It is interesting to note that Russian foreign policy has once again fallen prey to internal factionizalization.

Russia’s conduct in the dispute resembles the chaotic foreign policy style of the era of former President Boris Yeltsin. In that period, we also never quite knew who was in charge in Moscow; senior officials often freelanced in public and ministries were at loggerheads. Russia seemed incapable of implementing consistent policies. And at times during Yeltsin’s presidency, foreign policy became hostage to domestic political disputes.

Putin’s first term marked a significant departure from this sort of behavior. During his first few years in office, Putin centralized, streamlined and coordinated foreign policy decision-making to an extent unprecedented in post-Soviet Russia. He asserted direct executive control over the policy-making process and oversight authority over policy implementation. The days of government ministries conducting their own foreign policy were over. Foreign policy was no longer used as a weapon in domestic political battles. The president was now clearly the final arbiter in matters of international significance.

The new trend reflected Putin’s general strengthening of the executive branch’s authority in Russian politics. By emasculating the once-mighty regional governors and asserting control over both houses of parliament, he eliminated the challenges to the executive’s authority faced by Yeltsin. He also cleaned house within executive structures over the course of his first term, installing loyalists in top posts and limiting the extent to which big business could buy policies and officials. For the most part, there was a team approach on major foreign policy issues.

It appears that the Yukos affair marked a turning point in this process. The political friction caused by the event — and, more importantly, the competition over the massive economic resources that were up for grabs — precipitated the factionalization of the Putin executive branch. As Putin’s second term got under way, it became more and more clear that infighting between individuals and “clans” within the government was intensifying. It appeared as if gang wars between groups dubbed “siloviki,” “St. Petersburg lawyers” and “liberals” were simmering inside the Kremlin walls.

Much of what passes for political conflict in Russia now occurs within the executive branch. While the parliament is now little more than a rubber-stamp, it is disputes between Kremlin factions — especially the siloviki, led by presidential deputy chief of staff Igor Sechin and Putin aide Viktor Ivanov, and the St. Petersburg lawyers, led by First Deputy Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev and Miller — that determine major policy outcomes. A particularly glaring example was the failed merger of Gazprom with Rosneft. As a result of this factionalization, the strong Putin executive branch is no more. Although the external threats to its dominance, such as the parliament and the regions, are still largely powerless, the executive has been compromised from within by internecine conflict.

Charap has identified an important trend in Russian foreign policy that will severely frustrate President Putin’s ability to advance his future geopolitical agenda. This factionalization has become apparent in a dispute involving Finance Minister Alexey Kudrin. Kudrin had intended to go and attend the upcoming meeting of global elites at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in order to negotiate and finalize details relating to the important ministerial-level meetings Russia will be hosting this year as head of the G-8. As Kommersant noted, high level meetings like the ones that were planned will be essential to successfully organizing the ministerial conferences. The fact that Kudrin will be unable to go will greatly complicate this, to Russia’s disadvantage (especially since Moscow has made it a goal to finally accede to the G-8 as a full member). And why was he denied permission? Because, it seems, Prime Minister Fradkov wishes to flex his bureaucratic muscles and demonstrate his authority.

This is a prime example of how internal political struggle and factionalization can seriously affect the conduct of foreign relations. The future will surely bring more examples of this, perhaps in more consequential spheres. In order for Putin to realize his geopolitical ambitions under a unified strategic posture, he’ll have to regain control over the government bureaucracy. With a culture of adversity and corruption firmly rooted in the Russian government, that may no longer be possible.