The Washington Post reports that Lech Kaczynski, candidate of the Law and Justice Party (PiS), has won the Polish presidential election. Kaczynski’s victory follows another major win for his party in the Polish legislative elections, held just about one month ago. The PiS is now firmly in control of the Polish government, although, to smooth relations with coalition partner Civic Platform (PO), it has selected a moderate technocrat to serve as Prime Minister.
PO and PiS are both right-of-center parties, and their new predominance will lead to a meaningful rightward shift in Poland’s governing philosophy. Yet they embrace two very different visions of political philosophy. The PO is the party of classical liberalism; it advocates limited government intervention in both economic and social affairs, and is highly pro-EU. The PiS is the party of traditional conservatism; although it advocates some reduction in the scale of government intervention into the marketplace, it nevertheless strongly supports an active and interventionist social-welfare state; the PiS also endorses active government intervention in the social and religious affairs of the nation. In terms of foreign policy, the PiS is skeptical of the European Union and extremely pro-American.
As an individual, I’m reluctant to pass judgement on the policy preferences of Poland’s electorate. The Polish body politic is well-educated and the political system is transparent and free, so the election really is representative of what the Polish people want. As I’ve noted before, each state has its own system of political culture and traditions (one of the greatest strengths of the nation-state system, in fact), and each state has the right to pursue the political philosophy it finds most preferable. Poland is a very religious nation that has developed inclinations toward the social-market model; there’s nothing wrong with this. I’m by nature a moderate (European) liberal, and so the PO platform really appealed to me; I’m disappointed that the PO candidate, Donald Tusk, did not win. I think that Poland would’ve been better off under his leadership, but I certainly respect the Poles’ decision to choose Kaczynski.
From the perspective of the United States government, the election outcome at first glance appears to be quite positive. After all, the PiS is an extremely pro-American party. It has promised to work vigorously with Washington in coordinating its security policy, and will no doubt fully support the United States when the latter’s interests come into conflict with those of Russia. Having such a strong and aggressive regional ally would surely be immensely useful in advancing American objectives vis-a-vis Eastern Europe, right?
Well, not quite. While the election results sound nice on the surface, a Tusk victory would have better suited Washington’s agenda. This is for several reasons.
The primary reason is that the PiS economic plan is mediocre at best. Poland has been one of the greatest economic success stories of the past decade, achieving phenomenal economic growth by committing strongly to market-centric reform. This has left the Eastern European state in a better economic and fiscal position than many of its Western brethren. Yet the pace of reform has tapered off recently, and the government has essentially drifted on inertia. That wouldn’t be an intractable problem except for the fact that Poland is still in need of fundamental structural reform and modernization. Warsaw has come a long way, but it still has a ways to go. Unless and until the government enacts such reform, the economy will lag and eventually stagnate. Tusk and the PO promised, if not revolutionary reform, significant reform that was leading in the right direction. The PiS, despite its appointment of a moderate Prime Minister, supports only tepid reform. With the PiS now having a solid grip on the government, the social-market model will be strengthened and reform will be minimal. This is a significant worry for Washington because an economically troubled Poland will be a weaker and less reliable ally in the future. Washington would like to see the rise of a strong and prosperous Poland precisely because that’s the type of state that will best aid the United States in furthering its Eastern Europe agenda.
Furthermore, the level of support that the PiS will provide to Washington is exaggerated in a way. Poland’s strategic situation is the most compelling glue binding Warsaw and the United States together, not the leadership’s ideological bent. The outgoing center-left President, for instance, has been a strong supporter of the Polish-American bilateral relationship because Poland’s interests have demanded that. If Tusk had been elected, there’s no doubt in my mind that he would’ve been nearly as supportive of the American agenda as the PiS are now. In fact he might’ve made a more effective ally, since Kaczynski’s views on diplomacy are rather impolitic. Whereas Kaczynski has made opposition to Russia a public clarion call and will no doubt inflame regional tensions, Tusk would’ve taken a quieter and more low-key approach that would’ve smoothed over tensions and promoted constructive diplomacy.
Nevertheless, it is Kaczynski that we have now. He will certainly be a strong ally of the United States; the question is, will he and his party accept the necessity of continued reform in order to secure Polish prosperity and power? I encourage him to answer in the affirmative.
The United States stood alone with Israel in voting against a UNESCO resolution “intended to protect linguistic diversity and minority cultures from the negative impacts of globalization.” The 40-page document “affirmed the ’sovereign right’ of countries to protect and promote the diversity of cultural expressions on their territory and in international trade,” according to the IHT. I fully support Washington in its bid to kill the resolution, even if the opposition is just symbolic.
The United States has had a strained history with UNESCO, which was formed in 1945 in order to “contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice.” During the 1970s and 1980s especially, the United States (rightly) viewed UNESCO as being a tool for communist regimes and dictatorships to seek to supress the international freedom of the press. In protest, Washington withdrew from the organization in 1984 and was quickly followed in withdrawal by Singapore and the United Kingdom; the US only rejoined in 2003. Yet the organization is once again agitating against the global order.
This time, UNESCO has set its sights on culture and tradition. It contends that globalization has weakened national traditions and culture by allowing for the spread of commercialized (i.e. American) cultural imports; the goal of the resolution is to allow countries to restrict the importation of cultural products so as to maintain their own distinct culture. The notion that culture is under assault from globalization and restrictive measures are required to combat this “threat” is nonsense. Culture changes over time, true, and the globalized flow of ideas will no doubt influence this process. But this is to be encouraged. Countries will still maintain their own unique traditions and culture (the slow death of the nation-state is vastly exaggerated), and individuals will be exposed to all manners of new ideas and conventions that they may, in fact, prefer. Globalization serves to create a true marketplace of ideas, from which individuals and peoples can find the ideas and values that make the most sense to them. French culture is not in trouble because American commercial goods are corrupting the French people (and in fact isn’t really in trouble at all); French culture is changing precisely because the French people find cultural products elsewhere to be better in some respects. This search for optimality should be applauded, not abhored.
Fortunately enough, the resolution is symbolic and not effectively binding (which is to say that it won’t force major changes in the flow of cultural products); the complex system of rules and laws that govern international trade flows are independent of UNESCO’s control. Yet passage of this measure lends support and international legitimacy to the argument that restrictive cultural protectionism is a valid state policy, an idea that is antithetical to reason and to freedom. The United States should oppose this resolution–even if it must stand in isolatation–and in so doing make its own symbolic statement about the power and beneficence of globalization.
Ambassador Frank Lavin, who’s served as the US representative to Singapore for four years, recently criticized the island-state’s restrictions on freedom of speech, arguing that the country “will pay an increasing price for not allowing full participation of its citizens.” In and of itself, there’s nothing particularly alarming or newsworthy about this, because Lavin is leaving his post as ambassador. His remarks, moreover, were given during his “farewell dinner.” Both he and the Singaporean government clearly recognized what he was doing: ending his tenure as ambassador by reflecting upon his experiences and then politely suggesting to the government what he thought its leaders were best off doing into the future. He was not acting in an official capacity and his remarks did not announce a change in American policy toward Singapore.
What’s more concerning, however, is that his successor seems intent on making this criticism an official diplomatic issue.
Patricia Herbold, Mr Lavin’s successor, has suggested that the Bush administration might be preparing to take a tougher line on Singapore’s human rights record.
Ms Herbold, a lawyer and Republican fundraiser, told a US Senate hearing on her confirmation that she would continue a dialogue that Washington has with Singapore regarding the openness of its society and its political system.
US-Singapore relations have improved steadily since late 1980s, when Singapore accused the US of interfering in its internal affairs by alleging that the US embassy had secretly provided financial support to an opposition politician.
If Herbold does indeed “take a tougher line on Singapore’s human rights record,” it would be a costly diplomatic miscalculation for the United States: devoid of an upside, such a move would only risk retrenching US-Singapore relations.
Singapore is unique among states for having successfully developed a managed society. The government (and economy) is run by a bureaucracy of highly competent technocrats led by a small group of central figures. It is, for all intents and purposes, government by elite meritocracy; yet, despite the fact that the government is vested with a tremendous amount of power, Singapore is one of the least corrupt countries in the world. Due to a variety of factors, ranging from its Confucian culture to its compactness and homogeniety, Singapore has grown prosperous under this system of authoritarian governance; its economy is among the world’s most modern and sophisticated and its citizens are very well off.
Simply because the United States dislikes the illiberal flavor of Singapore’s government does not mean that Washington ought to pressure Singapore into becoming more American. The American system of liberal democracy works well for America, and the Singaporean system of authoritarianism works well for Singapore. Washington should respect that it does not hold a monopoly on legitimate political philosophy, and accept that other countries are better off under other systems of governance.
In this case, there’s absolutely no reason for the White House to pressure Singapore over the issue of the latter’s “human rights record.” Singaporeans prefer strict authoritarianism, and it’s their right to maintain it as they so choose. In any case, if change comes, it will come endogenously; the people of Singapore are exposed to all manners of foreign ideas, and will decide for themselves what they want. There’s already been, in fact, a loosening of the city-state’s famously harsh injunctions against such things as selling chewing gum (now legal for “dental” purposes) and gambling (the government has authorized the construction of a casino). More change will come in time, at the pace that Singapore desires. I trust Singapore, a modern and cosmopolitan nation-state, to be mature enough to make its own decisions over how it reacts (to borrow a Russian word) to public nyekulturny.
In any event, there’s a more practical reason why the United States should not press this issue. Singapore is fiercely protective of its sovereignty and independence, and will react harshly to any attempt by American officials to intervene in its domestic affairs. Washington needs Singapore as a strong ally to police the critical sealanes of Southeast Asia, mitigate the risk of war between Indonesia and Malaysia, and balance China’s growing power. There’s no need to introduce a strain on this key bilateral relationship when any such “gains” begotten by the new policy will only be Pyrrhic and illusory.
Fortunately enough, based on the actual statement the incoming-ambassador delivered, it seems as if the claim that Herbold intends to “take a tougher line on Singapore’s human rights record” is overstated. Of course the warning still stands, and Singapore is pretty sensitive about such matters, but the Bush administration seems to be deemphasizing the “human rights” aspect of relations. Since governments rarely blunder so badly, and since it seems likely that Herbold is perceptive enough not to really press Singapore over the matter, I’m fairly confident that this will be a nonissue. Nevertheless, the aforesaid argument had to be made.
To commemorate its 35th anniversary, noted international affairs magazine Foreign Policy brought together a diverse group of 16 public intellectuals to “to speculate on the ideas, values, and institutions the world takes for granted that may disappear in the next 35 years.” Each thinker selected one and then expounded on why their choice would in fact fade away in a short essay.
Princeton ethicist Peter Singer authors the lead essay, contending that “during the next 35 years, the traditional view of the sanctity of human life will collapse under pressure from scientific, technological, and demographic developments.” Singer is prominent in his field, and is acknowledged as one of the leading scholars in the area of animal rights. He has gained public visibility by staking out a radical view of animal rights (basically that they should enjoy complete protections) and other issues in bioethics. Based on my previous encounters with his work, I fully expected to him to make the case that the human being was going to lose its place as anything special in nature; needless to say, I greatly disagree with this sentiment.
After reading Singer’s piece, however, I was suitably impressed. His view was well-reasoned and surprisingly moderated; in fact, I must say that I mostly agree with the professor. It does seem likely that, as Singer suggests, we’re moving toward sanctity of personhood rather than sanctity of life.
When the traditional ethic of the sanctity of human life is proven indefensible at both the beginning and end of life, a new ethic will replace it. It will recognize that the concept of a person is distinct from that of a member of the species Homo sapiens, and that it is personhood, not species membership, that is most significant in determining when it is wrong to end a life. We will understand that even if the life of a human organism begins at conception, the life of a person�that is, at a minimum, a being with some level of self-awareness�does not begin so early.
Nevertheless, I have a major quibble with Singer: I think he underestimates the strength of religion in the United States. His vision is indeed grounded in science, and is thus the place that our ethics are ultimately evolving toward. Yet opposition, as he acknowledges, is strong among religious conservatives; religious ideals are strongly rooted in American culture and remain tremendously influential. While Europe will have no difficulty adopting a person-centric view of rights, the idea will face powerful opposition in the United States.
In the developing world, moreover, religious sentiment is often even stronger. So, though Singer’s view in this particular case will be vindicated in Europe and ultimately perhaps everywhere, it’s unlikely to gain world-wide (or American) acceptance within 35 years.
The next essay is a prediction of the demise of political parties by former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso. This was, for sure, one of the least persuasive essays. Cardoso spoke in sweeping generalities that are far from universally applicable; he also made no mention of the impact of different political cultures and structures in different countries. His view is, frankly, completely unjustifiable and without any deep support or evidence.
Christopher Hitchens follows that up with a piece on why there’s a good chance that the Euro will collapse. As usual, the essay is well-written and literary; in this case, however, that hurts the strength of Hitchens’ argument. The case that the Euro will collapse is certainly there; the EU has proven to be a tenuous and politically weak institution in that it’s dominated by member-states and their parochial concerns. A divergence between the European economies that the EU is unable to bridge may very well lay the groundwork for a collapse, as the concept of the unified currency is predicated on the idea that Europe really is one economy. Hitchens, however, spends a bit too much time on the literary and cultural flourish, and ends up putting style over substance. In the end, I’d say that the Euro has an even chance of going either way, depending on whether the Europeans can get their act together in time.
After Hitchens comes Shintaro Ishihara, governor of Tokyo and a Japanese nationalist. He predicts that Japan will become a strong and interventionist Asian power. The general concept underlying this thinking–that the great power competition in Asia will compel Tokyo to adopt a security posture grounded in realism–has been discussed before on this blog, and I remain supportive of the theory. The movement toward a more traditional foreign policy, in fact, has already gained widespread acceptance among the elite, as expressed by the serious bipartisan effort to amend Japan’s constitution and remove its mandate of pacifism.
That said, Ishihara advances a radical and extremely nationalistic position that strains credulity; it’s as if he’s writing a propaganda article rather than an analytical opinion piece. While I grant that Japan has historically been quite militaristic in its relations with other states, Japan’s post-war social transformation greatly weakened that impulse. In terms of both logic and empiricism, it seems highly unlikely that the island-state is about to experience a resurgence in militarism.
It clings to a hopelessly idealistic and historically illegitimate constitution handed down by U.S. occupation forces nearly 60 years ago to block Japan�s reemergence as a military power. Japan now entrusts its survival to the United States, has forsaken independent thinking, and has become spineless.
“Illegitimate constitution” and “spineless” are hardly the words of analysis; they are the words of propaganda, which in this case misconstrues history to advance the author’s point. Japan’s constitution was not illegitimate; it was imposed from outside, but was accepted fully by the Japanese people. It has become the fixture of Japanese politics and the Japanese accept it as the binding law of the land. This is the definition of legitimacy, and there’s no way to deny that the post-war constitution is now the legitimate foundation of Japanese civil society. And yes, after fighting the Japanese over control of the Pacific in a total all out war, the United States didn’t wish to see its nemesis rearm and resume the fight in the future. What’s the author’s point?
The idea that Japan is dependent on the United States for its survival and has become a “spineless” client state is simply wrong. The Japanese don’t have a nuclear deterrent, true, but they retain the ability to quickly construct one if necessary; and by not maintaining nuclear weapons, the Japanese have eased tensions in the rest of East Asia, heretofore helping to keep the strategic environment stable. The author avoids mentioning, moreover, that the Japanese military (strongly defensive in posture) is among the world’s most well funded and most effective. The Japanese can guarantee their survival well enough on their own. And Tokyo has a strong security relationship with the United States because that’s in the interests of Japan, not because Japan is subservient to Washington.
I wonder how the United States will interpret its security treaty with Japan if our nation decides to confront China, perhaps even militarily, in the dispute over the Senkaku Islands, a part of Okinawa with potentially valuable seabed resources.
If Japan consciously decides to engage China militarily over that dispute, then I would surely hope that Washington would refuse to come to Tokyo’s aid, for such a decision would be among the most ill-advised and disastrous Japan could make. Such a Japan would not be an ally that the United States should remain partnered to. Fortunately enough, the chances of Tokyo making such a decision are quite slim, despite the author’s professed belief otherwise.
Ishihara’s essay is a propaganda piece, pure and simple. His reasoning is flawed and the course he advocates would lead Japan to ruin. While the general theory that Japan is becoming more assertive in its relations with foreign powers is right on target, the author’s interpretation is, I contend, deranged and irresponsible.
After Isihara is a bizarre and confused article predicting the end of monogamy. From what I can gather, the author thinks that societies around the world are going to embrace free-love and having simultaneous recognized relationships. Needless to say, I find the argument rather… unpersuasive, although readers are invited to judge for themselves.
Following that is an absolutely brilliant essay by Harvard professor Harvey Cox, arguing that religious hierarchy is in serious trouble and likely to collapse. I fully agree with Professor Cox, and can do no better than to quote him at length.
In this environment, religious hierarchy is crumbling fast. The notions of consumer choice and local control have stormed the religious realm, and decentralization of faith is now the order of the day. Religious leaders who once could command, instruct, and expel now must cajole, persuade, and compete. […]
Grappling with choice contributes to a religious maturity unavailable to someone who simply accepts what is passed down from above, and for that reason it could actually strengthen the capacity of the religious to cope with the challenge of secularism. Of course, the lack of recognized authority could also lead to fragmentation. But even that has an upside. Pentecostalism, for example, has no hierarchy, but its divisions and rivalries have generated an entrepreneurial energy that has made it the fastest growing Christian movement in the world. They have proven that sometimes religion without hierarchy can endure, and even thrive.
Minxin Pei follows with why he thinks the Chinese Communist Party will disappear, and I generally agree. China is definitely going to shift away from dictatorship and toward more democratic institutions. My one caveat would be that the Party may very well survive, but in name only; meaning that, for all intents and purposes, the old Party would be dead. Lord John Browne on why the cars of the future will hardly emit anything dangerous is decent enough, I suppose, but it seemed fairly bland compared to rest of the articles; surely he could’ve gone into a little more depth on this obviously important issue, as he has done in print before. Same with Professor Lawrence Lessig’s argument that the public domain will disappear, which was unnecessarily alarmist and short-sighted. Among the rest of the predictions, there are only two I find of interest.
Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding father, discusses the increasing importance of demography. In his view, “it will gradually dawn on governments that immigration alone cannot solve their demographic troubles and that much more active government involvement in encouraging or discouraging procreation may be necessary.” Lee, now retired from government, is unusually perceptive and honest among former politicians, and his views always deserve consideration. In this case, I think he’s right to point out the important position that demography will occupy in the future; I think he’s also right to say that governments will take a more active role in trying to shape demography. Nevertheless, he puts too great of an emphasis on government authority. In Asia it’s true that governments will naturally play a major role in regulating procreation; indeed, they do so already. Yet political culture in the Western world is different, and I suspect that Western governments will play less of a role in fertility decisions than Lee imagines.
Finally, international relations scholar Richard Haass contends that sovereignty will be weakened during the next 35 years. He makes some important points.
Nation-states will not disappear, but they will share power with a larger number of powerful non-sovereign actors than ever before, including corporations, nongovernmental organizations, terrorist groups, drug cartels, regional and global institutions, and banks and private equity funds. Sovereignty will fall victim to the powerful and accelerating flow of people, ideas, greenhouse gases, goods, dollars, drugs, viruses, e-mails, and weapons within and across borders. All of this traffic challenges one of the fundamentals of sovereignty: the ability to control what crosses borders. Sovereign states will increasingly measure their vulnerability not to one another but to forces of globalization beyond their control. […]
States will also willingly choose to shed some of their sovereignty. This trend is well under way, most clearly in the trade realm. Governments agree to accept the rulings of the World Trade Organization because, on balance, they benefit from a rules-based international trading order, even if a particular ruling impinges on their right to protect national industries. Global climate change is also prompting limits on sovereignty. The Kyoto Protocol, which runs through 2012, requires signatories to cap greenhouse gas emissions. One can imagine an even more ambitious accord in which a larger number of governments, including the United States, China, and India, would accept stricter limits based on a recognition that they would be worse off if no country accepted such restraints.
Nevertheless, I must sound a cautionary note. Speculations on the demise of sovereignty have been proffered before, and yet the system has remained remarkably resilient. One must only look to the troubles facing the European Union to see that sovereignty continues to be at the core of the international system. So while the flows and exchanges he mentions, along with the growing importance of supranational institutions, will contribute to a weakening of sovereignty, sovereignty will by no means disappear. In terms of security, foreign policy, and power, especially, sovereignty will remain alive and well.
President Bush met with Maltese leader Lawrence Gonzi recently to discuss security and economic concerns; in particular, they focused on Malta’s potential accession to the Proliferation Security Initiative and relations with Libya. Malta is the eighth largest ship registry in the world, and is not currently a signatory to the PSI; it thus presents a terrorism and nuclear proliferation risk. In order to ensure that Maltese flagged ships are not exploited to smuggle nuclear weapons or technology, Washington has rightly made it a priority to bring Malta into the PSI.
Mr Gonzi told the FT he had no objection in principle to Malta joining PSI but had to consider whether there would be economic repercussions on an important part of its financial services sector.
“We will see how to work it out,” he said, noting that the US is a major provider of help and technical equipment to check containers at Malta’s Freeport, notching up success so far in confiscating counterfeit branded goods but not weapons-related items.
With a history of successful maritime security cooperation with the United States, Malta should have no difficulty adhering to the terms of the PSI. Any impacts on the financial services sector would be mild, no doubt, and if necessary Washington should provide additional incentives in order to secure Malta’s cooperation. The PSI is an important and effective multilateral regime, and the United States ought to expand its membership as broadly as possible, especially as a step toward institutionalizing maritime counterproliferation norms.
As for the discussions over Libya, I encourage the United States to embrace Malta as an interface to the newly opened country.
Malta is now trying to position itself as a “platform” for US energy companies breaking into the Libyan market.
Malta has fostered close commercial ties with Libya and was its main point of access by ferry to the outside world during the period of international sanctions imposed on Libya for its role in the 1988 Lockerbie bombing. Malta was also infiltrated by the Libyan agents who carried out the bombing of the Pan Am flight over Scotland.
Having worked closely with the regime in Tripoli for more than a decade, the Maltese have surely gained the trust of the Libyans and knowledge of how to operate successfully in the North African state. American energy companies would benefit from their expertise and connections. More importantly, however, routing new lucrative trade linkages through Malta would serve to strengthen US-Maltese relations. That, in turn, would further help to anchor transatlantic relations; Washington can use all of the support in Europe that it can get, and Malta offers an excellent opportunity to ingrain that support through economic linkages.
10/10 Update: Qaddafi continues to signal that Libya is eager to further normalize and strengthen relations with the United States. I again urge the administration to do so; directing some or most of the new trade flows through Malta would serve the purpose of strengthening transatlantic ties at the same time. This is not to say that Washington should immediately accede to all of Libya’s requests, of course. Withholding part of what Tripoli wants will keep its feet to fire (thus forcing the Libyans to continue to carry out favorable policies and reforms), while at the same time retaining future diplomatic leverage.