grand strategy is unfit for Japan in the current East Asian security climate. Second, and more importantly, the party is a young and untested amalgam of views. Formed under a decade ago, it is compromised of a mix of ideologies and political philosophies only broadly united in opposition. It has not yet had time to coalesce into a mature political actor and has yet to solidify its views in a broad overarching ideology and framework for governance. I fear that a DPJ government would be ineffective, just as the one previous opposition government was (it collapsed very quickly). Japan needs effective and stable leadership at this crucial moment of reform.

Koizumi is not as radical a reformist as the leaders of the DPJ are, and his diplomacy is occasionally impolitic. Yet he’s dedicated to major structural reform, proven himself to be an effective leader, conducted an intelligent foreign policy, and smashed down the old guard in Japanese politics. His second term promises to be even more successful. I only wish America had a leader as competent and successful as he is.

Taiwan’s Cabinet Approves Reduced Arms package. I discussed the arms deal before here. I’m glad the Taiwanese were able to finally work it out and get the acquisition passed, as it’ll greatly bolster their defenses against China over the next decade or two.

Pakistan Air Force to Hold War Games. This is an excellent demonstration of the tensions that have lately been reintroduced into the Indo-Pakistani relationship (after a short period of euphoria); I previously covered some of the issues here. Suffice it to say that, though the prospects of war remain unlikely, the prospects of peace are similarly dim. With the region in a state of flux, facing pressure from across the board, New Delhi and Islamabad are entrenching themselves. Other states, such as Israel, are taking advantage of the situation; Russia and China are exploiting the opportunity to peddle weaponry and influence. How this will impact the rise of India remains to be seen, but one can be sure that both Beijing and Washington will be looking to exploit this chill in relations for geopolitical gain. Will China forge closer relations with Islamabad in order to contain India? Will America be able to maintain favorable relations with both?

China urges action against threat of militarization of outer space. There’s recently been an upsurge in talk about the role of space in military affairs, some of which I discussed here. Right now, the US military is particularly interested in having weapons and planes traverse through space (from Earth, into space, and then back to Earth), which could offer dramatic advantages in range, speed, and flexibility. China is focusing on its space program as well; Beijing is looking into both prestige programs (going to the moon, for example) and military programs (advanced surveillence satellites). However, Washington has a tremendous edge in space technology, which concerns China greatly. In response, the Chinese have invested in anti-satellite weaponry and cyberwarfare, but remain relatively incapable of denying America the military use of space. With the Pentagon looking into jam-proof GPS satellite technology, undetectable stealth satellites, and satellite defense mechanisms, China is rightly worried that its countermeasures may soon become highly ineffective. Until it can catch up to the United States in terms of spending and technology, all Beijing can do to slow down the Pentagon’s progress is to try to establish an international norm against using space for military purposes. It won’t have much success.

Several decades down the line, China will probably be able to match Washington in space; until then, it’ll do whatever it can to impede America’s ability to exploit space militarily.

Vow to cut subsidies fails to ignite enthusiasm. Last October, I wrote a strong endorsement of President Yudhoyono of Indonesia. I was optimistic that he would prove to be a strong and capable leader; in many ways this has turned out true. Up to this point, his performance has been very impressive, and I’ve supported reestablishing military ties with Jakarta. Unfortunately, it seems Yudhoyono has lost his way. His handling of the massive depreciation of the rupiah has been atrocious; his refusal to reduce the terribly costly fuel subsidies that contributed a great deal to the crisis is an appalling failure in leadership. It behooves him to rectify this situation immediately, lest the government or economy collapse. It would be tragedy for his record to be permanently marred by a simple error in judgement, when he has done so much good for the country in the past year.

As I have discussed before, one of the key trends in Asia is Japan’s gradual shift to a more assertive foreign policy paradigm. The reasons behind this transition are primarily geopolitical: the rise of China and India, along with the change from bipolar stability during the Cold War to anarchic competition today, have forced Japan to place greater emphasis on power politics and military deterrence. But the cultural opprobrium against force has also weakened, although it still remains an integral part of Japanese culture. Meanwhile, Junichiro Koizumi, Japan’s powerful Prime Minister, strongly supports a return to traditional geopolitical statecraft, which has greatly accelerated the trend.

This paradigm shift has manifested itself in a variety of ways, not least through the transformation of security policy. Although ignored by many observers, Japan’s military has long been among the world’s most technologically advanced and preeminent. While by design centered around defending Japanese territory, the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) are extremely well armed and very well trained. Spending upwards of $40 billion annually on defense, Japan has ensured that its forces are equipped with the finest equipment money can buy. Aside from the United States, in fact, Japan is Asia’s most capable conventional military power.

Nevertheless, the Japanese military has been restrained by law from engaging in many types of coercive actions. Under the Constitution, for instance, military action not of a purely defensive nature is outlawed. Defense cooperation between Japanese firms and international contractors is greatly restricted by other legal impediments. Until recently, Japanese forces required time-consuming and very high level authorization to even shoot down a missile approaching the islands.

This has begun to change. For the first time ever, Japan deployed troops into a warzone when it participated (in a non-combat role) in the rebuilding of Iraq. Japan has stepped up patrols along its disputed maritime border with China, and used its military forces in service of securing much needed energy resources. Japan’s ban on arms exports, meanwhile, has come under serious scrutiny.

Although Koizumi has kept the entire Japanese government on an austerity budget for the past three years, this year the military is planning on increasing spending to $44 billion.

The defense budget for the next year includes 150 billion yen for missile defenses, including a new three-billion-yen package for joint development with the United States of a sea-based system to intercept ballistic missiles.

The idea of developing a joint anti-missile system was initiated after North Korea fired a suspected ballistic missile over Japan and into the Pacific in 1998.

The anti-missile shield will consist of land-based Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) interceptor missiles and seaborne Standard Missile 3 (SM-3) interceptors.

The Defense Agency also plans to buy a helicopter carrier, a mine-sweeper and submarines for a total of 182 billion yen, the official said.

Additionally, it wants to acquire six F-2 fighters for 76 billion yen, 11 tanks for 8.9 billion yen and 20 helicopters, he added.

This should come as no surprise, and future increases in the military budget are to be expected. There have even been rumors that the United States is considering whether to authorize F/A-22 sales to Tokyo; the F/A-22 is the world’s most advanced air superiority fighter, and selling it to another government would be quite a statement. I personally doubt that Washington will do so anytime soon, but it underlines the dramatic shift in Japan’s security policy. The move to an offensively capable force will, it seems, come sooner rather than later for Tokyo.